

EXHIBIT 6

-June of 2011, HSI Chicago started monitoring unusual drugs seizures from the Mail Branch related to the Silk Road

-On October 12, 2011, HSI Baltimore reported in ROI 13 in general case number BA08NR11BA0004 that in September of 2011 an informant told them that the Silk Road existed and they sold drugs there. No further reports were filed or subsequent cases opened on the website.

-On October 13, 2011, HSI Chicago opened case Operation Dime Store to document the findings of the seizures coming into the mail branch.

-On October 18, 2011, HSI Chicago documented the first Silk Road website lookout in TECS under number X8000659400COH.

-On December 8, 2011, HSI Headquarters prepared HSIR ID# ICE-HQINT-00431-12 titled Digital Currency Bitcoin and the Underground Website Silk Road. In that report they list 6 HSI investigations that had mentioned the Silk Road, including HSI Chicago and HSI Baltimore. HSI Chicago's investigation was shown as actively working the website and multiple vendors. HSI Baltimore's summary was that of only having one report from a CI mentioning the Silk Road existed. The other 4 HSI cases had only mentioned the website from interviews conducted.

-On January 03, 2012, HSI Baltimore SA Gregory Miller opened investigation BA13CR12BA0016 and stated in ROI 001 that on December 29, 2011, their CI began telling them some details about the Silk Road website.

-On January 13, 2012, HSI Baltimore GS Veronica Ryan requested a phone call about HSI Chicago's Silk Road case.

-GS Ryan expressed interest in our investigation and wanted to meet with HSI Chicago to learn about the investigation.

-By January 13, 2012, HSI Chicago had over 19 reports, 200 seizures, identified multiple vendors/targets, coordinated POE's and case information with multiple HSI attaché offices, signed up a CI and had met with the AUSA's office to prosecute the case.

-On February 01, 2012, HSI Baltimore flew into Chicago for a meeting. In attendance from Baltimore was AUSA Justin Herring, GS Veronica Ryan, Case Agent Gregory Miller, Co-Case Agent Michael T. McFarland, Co-Case Agent Melinda LeCompte and/or Intelligence analyst Lisa Noel. From Chicago was GS Tom Sebens, Case Agent Jared Der-Yeghiayan and SA Dave Jackson and partly there was AUSA Marc Krickbaum.

-During the meeting HSI Baltimore requested to split up our investigation so that they could work a section of it. They requested to work all the administrators and organizers and suggested HSI Chicago only works the drugs and overseas vendors. HSI Chicago strongly disagreed and stated that they were fully advance in the case and did not see any advantage to give up any aspect of their investigation which included the administrators and organizers. HSI

Baltimore had all 19 of HSI Chicago's ROI's printed out and commented how useful all their reports have been to them.

-HSI Baltimore then revealed that their informant that told them about the Silk Road in September was just arrested on or around January 17, 2012 for something unrelated and admitted to them then that he was actually a Silk Road vendor. He provided HSI Baltimore with access to his Silk Road account and HSI Baltimore suggested they would take down the site within a week or two with that information. HSI Chicago disagreed that could be done and disagreed with the strategy they intended to take and stated they were working all aspects of the investigation and wanted to send a message with case. HSI Baltimore stated that they would proceed by conducting multiple drug reversal deliveries across the United States. HSI Chicago asked if they were working with DEA in order to accomplish that and they responded they were not and they had the full authority to perform those reversals without the DEA. The meeting ended with HSI Baltimore stating that they intended on shutting down the website soon and weren't concerned with HSI Chicago's strategy but they would coordinate once they take the website down.

-In early March 2012, HSI Baltimore Case agent Gregory Miller contacted HSI Chicago Case Agent Jared Der-Yeghiayan to inform him that their case was likely to be shut down by their ASAC after he found out they were attempting multiple Domestic CD's without DEA participation. SA Miller stated their case had nowhere else to go from there.

-In late March 2012, HSI SA Miller informed HSI SA Der-Yeghiayan that he had been pulled from the investigation and GS Ryan had reassigned the investigation to SA McFarland because they needed to transform their case by using a certified undercover agent.

-On March 27, 2012, SA McFarland opened case BA02CR12BA0026 and started by sending multiple collaterals to other offices to conduct surveillance on multiple targets associated to the account they took over from their once informant. SA McFarland also created an unofficial task force comprised of multiple agencies to include DEA, Postal Inspectors, IRS and Secret Service.

-In April of 2012, HSI Chicago developed a new informant and informed HSI Baltimore of development. HSI Baltimore requested access directly to the informant but wouldn't tell HSI Chicago why they wanted the access or what they wanted to ask the CI. HSI Chicago offered to take any questions and directly ask the CI the questions for them, but they would not allow access to the CI without knowing any topic of questions. HSI Baltimore expressed anger over not being allowed direct access to the CI.

-In May of 2012, HSI SA McFarland called and requested the assistance of HSI Chicago to stop 2 outgoing parcels containing drugs from surveillance they conducted on a target. HSI Chicago located one of the two parcels and seized the drugs and then forwarded them to HSI Baltimore.

-In July of 2012, HSI Chicago developed a target (hereinafter referred to as "Target A") they associated to the creation of the Silk Road website.

On July 06, 2012, HSI Chicago inputted a TECS record on Target A.

-On July 9, 2012, SA McFarland wanted to send out a draft for HSI Headquarters notifying all HSI offices that he is the POC for all Domestic Silk Road related investigations and that HSI Chicago will be the POC for all international related investigations. HSI Chicago rewrote HSI Baltimore's Draft to state that they were

-On July 17, 2012, HSI Baltimore sent a collateral request to C3 for assistance in their Silk Road investigation to include funding and assistance coordinating all cases on the Silk Road.

-In late July, 2012, C3 contact SA Der-Yeghiayan and asked to brief them about the HSI Chicago case. After the briefing C3 stated to SA Der-Yeghiayan they were confused because HSI Baltimore visited C3 and pitched their case as the only Silk Road investigation HSI has and wanted to be a part of their undercover OP and wanted their support. C3 then queried TECS and found out that HSI Chicago had a much longer and what appeared to be diverse investigation on the Silk Road. C3 was also briefed on Target A.

-On August 01, 2012, C3 requested that HSI Chicago travels to C3 to pitch their case and to gauge what assistance they could provide.

-On August 03, 2012, C3 informed SA Der-Yeghiayan that they believed HSI Baltimore wanted funding to travel to the foreign country to interview Target A. HSI SA Der-Yeghiayan sent an email to SA Miller and SA McFarland notifying them that Target A was more involved in the Silk Road and was a target of their investigation, and asked in the email not to share the information with the rest of their unofficial Task Force.

-On August 03, 2012, SA Miller acknowledged the email.

-On August 06, 2012, SA McFarland acknowledged the email.

-On August 09, 2012, HSI Baltimore created an unlinked to HSI Chicago's TECS record on the Silk Road.

-On August 10, 2012, HSI Chicago met with C3 and presented their case. During that meeting C3 informed HSI Chicago that HSI Baltimore was being dropped from their CUC program because of improper use of CUC provided equipment.

-On August 23, 2012, HSI Chicago was called to a meeting at C3 to meet with HSI Baltimore and each present their cases to both SACs Operations Managers (Debra Note for Chicago). HSI Baltimore and HSI Chicago presented each of their cases. At the end of the presentations both HSI Baltimore and HSI Chicago's Operations Managers were discussing the confusion and odd approach to the HSI Baltimore's investigation and asked HSI Chicago if their investigative methods are interfering with HSI Chicago's case. HSI Chicago expressed deep concern for HSI Baltimore's tactics and the lack of focus in their investigation. HSI Chicago provided Debra Note a complete list of concerns and only received a response the same day to thank HSI Chicago for the email.

-On September 18, 2012, HSI Chicago received a report from OCDETF on Target A that showed that DEA Baltimore had a record in NADDIS on Target A that mirrored exactly HSI Chicago's TECS record. SA Der-Yeghiayan contacted SA McFarland and asked if he had shared the TECS record with their DEA Agent and the rest of their task force and he said he did. SA Der-Yeghiayan asked why he shared it when he explicitly asked Mike not to and his response was it was his task force so he had to share it. SA Der-Yeghiayan expressed serious concern over how any information that all these agencies would acquire on the target be relayed back to HSI Chicago and Mike stated verbally that he would share anything he learned on the target.

-On September 19, 2012, HSI Chicago received an email from HSI Baltimore CUC Program Manager Steven Snyder stating that HSI Baltimore was attempting to be under HSI Baltimore's CUC program but during his routine searches in TECS he noticed the HSI investigation and saw HSI Chicago was also under a CUC program and had the same targets, but had them in the system first. The program manager also called HSI SA Der-Yeghiayan and stated that he was not going to approve HSI Baltimore's request because it was clear to him that they were copying the HSI Chicago's case, and that there could only be one CUC program over the target website. A few weeks later HSI Chicago found out that HSI Baltimore's case was approved under their CUC OP.

-In October of 2012, SA McFarland began asking SA Der-Yeghiayan for all his information on Target A because they were trying to work him too. SA Der-Yeghiayan informed SA McFarland to not work Target A independent of HSI Chicago.

-HSI Chicago later discovered that HSI Baltimore had disseminated Target A to all members of their task force and they had issued multiple subpoenas on the target, and actively worked him to include a type of surveillance without the knowledge of HSI Chicago.

-In early October of 2012, HSI Chicago began developing a method to identify the main administrator of the website by analyzing thousands of pages of text on various websites to make a match. In early November of 2012, HSI Baltimore offered to provide UC Chat information with the administrator to help HSI Chicago with their development. HSI Chicago later identified a target (hereinafter referred to as "Target B") and began issuing subpoenas to further the identification and location of Target B. HSI Chicago informed Baltimore and shared the subpoena information with HSI Baltimore. HSI Baltimore began issuing duplicate subpoenas on the side for Target B without HSI Chicago's knowledge.

-On November 14, 2012, HSI Chicago sent a collateral request to HSI Vancouver for assistance with Target B.

-In December of 2012, SA McFarland continued to request information on Target A and Target B from SA Der-Yeghiayan.

-In January of 2013, HSI Chicago began pursuing Target A for charges of acting as an unlicensed money service business (18 USC 1960). Over several months HSI Chicago conducted several movements of money in a UC capacity in anticipation of charging Target A with 1960 violations.

-In late April 2013, HSI Chicago notified HSI Baltimore that they had secured the necessary charges needed to pursue Target A with 1960 charges. HSI Baltimore stated that they had looked heavily on their own into Target A and don't believe that Target A is involved in the website no longer. HSI Baltimore shared a few of their subpoena returns they received in early May.

-On May 10, 2013, HSI Baltimore notified HSI Chicago that the SS agent in their Task Force went "rogue" and seized the bank account in the U.S. containing 2 million dollars from Target A. HSI Baltimore claimed to have no knowledge of the seizure until after it occurred. HSI Baltimore also admitted that they told the SS agent of the connections HSI Chicago made to the Silk Road back in August of 2012. HSI Baltimore stated that the SS agent went to a totally different AUSA in their District to file the affidavit to seize the account. HSI Baltimore stated that the AUSA was not planning on charging Target A with 1960 violations.

-On May 13, 2013, HSI Baltimore called HSI Chicago and stated that they had complained enough to the SS about the way the agent went behind their back that the SS agreed to give HSI the other account containing 3 million USD belonging to Target A. HSI Baltimore proceeded to ask HSI Chicago if they could provide any other bank accounts belonging to Target A so they could seize those accounts too. HSI Baltimore proceeded to seize the 3 million USD using the same affidavit written by the SS agent except SA McFarland substituted his name and knowing that HSI Chicago built their pending charges on those seizures.

-On May 17, 2013, a conference call occurred between SA Der-Yeghiayan, Chicago AUSA Krickbaum, Baltimore's AUSA Herring, the seizing Baltimore AUSA Richard Kay, and SA McFarland.

-During the call AUSA Kay stated that they were trying to work on an interview with Target A with Target A's attorneys. AUSA Krickbaum asked what the purpose of the interviews was and AUSA Kay stated that they wanted to know more about Target A's money business and wanted to ask him directly about his knowledge of the Silk Road. HSI Chicago expressed serious concern over that approach and was concerned as to AUSA Kay using HSI Chicago's information developed on Target A for their own use. The outcome of the conversation resulted in AUSA Kay

stating that he would hold off for several months and “wag the dog” with Target A’s attorneys while HSI Chicago prepares their indictment. AUSA Kay agreed to check in with AUSA Krickbaum about the progress in the indictment.

-On June 19, 2013, During a joint SW conducted by HSI Chicago and HSI Baltimore based on a new target developed by HSI Chicago. SA McFarland spoke with SA Der-Yeghiayan about the Target A and SA McFarland stated that he had complete control over AUSA Kay and he was the one to decide whether or not Target A would be interviewed. SA McFarland stated that he would honor SA Der-Yeghiayan’s request to not pursue or interview Target A.

-On July 08, 2013, according to AUSA Herring, he was notified by AUSA Kay that a face to face meeting was going to take place between him and Target A’s attorneys. AUSA Kay or AUSA Herring did not notify HSI Chicago or AUSA Krickbaum.

-On July 09, 2013, during a conference call with AUSA Herring, SA Der-Yeghiayan, HSI Chicago GS Phil Osborn, and HSI Chicago SA Sixto Luciano, SA Der-Yeghiayan specifically asked AUSA Herring if there were any developments with Target A and AUSA Kay, specifically if there were any more talks about meetings, and AUSA Herring said there was not.

-On July 11, 2013, AUSA Kay met in person with Target A’s attorneys. According to AUSA Herring, during the meeting Target A’s attorney’s randomly brought up the Silk Road and stated that their client was willing to tell them who Target A suspects is currently running the website in order to relieve their client of any potential charges for 1960. AUSA Kay proceeds to set up a meeting with Target A overseas.

-Later in the evening of July 11, 2013, in preparation for a coordination meeting on July 12, 2013 at SOD, GS Osborn and SA Der-Yeghiayan met with AUSA Herring and SA McFarland for a coffee. No mention of the meeting with Target A was mentioned by AUSA Herring or SA McFarland.

-On July 12, 2013, during a coordination meeting with HSI Chicago, HSI Baltimore, FBI New York and multiple DOJ attorneys and CCSIP attorneys, HSI Chicago briefed their case and mentioned Target A as their main target. The CCSIP attorney over the meeting asked if any other office had any case on Target A, and all the Baltimore attendees (SA McFarland, SA LeCompte, AUSA Herring and AUSA Herring’s Supervisor, the SS agent that went “rogue”) all remained silent. The CCISP attorney stated that since the information HSI Chicago shared was brought in good faith that no other office should attempt to pursue that target outside of HSI Chicago.

On July 16, 2013, AUSA Herring notified AUSA Krickbaum and SA Der-Yeghiayan about the meeting AUSA Kay had with Target A’s attorneys. SA Der-Yeghiayan told both AUSA Krickbaum and AUSA Herring that he did not want them to pursue the target or to continue with this meeting. It was expressed that this would damage HSI Chicago’s investigation.

-On July 22, 2013, HSI SA Der-Yeghiayan spoke with AUSA Herring who informed him that AUSA Kay has continued to negotiate with Target A’s attorneys and has changed the meeting location to Guam on later on in August. HSI Der-Yeghiayan continued to express deep concern over this meeting and its

effect on HSI Chicago's investigation against Target A. AUSA Herring did not appear concerned or willing to stop the meeting from occurring.