Ok, one more time, obviously my last post was a bit weighty...The quotations you've cited are stated GOALS for the Tor Project- I have already shown evidence of where information is retained on a hard drive after closing the browser - you might have to use the scroll button to use these.If as an alternative to encrypting your drives you use a liveCD such as TAILS to browse the web (although this was not what you were advocating originally - still hats off to you for struggling to hang in there!), this might protect you from keyloggers but you'd be just as vulnerable to a cold boot attack if your entire OS was loaded into RAM, so by your own logic this wouldn't do much good!Having said this, it does admittedly have the advantage and disadvantage of not allowing you to record anything permanently on your hard drive - I say disadvantage as this means you would have to trust a third party with your Bitcoin wallet, bookmarks and indeed your Private Keys, let's see how that worked out for Hushmail users:http://cryptogon.com/?p=16002Or as I said (sixth time now!) you can generate your own key pair offline and safely store your private key on an encrypted drive on your machine.Is there anyone else here who does this i.e keeps their private key on a cloud somewhere as opposed to keeping it safely encrypted on their machine? I'm genuinely curious.V.Quote from: registration on May 20, 2012, 12:24 pmLibert and TAILS both allow persistence. Which I still advice against even if it's encrypted. If there's nothing saved there is nothing to be found. Find me a source where it says that having Tor Browser installed on your computer leaves traces on your OS after closure of the program (again, if nothing is saved that is). Do not state the obvious again and tell me what will be written where after i close my TOR browser from the Browser Bundle.QuoteApplication Data IsolationThe components involved in providing private browsing MUST be self-contained, or MUST provide a mechanism for rapid, complete removal of all evidence of the use of the mode. In other words, the browser MUST NOT write or cause the operating system to write any information about the use of private browsing to disk outside of the application's control. The user must be able to ensure that secure deletion of the software is sufficient to remove evidence of the use of the software. All exceptions and shortcomings due to operating system behavior MUST be wiped by an uninstaller. However, due to permissions issues with access to swap, implementations MAY choose to leave it out of scope, and/or leave it to the Operating System/platform to implement ephemeral-keyed encrypted swap. QuoteImplementation Status:  For now, Tor Browser blocks write access to the disk through Torbutton using several Firefox preferences. The set of prefs is: dom.storage.enabled, browser.cache.memory.enable, network.http.use-cache, browser.cache.disk.enable, browser.cache.offline.enable, general.open_location.last_url, places.history.enabled, browser.formfill.enable, signon.rememberSignons, browser.download.manager.retention, and network.cookie.lifetimePolicy. Quotemplementation Status: As a stopgap to satisfy our design requirement of unlinkability, we currently entirely disable 3rd party cookies by setting network.cookie.cookieBehavior to 1. We would prefer that third party content continue to function, but we believe the requirement for unlinkability trumps that desire. This is what i got from the link you posted earlier.