Quote (don't screenshot this one):
Right now, we are still in the process of setting up more servers and VPS's to support the Tor network, but we already have several online. An imperative aspect of Tor to consider is that compared to clearnet operations we actually operate on a network inside a network (inside "the internet") and therefore high traffic services can be profiled simply by ranking their traffic volume and comparing that against known IPs of the Tor network. Backopy recently stated that hidden services are no place for a single high volume service and he was right - but I believe that rather than give in to this threat and pass the baton that Silk Road should rise to the challenge and proactively counter what threat it poses given the resources we have available. Adding relays and exit nodes to the Tor network is a mathematically provable method to make traffic analysis exponentially more difficult for adversaries and it not only protects Silk Road users and servers, but everyone who uses Tor. Simply put, by increasing the "noise" of the network, it is more difficult to pick out individual services and users just like by increasing the size of a crowd makes it more difficult to pick out individual voices.
I feel a more explained and technical version was in order, and to keep my tone a bit more professional. In private forums like this, although I am not as bad here (compared to mod/admin forums since you're all reporters), I still get a little too lax on keeping a certain tone across statements and really I don't believe what I said above was media friendly or too helpful in clarifying my actions to the average user.
