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Discussion => Security => Topic started by: pine on August 13, 2012, 06:52 am
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For any curious SR users:
It is traditional on SRF to place the [intel] tag in front of the subject line when submitting sources of documentation/news to the forum. Sources should be high quality and ideally primary sources. Since there is a diverse set of possible topic areas, if you want to get a sense of what is appropriate intelligence then search the forum using the [intel] tag.
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Source:
Title: Global Drug Enforcement - Practical Investigative Techniques
Author: Lee, Gregory D
Publisher : CRC Press
ISBN10 | ASIN : 0203488989
ISBN13 : 9780203613078
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Definition of Undercover
The use of undercover agents is a time-tested investigative technique where disguises and pretexts are used to gain the confidence of known or suspected criminals in order to undermine their illegal activities. Working undercover in a drug investigation does not mean that the drug agent will be living and working with drug dealers full-time. To the contrary, undercover drug agents should strive to minimize the amount of exposure they have with a drug dealer. Short-term undercover operations are the norm in modern drug investigations. Long-term undercover operations do take place, but they require extensive planning and preparation and expose the agent to risks not encountered in short-term undercover roles. The longer the undercover agent is exposed to the suspect, the greater the odds he or she will be discovered to be a law enforcement official.
Drug agents should avoid going inside drug dealer’s residences and other dwellings since surveillance officers cannot immediately respond to help the agent if the need arises. Surveillance agents are ultimately responsible for the safety of the undercover agent, and operations that degrade safety should be avoided.
Undercover agents should never allow suspects to go to their personal homes for any reason. A furnished undercover apartment will help ease the suspicions of the drug dealer who asks to visit the agent at his or her home. If an undercover apartment or house is not available, numerous excuses can be given to deny the suspect’s request to conduct business there. Most drug dealers accept the fact that the undercover agent does not want to expose his family to other drug traffickers.
Purpose of Undercover Operations
The undercover investigative technique is used to infiltrate criminal organizations to determine their intentions. Infiltration of a criminal organization is extremely dangerous and is used sparingly by most law enforcement agencies.
Drug agents chosen for long-term undercover roles must weigh their personal lives against the demands of such an investigation. Supervisors and managers of long-term undercover agents must consider the risks along with the affect it will have on their employees and their families. Managers must decide if the risks posed to the employee are worth any potential information gained through a long-term undercover assignment.
One of the objectives of an undercover operation is to identify as many members of a drug conspiracy as possible, and determine what their particular role in the organization is. By interacting with these persons, undercover agents can sometimes predict, with some accuracy, which members of a criminal organization may later cooperate with law enforcement after they are arrested.
Undercover agents obtain evidence for court. Through their roles, they have the opportunity to learn where drugs and evidence are located. In addition to drugs and evidence of the crime, undercover drug agents should be alert to determine where drug proceeds and items purchased with ill-gotten gains are located.
One of the most important responsibilities an undercover agent has is to determine the suitable time and place for the execution of arrest and search warrants. His or her intimate knowledge of the drug traffickers will be beneficial in helping locate persons subject to arrest, and predicting if these persons will resist arresting officers.
Undercover agents frequently pose as customers of drug traffickers. An informant introducing an undercover agent to a drug trafficker usually accomplishes this. In complex investigations, more sophisticated undercover roles may be required. The agent may be required to pose as someone who possesses a special skill the drug trafficking organization needs, such as a pilot or money launderer.
Through thorough debriefings of informants, the case agent determines where the criminal organization is most vulnerable to the introduction of an undercover agent. Since traffickers have to rely on the recommendations from trusted associates, they may ask a confidential informant (CI) to find a pilot or big-rig truck driver to move drugs from one location to another. This is an ideal opportunity to introduce an undercover drug agent into the organization. The selected agent must possess the necessary skills required to convince the traffickers he or she can perform the job. They may be quizzed extensively about their experience in these skills, something the undercover drug agent must be prepared for.
Other areas where drug trafficking organizations often need persons with particular skills to carry out their objectives are: boat captains, flight attendants, travel agents, real estate agents, bank employees, investment consultants, chemists, chemical suppliers, automobile dealers, enforcers, counter-surveillance personnel or lookouts, corrupt law enforcement officials, private investigators, and house sitters. A house sitter is someone who will reside in a residence where a substantial amount of drugs and or money are stored. The house sitter not only provides security, but also maintains the overall appearance of the residence so to not raise suspicions from the neighbors. Sophisticated Colombian cocaine trafficking organizations have been known to provide written instructions to house sitters on how to give the appearance of being a normal American family by attending local churches and having barbeques on Sunday afternoons.
Qualifications for Undercover Work
The drug agent selected for an undercover role must first possess the necessary sophistication for the assignment. Supervisors and managers need to insure that the candidate has sufficient knowledge about drugs in general, and specifically how they are bought, sold, diluted, transported, smuggled, concealed, and used. They must also speak the trafficker’s “language” and know street terminology for different drugs. He should be an experienced investigator who has a good working knowledge of street and wholesale prices in the area.
He or she must have the appropriate appearance for the role. An investigator normally assigned to surveillance work who has a disheveled appearance may have to become well groomed and tailored if he is needed to play the role of an investment banker anxious to launder a drug dealer’s money. On the other hand, a clean-cut investigator must alter his appearance if he hopes to convince a drug dealer he is a homeless person who is addicted to drugs. Appearance is equally important as knowledge and skill.
Undercover drug agents must understand the metric system. Drugs are dealt in quantities of grams, ounces, pounds, kilograms, and metric tons. The undercover drug agent needs to understand that some drug trafficking organizations use a variation of this system for drug sales. For example, Mexican heroin organizations sell 25 gram ounces of heroin, instead of the true weight of 28.35 grams, simply because a large number of their customers are Americans, and it is easier to separate a kilo into 40, 25-gram pieces. Mexican heroin traffickers also deal in 20-ounce half-kilos. The latter two equal the correct metric measurement for a half-kilogram and kilogram.
Investigators working undercover assignments targeting Mexican heroin traffickers who do not know these nuances between different trafficking organizations will demonstrate their lack of experience in the drug business, and may possibly expose themselves to dangerous situations. A quick primer on the drug dealer’s metric system is:
Kilogram=1000 grams or approximately 2.2 pounds
Gram=0.03527 ounce
Ounce=28.35 grams
Pound=0.4536 kilograms
Metric ton=1000 kilograms (2200 pounds)
The experienced undercover officer knows what drugs are sold in what increments. For example, methamphetamine at the wholesale level is always sold in quarter-pound to pound quantities. Retail sales of methamphetamine can be in any quantity, but is usually sold in ounces. Cocaine is commonly sold at the wholesale level in kilogram increments whereas retail sales are usually ounces, half-ounces, and grams. It would be a tactical error for an undercover drug agent to ask a drug trafficker for a kilogram of methamphetamine. The trafficker would immediately recognize this person as someone who did not know what he or she was talking about. This is why preparation is so important before performing any undercover assignment.
Some trafficking organizations are reluctant to deal at the wholesale level with someone outside their own ethnicity or nationality. However, street level sales to persons of different ethnic groups are commonplace. This is one reason a well-trained, ethnically diverse drug investigation unit is most effective against drug traffickers. Dealers are naturally leery of strangers who may be undercover agents or informants. They become more cautious as the stakes are raised. Informants can often ease the fears of the drug trafficker by vouching for the undercover agent, but ultimately the agent must convince the trafficker he is not affiliated with law enforcement.
Drug agents selected for undercover assignments should not be from the same area where they will be working. Smaller police departments can overcome this dilemma by having an undercover exchange program with other departments to insure covert law enforcement officials are not recognized.
Undercover Agents’ Traits
Intelligence
Obviously, drug agents who perform undercover operations have to be intelligent. They must also have an abundance of common sense, and be able to think quickly on their feet and make sound judgments while under stress. They must be able to recognize criminal acts when they are committed in their presence, and identify those persons responsible for the crimes later in court.
The undercover agent must be able to work with others on his team and know how to gain their full support during difficult surveillance operations, keeping their needs in mind. An undercover drug agent who unnecessarily prolongs a meeting with a suspect for the sake of “playing the role,” will find his surveillance team less enthusiastic the next time they cover him. The undercover drug agent must be cognizant of the telltale signals suspects give when they intend to rob him of his “buy” money instead of selling him drugs.
Self-Confidence
Successful undercover agents frequently display an abundance of self-confidence. Self-confidence is gained through having a thorough knowledge of the case, the drugs in question, and the suspects he or she is targeting. Self-confidence will rub off on both the informant and the suspect who will both feel comfortable working with the agent during his undercover role.
Someone with no self-confidence will communicate to the traffickers he or she couldn’t possibly be the person the informant led them to believe. Creating a doubt in the criminal’s mind may not only jeopardize the undercover operation, but could pose safety problems for the informant and agent alike.
Courage
It takes courage for a drug agent to meet with a known criminal to discuss buying drugs. The suspects undercover agents meet are people they would never otherwise associate with in either professional or social settings. Yet, he or she is flung into a situation where they must now socialize with these criminal types, and gain their confidence.
Undercover work is extremely dangerous. More DEA special agents have been killed or injured while working undercover than in any other assignment. If the agent selected for the undercover assignment expresses reluctance because of fear or uneasiness, supervisors should not allow him or her to perform that particular assignment. Undercover work is not for everyone. On the other hand, drug agents who only want to perform undercover roles need to experience other duties as well.
Some drug dealers may attempt to rob a customer if they feel there is an excellent chance of getting away with it. Dealers know that any customer they rob of their money to purchase drugs would be reluctant to report such an incident to the police. The undercover agent must constantly ask him or herself why the suspect insists on doing a drug transaction a certain way or at a particular location. Could robbery be the motive? Even well established drug dealers may decide to rob a customer if they think they can get away with it.
The most dangerous situation for the undercover agent is when money and drugs are together to be traded. The danger level is relatively low when there is only a meeting to discuss an upcoming drug transaction, but the danger level rises significantly when drugs or money is shown to the other party. The danger level also rises significantly when the drug dealer believes the undercover agent has access to a large amount of money to be used in a future purchase.
Even if the undercover agent has no plans of showing the trafficker money, there may be problems. If the agent has told the trafficker he or she has access to the money, there is a possibility the dealer may attempt to hold the agent hostage until someone delivers the money in exchange for the agent’s release. Undercover drug agents must constantly be on guard against robbery or kidnapping attempts by the drug trafficker he or she is negotiating with.
Often undercover drug agents will not carry weapons during their undercover roles for fear of them being seen. They do not want to be thought of as either someone who intends to rob the drug trafficker or as a drug agent. The presence of a firearm for self-protection may be easy to explain to the drug dealer, but it increases the likelihood that the dealer will bring a weapon to future meetings. The undercover agent must assume at all times that the drug trafficker is armed or may have someone who is nearby.
When the time comes for the surveillance team to arrest the drug dealer, the undercover agent should remove himself from the scene and resist the temptation to participate. Arrest situations are an exceptionally dangerous aspect of the undercover agent’s job. The suspect may initially believe he is being robbed and may attempt to defend himself. Or if he realizes he is about to be arrested, he may mistakenly assume the drug agent is an informant, and attempt to immediately retaliate against him. Ruthless drug dealers are much more likely to kill an informant than a law enforcement officer. Undercover agents have successfully avoided being killed by drug traffickers when they were able to convince them they were actually law enforcement officers.
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Good Judgment
Undercover drug agents need to exercise good judgment at all times. They need to be experienced law enforcement officers who can anticipate trouble before it happens.
Dealers frequently insist on receiving the money before delivering the drugs. Their insistence is usually a test to see if the drug agent is foolish enough to do such a thing. Undercover agents and their supervisors need to recognize that fronting, or advancing departmental funds to the drug dealer on the promise he will return later with the drugs is not a good idea, no matter what the informant says, or how convincing the dealer may be. There is no guarantee that the dealer will return with either the money or the drugs, or at all. Giving money to the dealer in advance is a foolish decision that exhibits poor judgment.
Many departments have policies addressing when an undercover drug agent may, under extraordinary circumstances, advance monies to the drug dealers, and when, where, and under what circumstances official funds will be displayed to the drug dealer to prove he or she has the means to purchase the drugs under negotiation. The drug dealer is usually satisfied the undercover agent has the means to purchase the drugs by conducting a money flash. (See Chapter 8 for details.) These written policies usually come as a result of an undercover officer or supervisor exercising poor judgment during a past drug investigation.
Drug agents working undercover must know their perimeters and limitations before engaging in negotiations with drug dealers. They must follow their department’s guidelines and last minute instructions from their supervisors. Deviation from a supervisor’s instruction, or a departmental policy could, at a minimum, jeopardize the outcome of the investigation and cause severe safety problems for the undercover agent and back up teams.
Undercover drug agents should never get so personally involved in the investigation that they believe their reputations rest on the outcome of the case. Agents with the gotta go syndrome will say or do anything the drug dealer wants to convince him to deliver the drugs. These agents are so focused on the outcome of the investigation that they cease to exercise good judgment. Some will ignore a supervisor’s direction fearing it will jeopardize the delivery. Supervisors need to counsel these agents and reevaluate if they should continue their undercover role.
Initiative and Resourcefulness
Undercover officers need to show initiative during undercover operations. They need to develop new and safer ways of doing their jobs. They need to have several public locations preapproved by their supervisor that are suitable for conducting future undercover negotiations and drug deliveries before initially meeting the drug dealer. This way, if during negotiations the trafficker suggests a location for a drug delivery that is totally unacceptable, the undercover officer can immediately suggest an alternative without having to seek permission from a supervisor before agreeing to a meeting there.
Undercover investigators often need to develop ways of convincing the drug dealer they have no connection with the police, or that they are from out of the area. If a drug dealer wants the undercover agent to accompany him over the weekend to attend parties, the agent needs to have a good reason why he cannot. It is unrealistic for an agency to allow the undercover investigator to have unnecessary long-term exposure to the suspect. Surveillance teams are often scarce or not available. Resourcefulness is shown when the agent responds that he has a commitment out of state, and then gives the drug dealer the telephone number where he can be contacted. What the dealer does not realize is the number connects to an undercover telephone line at another law enforcement office in that particular state that is automatically forwarded to the agent’s home telephone number giving the appearance he actually is out of town. The blocking of the caller ID function on the telephones is a must.
A good undercover agent needs to take the initiative and learn about every modern means of electronic communication, and how to use these tools to enhance his credibility with the criminals, as well as how to defeat these items when they are used against him.
Good Memory
Despite the use of recording devices and transmitters, the undercover officer should have a good memory for details. The clothing worn by the suspect, the license plate of his vehicle, and the name of the person the drug dealer called from his cellular telephone are all important bits of information the drug agent needs to memorize. Fortunately the use of recording devices greatly enhances the accuracy of what transpired during undercover meetings, but there is no substitute for an officer who possesses a good memory to recall of the events for later courtroom testimony.
Good Communication Skills
Successful undercover agents have the ability to clearly communicate with others. A miscommunication with informants or traffickers will cause severe delays in the development of the investigation and could lead to safety problems. If unsure of the particular time or location of a meeting, the undercover agent must clarify the information. Nothing should be assumed. If an informant acts as the interpreter for the undercover agent, he should take extra precautions to ensure the translation is correct.
If during an undercover meeting the suspect uses slang or terms not familiar to the drug agent, he must later thoroughly debrief the informant about them, or ask reasonable questions during the meeting to make clear what the dealer meant. Slang terms are often unique to a particular area and can change considerably from region to region. The undercover agent should be familiar with the local terminology, but should not use such terms unless he is certain what they mean.
When an undercover agent assumes a role of a money launderer or corrupt employee of a financial institution, he must have a good working knowledge of the profession. His or her knowledge of stocks, letters of credit, bonds, banking, investing, other financial instruments, and in particular wire transfer of funds to offshore banks, is essential. He cannot assume the suspect has little to no knowledge, but rather he or she should assume the suspect has vast knowledge on the subject matter.
Proper Experience for the Role
When possible, investigators with experience in undercover operations should be the first choice for any undercover assignment unless they lack an essential talent needed for that role, e.g., foreign language, financial background, licensed pilot, etc. For example, a lesser-experienced investigator who speaks Spanish may be a better choice for an undercover role over an experienced investigator who does not when dealing with a Spanish-speaking suspect. Even though a CI may be able to provide translation for the non-Spanish speaking investigator, they cannot always be trusted. There has to be a balance between experience working undercover operations and the skills necessary to successfully complete the mission. Novice undercover agents can gain experience playing minor support roles in undercover operations.
Good Common Sense
There is no substitute for good common sense. No matter how talented, multi-lingual, experienced, or courageous a drug agent may be, if he does not exhibit an abundance of common sense, he should not be considered for an undercover assignment.
Common sense is an essential element in undercover operations and has a direct bearing on the safety of the agent as well as the surveillance teams providing his or her protection. Common sense does not come from textbooks or training courses. It is a part of a person’s makeup. Supervisors need to identify drug agents who will exercise common sense in undercover assignments, as well as those who will not.
Undercover agents who assume the personality and characteristics of criminals to the point where they have a hard time reverting back to being themselves, need to be considered for reassignment. Further, an agent who is willing to take unnecessary risks, does not follow their supervisor’s directions, or deviates from the agreed upon operational plan, should have their undercover role terminated.
Necessary Preparations for Undercover Assignments
Once selected to perform an undercover assignment, the drug agent should review the file of the CI involved in the case before a thorough debriefing takes place. The review should focus on the informant’s past performance and manageability. If the informant has a history of perjury, or is known for embellishment or exaggeration, a supervisor or prosecutor should review the facts and decide whether this informant should continue to be used. If the decision is made to use the informant, the undercover agent may want to minimize the informant’s role, if possible, and must continuously verify information the informant receives outside the agent’s presence. Further, the case agent must insist the informant record every phone call he has with the suspects.
The drug agent must research the criminal history of the informant, and the degree of his past relationship with the suspect. The motivation for the informant to provide information to the police must be determined. In short, the undercover agent must know as much as he can about the informant’s background so he or she can feel comfortable working with him. The agent should consult with other agents who have handled this informant in the past.
The informant must be fully debriefed. When formally debriefing the informant, the undercover agent must determine the trafficker’s limitations in respect to the quality and quantity of drugs he usually deals in, and the modus operandi he uses. The undercover agent must stay within the boundaries of the suspect’s limitations. To significantly exceed these limitations would raise suspicions by the dealer and could seriously jeopardize the case. The dealer may also feel he is not in the same league as the undercover drug agent. It would be unrealistic for the informant to introduce someone to the suspect who wants to purchase far more drugs than the informant knows the suspect is capable of handling.
Research must be conducted by the undercover agent to ascertain the known associates of the suspect. They should be fully identified and their photographs obtained before any undercover operation begins. These associates are likely to be the persons the suspect will solicit to conduct counter-surveillance, act as runners for drugs or money, or provide protection to the suspect during the conduct of the drug deal. The identities of these persons can possibly be made through recent arrest reports, intelligence databases such as the DEA’s Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Intelligence System (NADDIS), Western States Intelligence Network, Treasury Enforcement Computer (TECS), and many others.
The undercover agent must ascertain the suspect’s propensity for violence. Intelligence reports and arrest records may shed light on the suspect’s violent nature, or lack there of. The undercover agent must never assume because the suspect did not exhibit violent behavior during past encounters with other drug dealers or the police, he will not do so this time. The suspected level of violence the drug agents will most likely encounter from the trafficker will dictate the need for additional security, surveillance, and other manpower. If the informant believes the suspect has a history of violence, specifically robbing drug buyers of their money, whether or not the suspect is a genuine drug dealer, this information needs to be corroborated prior to any face-to-face meetings between the suspect and the undercover agent. If it cannot be corroborated because the trafficker’s victims never reported the crime to the police, it must be assumed.
Drug enforcement supervisors must weigh the risks of having either an undercover agent or CI attempt to make controlled purchases from a suspect who may be more inclined to rob the buyer than sell drugs. The risks increase proportionately with the amounts of drugs and money being discussed. They need to bear in mind that undercover assignments are the most dangerous aspect of investigating drug crime.
Just prior to the scheduled meeting with a drug trafficker, the CI should be debriefed again to ascertain any additional information that may have come to mind, or any changes that may have occurred since the last debriefing.
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The Cover Story
Drug traffickers are keenly aware of the use of CIs and undercover agents being deployed against them. Because of this, they are constantly on the alert for indications their associates, especially new members of the organization, may be working with law enforcement. One way to ease the suspicions of drug traffickers and enhance the safety of the undercover agent is to devise a solid cover story.
Cover stories are used to prepare the CI and undercover agent in answering questions the drug traffickers may ask so they are consistently the same. Some background information that must be agreed upon and memorized by the undercover agent and informant is: How did the two meet? When did you meet? Where are you from? What previous experience do you have in drug trafficking? Undercover agents are advised not to say they met their informant in jail since contacts within penal institutions may easily confirm this is not true. If an informant is involved and he has already answered seemingly innocent questions about the background of the undercover agent, he must be thoroughly debriefed on exactly what was asked, and what answers he gave before an introduction is made.
To further ease the suspicions of the traffickers, the undercover agent must know as much about the methods of transportation, smuggling, and price of the drug in question as possible. He must give the appearance of being either a desperate novice in need of money, willing to learn the business for the first time, or a skilled professional who has never been arrested. He may be required to know how to street-test drugs to determine if they are genuine. He must know how drugs are normally packaged for the quantity he is purchasing, and be able to talk about fictitious sources of supply.
The cover story must make sense to the trafficker when he hears it for the first time. The differences in age, race, socio-economic background, etc., with the informant may have to be addressed. A black undercover agent and a white informant, who might not otherwise socialize, may have to convince a trafficker that they first met each other while in the military or while attending school. They may have met through a mutual “friend” that is created. Whatever story is used, it must leave the trafficker comfortable. Undercover agents are advised not to be too specific in detail with their cover stories, and they should not mention their pasts unless quizzed by the trafficker. The informant must alert the undercover agent when he has been questioned about certain details such as when and how they met, so that the agent can be prepared to answer the same questions the same way if asked by the trafficker.
The undercover agent should not volunteer any cover story information to the suspect, but can expect to engage in conversation that will “break the ice.” Many suspects are paranoid about being arrested, and they all want to feel comfortable with a new person when discussing their drug business. A suspect may go far beyond having a friendly conversation, and begin to ask many specific questions in an attempt to trip up the agent. If this occurs, an appropriate response is to sternly tell the suspect it is none of his business, and put him on the defensive by asking him if his curiosity is because he is working for the police. This usually halts further questioning. The more information the drug agent volunteers to the suspect, the greater chance he or she will say something contradictory to what was said previously.
Undercover Identity
Although an undercover agent may never have to prove his identity to a drug trafficker, he or she must prepare for the event. A used wallet containing documents that will satisfy an inquisitive suspect should be prepared well in advance for future undercover assignments.
Sophisticated drug dealers have been known to either personally investigate, or hire private investigators to delve into the background of the undercover agent to find any law enforcement connection. Many demand that they visit the undercover agent at his or her home, believing that a police officer would never allow such an event to take place.
Since the sophistication level of many drug dealers has risen, investigators should never assume drug dealers would not investigate their backgrounds. For this and other reasons, investigators should avoid using any part of their real names while working in an undercover capacity. Suspicious drug traffickers have been known to telephone various law enforcement organizations asking for a drug agent by first name, hoping he or she will answer the phone in an attempt to recognize the voice. If this happens, the trafficker could retaliate against the informant who introduced the agent to him.
To help convince the traffickers that the undercover agent is not associated with law enforcement, he must be equipped with documents and other items that coincide with his undercover identity. An undercover driver license is the most important document the agent can possess in convincing the trafficker he is not associated with law enforcement, and it serves as a foundation for other supporting documents. Many states will provide law enforcement personnel with genuine driver licenses displaying the chosen undercover name and address of the agent. These records are usually segregated from other records within the department of motor vehicles at the state capital, and only a few select employees have access to them. DMV employees in some cases will alert the undercover agent in the event a member of the public or another law enforcement agency queries information pertaining to the undercover driver license.
In picking an address to use for the undercover driver license, a post office box, whether from a U.S. post office or a private company, works well. These boxes lend an aura of authenticity since drug dealers often use them to disguise where they actually live. An advantage in using a private box office allows the undercover agent the use of an actual street address, using the box number as an apartment or suite. Even if the undercover agent’s law enforcement agency cannot pay for the use of a private post office box, the address of an actual private post office box can still be used. If the agency is to pay for the private post office box, the undercover agent must fill out the rental application with information identical to the cover story he or she assumes, in all areas required in the application, e.g., employment, home and work telephone numbers, etc. The undercover agent cannot risk having the proprietor of the business furnishing this information to the suspect either voluntarily or unwittingly. Further, the undercover agent making application for a private post office box should never identify himself or herself as a law enforcement officer seeking an undercover address.
Using the address of a large apartment complex, leaving off the apartment number, may work equally well, however it could pose problems if a suspect demands to know why an apartment number is not shown on the license. Using a vacant lot should be avoided since in many states, the only way a driver license can be obtained is through the mail. If a purely fictitious address is used, questions can be raised on how the license was obtained without government intervention. Using the actual address of someone in the telephone directory should never be done because civil liability could fall on the department in the event the suspect later attempts to retaliate or otherwise confronts the occupants of the residence.
When deciding an undercover name, the selected family name should match the agent’s ethnic background unless a feasible story can be concocted to explain otherwise. The selected name should be one the undercover agent will readily recognize the first time he or she hears it. The use of a mother’s maiden name, or close relative or friend’s last name may serve this purpose. The use of the names of actual persons, living or dead, should be avoided.
The date of birth used in an undercover drivers license or other document should be different from the actual date of birth of the undercover agent. Like the undercover name, the date of birth should be readily recognizable, and memorized by the agent. Using the date of birth of the spouse or mother of the undercover agent may help in remembering this important date under the stress of an ongoing operation.
When selecting a city of residence that will appear on the drivers’ license, it should be one that the undercover agent is thoroughly familiar with. Ideally, it will be a city the suspect knows little about. The undercover agent must be prepared to talk about famous restaurants, landmarks, news events, and weather for the city they select as their hometown.
The undercover agent must be comfortable with the background information he or she is going to present to the suspect. These are facts that should be difficult to verify. The selected neighborhoods, residential areas, schools attended, and employment history for the area must be well rehearsed prior to any contact with the suspect.
Undercover Vehicles
Hand in hand with an undercover driver license is an undercover vehicle registration certificate. In cooperation with state departments of motor vehicles, genuine registration certificates in the chosen undercover name can be issued. The name and address of the registered owner of the vehicle should be identical to the name and address that appears on the drug agent’s undercover driver license. Under no circumstances should an undercover agent’s privately owned vehicle be used in an undercover operation. If a government owned undercover vehicle is not available, one should be rented for the specific operation, using the agent’s undercover identity on the rental application. Using a rental vehicle for undercover meetings and the purchase of controlled substances is readily acceptable to drug dealers who frequently do the same in an effort to prevent their expensive privately owned vehicles from being confiscated under federal or state asset forfeiture laws.
If the undercover agent is posing as someone from out of the area, he or she should rent a vehicle at a car rental agency that services a major airport. Efforts to make another vehicle appear to be a rental car, or renting a vehicle from other than a transportation hub may raise serious questions with the suspect. If during an undercover operation the suspect is left alone in the agent’s vehicle for any length of time, he can be expected to go through glove box and common areas of the vehicle looking for anything connecting the agent with law enforcement. A good technique to ease the fears of the drug trafficker is to allow him time alone in the vehicle to look for documents that coincide with the undercover agent’s cover story.
Whatever type of undercover vehicle is selected for an operation, it must be cleared of all official documents, markings, and accessories that might be associated with law enforcement. It is possible to equip undercover vehicles with concealed microphones and cameras to record meetings between drug agents and suspects. Professionally installed devices can be concealed well enough to not raise any suspicion on the part of the suspect. Supervisors should insure that undercover vehicles under their control cannot be identified as being connected with law enforcement.
Undercover Documents and Credit Cards
Other documents that should be in agent’s undercover wallet can be credit cards issued in the covert name, membership in a health club, library card, undercover business cards, commercial airline frequent flier memberships, discount store membership cards, etc. Checks from a cancelled checking account with the undercover name printed on them will further add to credibility.
Undercover credit cards can be obtained through cooperative credit reporting agencies that will create a fictitious credit history under a covert name. In this way if a credit history should ever be requested on the undercover agent, the credit reports will confirm the undercover agent’s date of birth, place of birth, place of employment, and undercover social security number.
Upon application, agent’s can easily obtain additional credit cards in their undercover names tied to their existing personal Visa, Mastercard, Discover, and American Express accounts. However, if a trafficker should steal a credit card receipt resulting from a purchase the agent makes, and later checks with a credit-reporting agency, the connection to the primary cardholder being employed by a law enforcement agency will be discovered.
Planning the Undercover Operation
Investigators selected to perform undercover roles must discuss the overall strategy and objectives with the case agent and their supervisor. The case agent is the individual responsible for the overall outcome of the investigation, and with supervisory concurrence, will make decisions and direct the day-to-day activities connected with the case. Together the case agent and undercover agent should meet with the informant frequently to discuss and rehearse the cover story. An operational plan must be formulated for any planned undercover meetings with suspects to fully brief surveillance team members who may not be knowledgeable about the investigation, and to identify clear goals that have been established for the operation.
Undercover agents must search their vehicles for anything connected with a law enforcement agency. They must insure that identification placards, parking and building passes, payroll slips, etc. have been removed from the vehicle before leaving on an undercover assignment.
Many undercover agents feel comfortable carrying their departmental identification with them during covert meetings; however, obvious problems will arise if the suspect somehow discovers it. It may be appropriate to carry official police identification if the operational plan calls for the suspect’s arrest at the conclusion of an undercover meeting. There have been occasions when the lives of undercover agents have been spared because they were able to convince the suspect they were law enforcement officers. A drug suspect may be less inclined to murder a police officer or federal agent during a drug transaction for fear of the death penalty, if he is convinced the undercover agents are law enforcement officers and not informants or other drug dealers.
Undercover agents should be mindful of leery drug dealers who might want to search their persons to check for body transmitters, especially during the initial meeting. If police identification is located, this will cause obvious problems for the undercover agent and the informant who introduced him or her to the suspect. Drug agents must evaluate each situation before deciding whether or not to carry official identification.
Carrying an excessive amount of keys is a sign of responsibility. All keys to handcuffs, police buildings that are marked “do not duplicate” and other areas connected with the agent’s workplace must be stored. The undercover agent should only carry a minimum amount of keys on a separate key ring for the purposes of the operation. This key ring, which should be nondescript, should only have keys to the undercover vehicle, a post office box, and another key designed to look like a common house key.
The undercover agent must decide for him or herself, whether or not to carry a firearm. Special care should be made if the weapon is of a type typically carried by law enforcement agencies. If a nonstandard weapon is not available for use in undercover operations, the agent should seriously consider not carrying a weapon at all, regardless if the suspect is going to be arrested during the planned operation since undercover agents should not participate in the actual arrest of the suspect. If a weapon is going to be carried, the agent must be able to explain why he is carrying a weapon if it is noticed. The presence of a weapon may frighten a suspect and make him believe the undercover agent plans on robbing him of his drugs. If the suspect knows the undercover agent is armed, he may be more inclined to carry a weapon to future undercover meetings.
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The Written Operational Plan
An operational plan is an important document created by the case agent that should be approved by a supervisor prior to distributing it to the other agents who will be participating in the operation. It should contain general information about what the objectives of the operation are, who the suspects are, their descriptions, home addresses, and what assignments each participant will have. The areas that should be addressed in any approved, written operational plan include (Figure 7.1 to Figure 7.6):
• Date, time, and place of the operation.
• The objective of the operation (e.g., arrest, purchase, money flash, meeting, etc.).
• Brief synopsis on what has led to this undercover meeting.
• Specific personnel involved in surveillance, and what their particular assignments are.
• If counter-surveillance is expected or anticipated.
• If the suspect is expected to be armed.
• Estimated duration of the meeting or operation with an established cut-off time.
• Whether the undercover agent has been approved to or prohibited from traveling with the suspect or to a second location.
• The anticipated actions of the informant.
• If body transmitters will be used, and who will be responsible for recording the undercover conversation.
• Listing of known vehicles associated with the suspect along with their addresses and physical descriptions.
• Known associates of the suspect that may appear on the scene unexpectedly.
• Distress signals, both audible and visual.
• Photos of suspect.
• Photocopies of maps showing the exact location of the undercover meeting.
• The cellular telephone and pager numbers of the undercover agent. Radio call signs, telephone numbers, and pager numbers for all surveillance agents.
• The location and telephone numbers for the local police, as well as police agencies with jurisdiction where the undercover meeting will take place.
• The nearest hospital emergency room.
Some operational plans have more information, but too much information may detract from information deemed essential and make it hard to find important information quickly. Many plans are preprinted with check marks next to the names of those agents who will be participating. In any event, a supervisor should thoroughly review the plan and discuss it with both the case and undercover agents. The supervisor should make it clear whether or not the undercover agent is authorized to deviate from the approved operational plan, and any consequences for doing so.
Before approving the undercover agent to travel to a secondary meeting location, the location should be known, and surveillance agents already in place to look for other persons associated with the suspect. The location of an undercover meeting should never be approved that gives the suspect a tactical advantage.
An undercover agent’s unilateral decision to deviate from the approved investigative plan can cause serious problems. If the suspect wants the undercover agent to travel with, or follow him to a secondary location, the agent should refuse to do so unless it was approved beforehand by a supervisor and discussed during the operational briefing. If the undercover agent leaves with the suspect without the knowledge of the surveillance team, they will naturally think the agent is under duress and view it as a possible kidnapping or robbery attempt and would be expected to take action to rescue the agent.
It is unwise, for several reasons, to furnish government money to a suspect on his promise to return later with drugs. The suspect could change his mind and keep the money without fear of retribution from the undercover agent or the police since in his mind he is dealing with another drug dealer. Even if the trafficker sincerely intends to return with the drugs, he may be robbed of the money before he can obtain them. Fearing retribution from the undercover agent, he may flee. Either way, only under extraordinary circumstances in a tightly controlled environment should undercover agents or their supervisors allow money to be advanced to dealers.
The undercover agent should ask but not insist on seeing the drugs to be purchased before any money is displayed. Once the location of the drugs is revealed the arrest can be made without ever jeopardizing the loss of official government funds.
Undercover agents should avoid accompanying the suspect in his vehicle since control cannot be exercised over the moving vehicle. The suspect could drive the car into an area where surveillance agents would immediately be detected, or he could drive to a deserted location where accomplices are waiting to rob the undercover agent. Allowing the suspect to travel in the undercover vehicle is preferable, but only if the agent is driving, knows ahead of time where he is going, reasonably believes the suspect is unarmed, and adequate surveillance agents are available to follow.
If the operational plan forbids the undercover agent from traveling anywhere with the suspect, regardless in what vehicle, and this occurs, the surveillance team must assume the agent is being kidnapped for the purpose of robbing him or her. Even if the surveillance team is electronically monitoring the conversation between the undercover agent and suspect, and distress does not seem obvious, the surveillance team must still assume the worst and be ready to rescue the agent. If the undercover agent is under distress and can communicate with the surveillance team through a wireless transmitter, he should attempt to alert them as soon as possible to what is happening. For example, the undercover agent can simply state, “Why are you pointing that gun on me?” or “Don’t shoot me!” as obvious signs of distress. Under these circumstances, the undercover agent should immediately identify him or herself as a law enforcement officer and tell the suspect other agents are following them. Drug dealers are less likely to kill or injure a law enforcement officer than an informant or other drug dealer.
The Operational Briefing
The case agent should conduct an operational briefing immediately after the approved operational plan has been distributed to each agent or officer participating in the operation. The informant and case agent should be personally introduced to the surveillance team members to insure they are not mistaken to be the suspects.
If possible, an undercover agent should always be equipped with a cellular telephone in order for him or her to have instant communication with the case agent and supervisor. This also allows the case agent to inform or warn the undercover agent, during the actual operation, things that the surveillance team has detected. Cellular telephone communication with the undercover agent also allows supervisors to direct the undercover agent to discretely shut the operation down if they deem it necessary.
Undercover operational plans and briefings cannot be taken lightly since the agent or informant will potentially be exposed to extreme danger. Everyone associated with the operation must be thoroughly briefed on the plan and know who the participants are. Supervisors should approve all such plans, as well as the concept of the operation. There must be an adequate amount of surveillance agents to cover the meeting, and they must be trained and equipped to handle any eventuality.
The Undercover Meeting
Undercover agents, meeting a drug trafficker for the first time, will naturally feel uneasy and nervous. Not only is he nervous about being away from his fellow officers in the presence of the unsuspecting drug dealer, he will feel pressure knowing his performance will be judged by his peers. This should not matter, but it is a natural occurrence. The objective of meeting undercover with a drug trafficker is to gather evidence and build a prosecutable case against the suspect. Even though the undercover agent may appear anxious and nervous, the drug trafficker will probably mirror the same anxiety and nervousness.
When an informant is involved in an undercover meeting with a suspect, he will be the key to the success of the operation. If the suspect believes the informant when he says the undercover agent is a genuine drug dealer, then he will most likely deal with the agent. If the informant does not have a great deal of credibility with the suspect, he may never lose his suspicion that the agent is a law enforcement officer.
Formal meetings with suspects should be in public, especially the initial meeting. During this first meeting, the undercover agent will get a feel for the suspect, and begin to learn about his personality. The agent should attempt to establish a rapport with the suspect as soon as it is practical. They should not jump into to talking about drugs within a short time of meeting the suspect. The agent should let the trafficker bring up the topic of drugs first, if possible. If not, when the appropriate time arrives, the informant can take the lead by mentioning the topic.
Undercover meetings can be held in restaurants, hotel lobbies, parking lots, restaurants, and bars. Hotel rooms should only be used when the undercover agent wants the suspect to feel comfortable enough to go into detail about his drug trafficking operations. The suspect often suggests a hotel room when large amounts of money and drugs are going to be exchanged. However, because hotel rooms are secluded and confining, they pose a significant amount of danger for the undercover agent. Because of their seclusion, drug traffickers may be more inclined to rob the undercover agent. Robbery is something the undercover agent must always be conscious of when negotiating with the drug trafficker. Undercover agents must constantly ask themselves why the suspect insists the drug transaction be conducted a certain way or at a particular location.
Suspects are highly suspicious of new people they are introduced to. Undercover agents should remember the suspect is always looking for a reason not to do a drug deal with them. Because of their suspicions, they may withdraw their offer to sell drugs and never contact the agent or informant again.
Many lower-level drug dealers routinely abuse the drugs they sell, creating paranoia. Some are extremely paranoid of being arrested, and will take extraordinary means to detect police informants and undercover agents. Some paranoid drug dealers are convinced the government is tapping their phones, and that they are under constant observation by satellites, none of which is true.
One way to make the trafficker feel comfortable is by not asking too many questions. Traffickers believe that the more questions asked, the more likely the person he is dealing with is associated with the police. By not asking a lot of questions, credibility rapidly builds up in the eyes of the trafficker who may feel comfortable enough to boast about his drug trafficking successes. Undercover agents can never ask too few questions.
The undercover agent should not volunteer any personal information from his or her cover story, and only answer those questions that have the appearance of being harmless. Undercover agents, as well as their informants should be attentive as well as be a good listener. Everything he says and does may later help in identifying other members of his organization.
Undercover Negotiations
The objective of the undercover agent is to successfully negotiate the price and delivery of drugs to him or her without having to display money first. If during negotiations the suspect insists on seeing money before bringing out drugs, this can be done safely, under controlled circumstances, but should be avoided if at all possible. (See Chapter 8 for details.)
As mentioned earlier, during actual negotiations, the undercover agent should always keep robbery in mind. The agent should never agree to meet in an area where he or she is known or where the suspect frequents.
Undercover agents should have at least three specific locations in mind that have been prescreened by a supervisor as being acceptable for a drug operation. If the first location mentioned by the undercover agent is unacceptable, he or she will have two or three others as alternatives.
The agent should never allow the trafficker to talk him or her into doing something inherently dangerous. Some undercover agents are so determined to be successful in their negotiations they will sacrifice their personal safety to increase the chances of the suspect delivering drugs to them. They have found themselves caught up in with the gotta go syndrome in that no matter what, the deal has got to go. To counter this, supervisors should review all audiotapes of the negotiations between the agent, informant, and suspect to insure the agreed upon terms provides safety for the undercover agent and surveillance team.
During undercover negotiations, surveillance and arrest teams must be kept in mind. Where the agent parks his vehicle, where he sits in a restaurant, and where he stands in the lobby of a hotel is important, and can raise security concerns if surveillance teams are unable to constantly observe him or her.
The undercover agent should be thoroughly familiar with the use of modern mobile telephones, pagers, and other communication devices. Codes can be used on pagers to designate certain events and to pass on information that will not be obvious to the suspect during the negotiations. Supervisor’s can send a simple page of “10–22” to order the undercover agent to end the undercover meeting soon.
Prebuy and postbuy surveillance should be established during the actual transaction to look for counter-surveillance accomplices, sources of supply, and where the drugs may be hidden.
The undercover agent should strictly stick to self-imposed time limitations during meetings with the suspect. Surveillance agents will naturally become curious why the meeting that was supposed to last for 30 minutes is dragging on for over an hour. Further, the longer the undercover agent is exposed to the suspect, the greater the likelihood he or she may say something that will be contradictory to what he or she earlier said, raising the suspicions of the suspect.
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Drug Samples
Usually before the purchase of a substantial amount of drugs, an undercover agent will ask for a sample of what he is going to be purchasing. Drug sample weights range from a gram to a kilogram according to amount of drugs being negotiated for sale.
Requesting a sample serves several purposes. Providing a sample to the undercover agent is a crime in and of itself, making the suspect subject to arrest. It may also provide surveillance agents with the opportunity to follow the suspect to the person he obtains drugs from, and where drugs are being stored. This information may become the basis for a search warrant in the future.
It is perfectly acceptable for the undercover agent to purchase the sample of drugs being negotiated. This changes, however when huge amounts of drugs are being negotiated for purchase. In this situation, the sample will sometimes be cost free. A sample does not guarantee that the drugs being purchased will be the same quality and purity. Many suspects have multiple sources of supply, which can generate several samples, each one providing an opportunity for surveillance agents to follow the suspect to where he obtains them.
Requesting a sample during an undercover meeting with the suspect provides an opportunity to identify other members of the drug trafficking organization. The suspect may be convinced to travel from the meeting to his source of supply to retrieve the sample while the agent waits for him to return. This gives surveillance agents an opportunity to follow him from the meeting location to his source of supply. The source of supply can then be followed and surveillance may determine where drugs are being stored, possibly resulting in the issuance of a search warrant later.
If the undercover agent is negotiating the purchase of multi-kilogram amounts of a drug, he should ask to see the drugs beforehand and be allowed to remove a small sample himself from a kilogram package to gauge the quality of the drug. The agent should tell the suspect that any sample he cannot personally retrieve is meaningless since it may not have come from the drugs the trafficker intends to sell him. In the event the trafficker allows the undercover agent to see the drugs to prove he has them, usually after the displaying of a flash roll, the objective of the investigation has been met and the suspects can be arrested and the drugs seized.
Any sample that is obtained by an undercover agent should immediately be sent to a crime lab for both a qualitative and quantitative analysis. These examinations will not only tell the agent if the sample is in fact a controlled substance, but how pure the drug is. If the sample is of such low purity to almost render it worthless for resale, the undercover agent can tell the suspect later that he was dissatisfied with the drug sample he received. If the agent does not complain about the sample’s purity, the trafficker will perceive the undercover agent as either a fool, or a drug agent since the trafficker probably knew the quality of the drugs was poor. If the trafficker did not know the quality of the sample was poor, he will probably confront his supplier about the quality, which may give agents an opportunity to identify him through telephone calls or surveillance.
Use of Controlled Substances by Undercover Agents
Suspects on occasion will ask, or sometimes demand, that the undercover agent take a controlled substance in their presence before they are willing to sell drugs to them. Agents should have a convincing story ready to tell the suspect why he or she will not take drugs at that time. Some examples of responses are:
• “I want to save the drug to take it at a later time.”
• “I want to give the dope to my girlfriend.”
• “I don’t take drugs when I’m doing business.”
• “We can party when the business is over.”
• “I’m allergic to the drug; it almost killed me the last time I took it.”
• “I’m a businessman/woman and don’t do drugs.”
• “I only sell the stuff; I don’t take it.”
• “I have to take a drug test for my probation/parole agent, and I don’t want to come up positive.”
• “I’m scheduled to take a drug test tomorrow for a job and don’t want to come up positive.”
If these excuses do not work, the undercover agent should refuse and depart the area. He or she should call the suspect after a few days allowing the informant an opportunity to again vouch for the undercover agent’s truthfulness. If this fails to change the mind of the suspect, the agent should contact the suspect and tell him he or she is now willing to take the controlled substance in order to do the deal. The agent should also tell the suspect to have the drugs to be sold nearby so the transfer can be completed before the affects of the drug kicks in.
Upon the delivery of the single dose of the drug to the agent, the suspect should be arrested and his vehicle and person searched for other drugs. A search warrant for other locations may be justified under these circumstances since the suspect told the agent he was in possession of a larger amount of drugs than he intended to sell.
Undercover agents are generally prohibited from taking controlled substances while performing undercover operations for many good reasons. There is no case worth getting an agent hurt or killed. Taking an unknown substance from a drug dealer is an unacceptable risk for any employee of the agency. Only under the direst of circumstances could the undercover agent justify such an act. One circumstance would be if the suspect pointed a gun at the unarmed undercover agent and demanded he took drugs to prove he was not the police, and if he did not, he would kill the agent. Absence a horrific event as this, there is no way to justify the use of drugs by an undercover agent.
For the protection of the operative, some jurisdictions absolve state peace officers from prosecution if they use drugs in conjunction with undercover assignments. There is no such comparable federal law. These laws are designed to protect the undercover agent from prosecution if he or she is forced by the suspect to ingest a controlled substance while under duress. Proper planning and preparation will minimize the undercover agent’s exposure to violent drug criminals who force their new customers to ingest controlled substances before conducting business.
Confidence Buys or Buy-Walk Operations
Drug dealers are naturally leery of new customers for fear of them being undercover agents. One proven way to ease the fears of the trafficker, as well as defeat the entrapment defense, is to make a series of confidence buys.
A confidence buy usually starts with relatively smaller amounts of drugs and progresses to larger quantities. The objective is to make the suspect feel comfortable selling drugs to the undercover agent later since he was not arrested after the initial transaction. The theory is that the more confidence buys that are made, the more convinced the buyer is that he is not selling to an undercover agent.
Coordination should be made with the local, state, or federal prosecutors to determine when sufficient evidence has been gathered to ensure an indictment and conviction of the suspect. The amount of money left in the department’s budget for buy money also factors into how many confidence buys are made from the suspect before he is eventually arrested.
The following is an example of a logical progression of a typical methamphetamine drug investigation conducted by a local municipal police department. Starting off with a one ounce purchase, the second buy increases to four ounces, followed by a third purchase of five or six ounces, and ending with the final delivery of one pound. It would be unrealistic for a person who normally purchases four ounces of methamphetamine to suddenly jump to a ten-pound quantity. The final quantity of drugs delivered to the agent depends on how confident the suspect is the undercover agent is not connected with the police.
It also depends on what quantities of the drug the suspect has access to. Many boast of being able to obtain drugs in any amount, when they actually cannot. They may, in fact, have access to large quantities of drugs, however their source of supply may not trust them with the drugs unless they pay for them first. This will prompt the suspect to ask the undercover agent to furnish or front the money with his promise to immediately obtain the drugs and deliver them to the agent. Many departments, including the DEA, have policies against fronting money for drug purchases except under extraordinary circumstances. Many times the undercover agent and suspect come to an impasse due to the suspect’s inability to obtain drugs without paying for them first.
A successful technique used to give surveillance agents an opportunity to identify the suspect’s source of supply is to make two separate orders of drugs the same day from the same suspect. The undercover agent first meets the suspect at a public place, such as a restaurant. The agent orders a sufficient quantity of drugs beyond the dealer’s capabilities that prompts him to travel to his source of supply to obtain them. Surveillance agents will follow the suspects, but if they are unsuccessful in finding out where he went, they will notify the undercover agent. Upon taking delivery of the drugs, the undercover agent will tell the suspect that while he was gone, he received a telephone call requesting a second, equal amount. He or she asks the suspect to retrieve the same amount again immediately. Surveillance agents will now have experience following the suspect and may be successful in following him a second time to his source of supply.
Buy-Bust Operations
This frequently used technique is similar to a confidence buy operation, except the suspect will be arrested upon delivery of the drugs to the undercover agent. The preparation involved is identical to any other planned undercover encounter with the suspect, however the danger level rises when surveillance agents suddenly appear and take the suspect into custody.
Undercover agents should not be physically involved in the actual arrest of the suspect since he or she will most likely not have the equipment necessary in making such arrests, e.g., handcuffs, bulletproof vest, gun, spare ammunition, badge, identification, etc.
At the time of the arrest, the undercover agent should back away from the situation and take cover in the event of a shooting, and remain out of the way of the arresting agents. Once the situation is under control, the undercover agent should be made available to assist the case agent in the postarrest questioning of the suspect. The presence of the undercover agent during such questioning verifies that the suspect was dealing with a government agent and not an informant. It also makes lying about what he said or did in the undercover agent’s presence fruitless and unnecessary
If after being advised of his constitutional rights, the suspect agrees to talk with agents, he should be questioned in detail as soon as practical after the arrest. Because of the heat of the arrest and psychological trauma the suspect will experience, questioning him at the scene of the arrest rather than at the office may prompt him to cooperate before he has more time to think about it. His cooperation may reveal his source of supply and where more drugs and money/drug proceeds are located.
Federal and many state laws allow law enforcement officers to tape-record telephone conversations when they have the consent of one of the parties. Undercover agents, CIs, and cooperating suspects can each give their consent to the recording of their telephone conversations with drug suspects. Due to this, case agents should always be equipped at the scene of the arrest with a tape recorder to record any voluntary cellular telephone conversation between the suspect and his source of supply.
The case agent should give the suspect specific instructions on what to say to his source, and that the objective of the conversation is to get the source to acknowledge his involvement in the conspiracy. This can usually be achieved by instructing the suspect to inform his source that the drug delivery went well, and that he now has money to either purchase more drugs, or to pay for the drugs he received on consignment. This recorded evidence may later be detailed in an affidavit in support of the source of supply’s arrest warrant, and later a search warrant that may yield more drugs, money, and documentary evidence of other members of the organization.
Postbuy Debriefings
After the undercover operation is completed, the designated report writer should collect all the notes from those agents who participated in the surveillance so an accurate account of the events that took place can be documented. If drugs were obtained, the evidence should be weighed in front of a witness and placed in an evidence container, usually a transparent plastic bag, that is sealed and placed into the evidence room. A presumptive field test of the drugs can be performed. This is where an agent places a small amount of the drug into a clear, plastic ampoule that contains chemicals designed to change colors when a particular controlled substance is introduced. If the substance is what it was purported to be, the chemical reaction will produce a certain color substantiating this. These tests, however, are not a substitute for a thorough examination by a certified chemist, and their results are not admissible in court.
As cautioned earlier, this field test cannot be substituted for an examination that will reveal the purity of the drug. The field test does not reflect drug purity, regardless of how fast the chemicals change color in the ampoule. Future undercover meetings to talk about the sample should wait until a qualitative examination has been conducted.
Whatever the drugs were contained in by the suspect should be preserved for fingerprints. The suspect’s source of supply may have handled the container, substantiating his involvement in the crime. A single fingerprint may reveal the identity of the source of supply if he has been arrested before. Evidence forms are designed to clearly establish the chain of custody of the drugs from the moment they were obtained by the undercover agent to their transfer to the crime laboratory and introduction in court.
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Proven Undercover Techniques and Strategies—Playing Mind Games with the Suspect
Traffickers have preconceived notions about police in general, and undercover drug agents specifically. They draw these notions from personal experiences in the drug trade, conversations with other dealers, and from television and movies that portray police tactics.
All drug traffickers are paranoid of being arrested, and many of them think they have an uncanny ability to detect undercover agents. Sometimes the traffickers outsmart themselves by mistakenly believing they know police tactics well enough to avoid detection.
Experienced drug agents know that drug traffickers are rarely on time for meetings to negotiate prices or to actually deliver drugs. Recognizing they are chronically late for important meetings, some suspects believe that anyone who is on time could be an undercover agent.
To further convince the trafficker that he is dealing with another drug dealer, surveillance agents should arrive at the meeting location in time to see when the suspect arrives. They can then alert the undercover agent to then drive into the parking lot a few minutes later, giving the illusion that he was also late for the meeting.
If surveillance agents cannot positively place the suspect at the meet location, the undercover agent should arrive a minimum of 15 minutes late for any meeting with the suspect in case the suspect has counter-surveillance in place to tell the trafficker when the undercover agent arrived. If the suspect is not there, the agent should wait no more than 15 to 20 minutes for the suspect to arrive, and then depart the area. Drug dealers have been known to hire counter-surveillance persons specifically to tell them how long the undercover agent waited at the meeting location before leaving. Traffickers believe that undercover agents not only have the responsibility to arrive on time, but will also remain at the location until the suspect arrives, regardless of how long that may be. In the mind of some suspects, the longer the drug customer remains waiting for them to arrive, the greater the likelihood this customer is an undercover drug agent.
With this in mind, supervisors should set a strict time limit for the suspect to arrive at the meeting, as well as for the suspect to return to the undercover agent with the drugs. In the case of a delivery, if the suspect is late by 20 to 30 minutes, the undercover agent should be instructed to leave the area and not return without first hearing from the suspect. In the mind of the suspect, the longer his customer waits for the drugs to be delivered, the greater the likelihood he is dealing with an undercover agent. Further, undercover agents should always leave the meeting location and return later to meet the suspect to take delivery of drugs rather than wait at the location the entire time. This will help prevent the suspect’s accomplices from robbing the undercover agent and keeps him or her away from possible counter-surveillance at the location.
Some drug suspects firmly believe that if they ask the undercover agent if he or she is a law enforcement officer, and he or she denies it, that anything they say from that point cannot be used against them in court. This, of course, is nonsense, but it can be used by the undercover agent to further convince the suspect he or she is not a police officer.
Another technique designed to reinforce in the drug trafficker’s mind that he is not dealing with an undercover agent, is for the agent to ask the trafficker if he is a police officer. Most traffickers immediately become defensive, and this can help dispel the notion the undercover agent is anything other than another drug dealer.
The undercover agent can also ask the trafficker’s permission to physically check him for the presence of wire transmitters or tape recorders. This can be accomplished in a public restroom, or in the undercover agent’s vehicle. This again will put the trafficker on the defensive, and it also allows the agent to search the suspect for weapons he may be carrying. Also, if a transmitter or tape recorder is found on the suspect, it will mean that the suspect is probably a police informant targeting the undercover agent in a reverse sting operation. A reverse sting is when an undercover agent or informant poses as a drug seller, instead of drug buyer, for the purpose of seizing the suspect’s money he intended to use to purchase the drugs, therefore depriving him of the means to do so. Suspects the police arrest can be charged with attempting to commit a drug crime or drug conspiracy, if applicable.
Some traffickers also believe that drug agents do not work at night, weekends, or especially holidays. They are convinced that if an undercover agent will not agree to consummate a drug transaction on any of these days, he must be working for the police.
What these traffickers do not understand is that many drug agents often work at night, on weekends, and on holidays when necessary, although many undoubtedly would prefer not to. An undercover agent can defeat the trafficker’s intention of completing the drug deal on a weekend or holiday by the agent being the first to suggest it. The agent should tell the suspect he knows that drug agents do not work at night, weekends, or holidays, and he would prefer to do a drug transaction then to help avoid detection. The suspect will most likely agree. As the agreed upon date approaches, the agent should call the suspect and reemphasize the importance of doing the deal on that particular day.
A day or so before the event, in what will seem to be a sudden, unexpected change, the agent should either personally meet with or telephone the suspect and tell him that something has suddenly come up, e.g., insistent girlfriend, sick relative, conflicting drug deal, etc., requiring his or her presence elsewhere for the entire weekend or holiday period. The agent promises that immediately upon his or her return, the deal will be consummated.
The agent can go so far as to furnish the suspect with a telephone number he can be reached while out of town for the weekend or holiday period. By providing the suspect with an undercover telephone number used by an out of town or out of state police agency, the suspect should be further convinced the agent’s excuse is valid. What the suspect does not realize is that the agent has already made arrangements to have all incoming calls to that out of town number forwarded back to his home telephone number, so he or she can talk to the suspect if need be.
If the suspect believes the undercover agent’s feelings about doing a drug transaction on a weekend, he will most likely agree to sell the drugs to the agent during normal working hours. Most drug dealers know that undercover agents will never provide them with their home address or telephone number. To overcome this, an undercover agent can provide the suspect with a telephone number purported to be his or her home phone number. The suspect will not realize the number is actually to an undercover telephone, located at the office, with an attached answering machine featuring the undercover agent’s voice urging the caller to leave a message or to page him. In cooperation with the local telephone company, an out-of-town area code can be installed in the office. The agent can periodically check the machine for messages while either at the office or remotely from the undercover agent’s residence. The suspect can then be called back from the agent’s home telephone, provided the caller I.D. feature the suspect may have has been blocked by the agent.
The agent can also have his or her undercover telephone forward all telephone calls directly to his or her actual home telephone number after duty hours. With dramatic technical advances in personal communication devices, undercover agents must become familiar with them before using them in any undercover operation.
The Seven Critical Factors Leading to Undercover Violence
Undercover violence is defined as any violence directed towards the undercover agent or support personnel during an undercover operation. This violence may include injuries sustained by undercover or support personnel by friendly fire coming from surveillance agents.
Robbery is the most common reason behind undercover violence, whether it is to steal the agent’s flash roll or drugs used during a reverse sting operation. Whenever money or drugs are exposed, the risk of robbery climbs dramatically.
Violence is sometimes directed towards undercover agents in retaliation for them causing the arrest of a suspect. Undercover agents should always be alert for defendants who may seek retribution after they have been identified as law enforcement officials, whether they are at work or home.
The DEA conducted a study to determine what factors contribute to violence after five special agents were murdered while performing undercover roles during investigations over a three-year period. The DEA correctly identified that factors such as increased trafficker paranoia stemming from the use of mind altering drugs, coupled with a significant increase in mandatory prison sentences, created an incentive for the dealer to either fight or flee. Further, the proclivity toward violence from some foreign trafficking groups and the large amounts of money involved during drug transactions were all included in the recipe of violence during undercover operations.
Poor Operational Planning
A complete operational plan should be mandatory for any undercover operation. Supervisors should discuss and approve such plans with the undercover and case agents before any briefing is conducted. At a minimum, the plan should reflect the potential risk the undercover agent will be exposed to, and how it will be countered. It should always include prebuy surveillance of the suspect and the location of the meeting, surveillance of the undercover agent and flash roll, preapproved alternate meeting locations, distress signals, the arrest signal, and an arrest plan. The approving supervisor, who will be at the enforcement operation, should allow for some flexibility in the operational plan.
Making the Arrest
Arguably the most dangerous action the undercover agent could perform is to attempt to personally arrest the trafficker immediately after taking possession of the drugs he has just purchased. The trafficker has obviously been convinced he has been dealing with another drug dealer or user, and for the undercover agent to suddenly revert to his law enforcement identity will confuse and disorient the suspect. He will immediately believe he is being robbed of the money he just received and may act in self-defense. For this reason, the undercover agent should maneuver him or herself as far away from the scene of the arrest as possible. If the arrest team arrives before the undercover agent has had the opportunity to depart the area, he or she must take a defensive position to prepare for any violent actions that may immediately follow.
Managing the Flash Roll
Mismanaging flash rolls is the single most critical factor in undercover violence. The drug trafficker will constantly assess the undercover agent for his vulnerability to robbery. Most traffickers are in the business to make money, but some believe they can get away with rip-offs if the circumstances are right since the victim is not likely to report the robbery to the police. Even without ever seeing money, if the trafficker realizes that the undercover agent has access to a large sum of money, he may attempt to kidnap the agent to hold him hostage until the money is exchanged for his freedom.
To avoid these problems, the undercover agent should never let the trafficker know, or even assume where the money is being kept either before or after a displaying of the money has been completed. The undercover agent should make it clear to the trafficker through his or her conversations with him that he will not have access to the money again until the drugs are delivered to him.
When drug agents elect to conduct a scheduled flash of the money instead of a surprise flash, they are unnecessarily exposing the undercover agent to danger. Drug agents should always strive to display money using the surprise tactic, thereby preventing the trafficker from formulating a plan to steal it. For further details, see Chapter 8 on flash roll management.
Poor Communication
Every undercover agent should be equipped with, at a minimum, a pager or a cellular telephone so his or her supervisor and surveillance team can remain in constant communication. The undercover agent needs to be alerted in the event the surveillance team detects counter-surveillance or other indicators of a possible robbery.
The use of such devices is so important to agent safety to justify canceling or delaying the scheduled undercover meeting until such time they can be obtained. Even if the undercover agent is engaged in conversation with the trafficker inside a restaurant, it would not be unusual for him or her to receive a call on a cellular telephone from his “money man” or some other person. Certain codes can be displayed on pagers that will alert the undercover agent to immediately leave the area or make a telephone call to the case agent for updates on the observations made by the surveillance team.
Complacency
Complacency is a real danger that is especially prevalent with more experienced drug agents. Although many undercover operations are similar, none are ever the same. Each undercover meeting and operation has a high potential for danger, and the undercover agent cannot predict the intentions of the drug trafficker based on his or her past experiences with him.
Complacency coupled with the attitude that “it will never happen to me,” is a dangerous combination for an undercover agent. He must constantly be on guard and approach each undercover situation as an entirely new challenge where surprises are the norm. Supervisors should look for signs of complacency among his or her subordinates and consider removing them from undercover roles until a new attitude emerges.
Inaccessibility of Undercover Weapons
The decision to carry a weapon while undercover should be the sole discretion of the agent. However, if a weapon is going to be carried, then he or she should make it readily accessible if the need should arise. Various commercially made holsters are on the market that provide complete concealment, however, they are not always easily accessible. Unexpected situations can arise in which the undercover agent may need immediate access to a firearm. He or she should use these hidden holsters while qualifying at the pistol range to insure they are familiar with their operation and reduce the time needed to draw their weapons.
Making Inaccurate Conclusions from Accurate Observations
Danger can arise when drug agents draw inaccurate conclusions based on accurate observations, and then make operational decisions based upon them. Drug agents must remain aware, stay alert, and keep an open mind during undercover operations. Experienced agents may see something entirely different from an inexperienced one. There is no substitute for experience, especially when the undercover agent’s life may be on the line.
Drug agents must have constant, free flowing intelligence information from surveillance, technical listening devices, and open sources in order to make appropriate conclusions about the intentions of drug traffickers. Constant, thorough debriefings of any informants involved will help drug agents make accurate conclusions.
Summary
Undercover agents face the most dangerous aspect of drug law enforcement. They come face to face with drug criminals as the crime is occurring. They are exposed to dangerous criminals who may be bent on robbing them of their money. The suspects the undercover agents encounter may not think twice about robbing or even killing someone they perceive as being another drug dealer. Suspects reason that their victims will either not report the crime to the police or their death will not generate much police interest.
Undercover agents need to adequately prepare for every assignment they face. If the agent is exposed as a police officer, it could create serious safety problems for the CI who introduced the drug dealer to the agent. They must have sufficient documents in their undercover identities to convince a suspect he is not dealing with the police. His or her cover story must be rehearsed with the informant to further credibility.
Agents selected for undercover assignments should have those traits most seasoned police detectives have and, above all, be willing to accept the inherent dangers associated with this type of work. Agents unable or unwilling to perform undercover assignments should not be forced by supervisors into these roles.
All operational planning must be designed with the safety of the undercover agent in mind. Supervisors must review and approve these plans before any operation is conducted. Even if drug agents always follow proper procedures and strictly adhere to the seven critical factors of undercover violence, they will still be exposed to an element of danger inherent to the job. However, following the steps identified by the research conducted by the DEA minimizes this risk.
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Also:
Flash Roll Management
A flash roll is a sum of money displayed to a drug trafficker by an undercover agent, for a brief amount of time, to prove he or she has the means to purchase a quantity of drugs under negotiation. When, where, and how to display departmental funds to known criminals is something drug enforcement supervisors need to fully understand.
The objective of doing a money flash is to convince the suspect the undercover agent can buy the drugs, while at the same time protecting the money from theft or robbery. There are several sound reasons for displaying money to drug suspects: (1) money flashes prove the undercover agent is serious about purchasing the drugs under negotiation; (2) it proves he or she has the means to purchase the drugs; (3) the need to later show the money to the suspects again is eliminated; (4) the suspect is forced to verify he has access to drugs by showing them to the undercover agent; and (5) the displaying of money has a tendency to move the case rapidly.
Surprise Flashes vs. Scheduled Flashes
When contemplating displaying money to any criminal, the safety of the undercover agents must always be taken into account. To minimize the danger the undercover agents are exposed to, a technique known as a surprise flash, usually works well.
A surprise flash is when an agent displays money to the drug trafficker, without his prior knowledge, that he believes will be used to purchase drugs at a later time. The money only needs to be shown long enough for the suspect to count it or otherwise be convinced that all the money needed for the pending drug transaction is there.
One drawback to surprise flashes is that the money may be displayed to a suspect who does not have credibility with his source of supply. The suspect may vouch for the undercover agent, but if the source of supply does not believe him, the technique will not work in getting the drugs delivered, no matter how many times the money is shown to the suspect. The undercover agent must convince the source of supply to attend a meeting where he and his middleman can both see the “buy” money simultaneously.
Scheduled flashes are when the suspect knows in advance he is going to see the money that will be used to purchase drugs. This should only be done in extraordinary circumstances and only in an extremely controlled environment. Because of the obvious dangers involved, scheduled flashes should be avoided whenever possible.
Creating a Controlled Environment
The challenge to the case agent is to devise a scenario that will minimize the dangers the undercover agent will be exposed to when displaying money to a known criminal. A tightly controlled environment should be created to deter the suspect from ever attempting to steal the money. An example of a controlled environment would be the scheduling of a money flash inside a bank vault where the money is stored in a safety deposit box. Surveillance agents should be positioned inside the bank posing as customers and employees. In general, because of the inherent dangers associated with this technique, scheduled flashes should be avoided.
Surprise flashes in public places help to deter the suspect from robbing the agent of the money. A restaurant, public parking lot at a shopping mall, or similar place works well; however, the suspect will now know that the undercover agent has access to the money. When the amount of money is large enough to temp the suspect to steal it, this will cause significant safety problems that must be overcome. The suspect may later consider kidnapping the informant or the agent, holding him or her hostage until the money is delivered to them. In order to deter this from happening, the undercover agent must make it clear to the suspect that the money does not belong to the agent, but rather it is money pooled from many different investors. Further, that the money will be given back to the investors immediately until such time an agreement is reached on how to take delivery of the drugs. Anything the agent can say to convince the suspect he or she will no longer have access to the money afterwards will go a long way in deterring a robbery.
Using a Second Undercover Agent
Using a second undercover agent in a money flash enhances the safety of the operation and shows the suspect he is dealing with a professional who takes his business dealings seriously. Money that is displayed to any suspect must leave the area as soon as practical. Money flashes can be done in such a manner to reach this objective.
For example, an undercover agent meets with a suspect in a restaurant to further negotiate the price and method of delivery of drugs. The previous agreed upon amount of money needed for the purchase of the drugs is $100,000.
During the negotiations, the undercover agent uses his cellular telephone to call a second undercover agent and tells him or her to meet him at the restaurant. At this point the suspect does not know what the agent is planning.
A few minutes later, the second agent arrives and is seen in the parking lot by the first agent. The primary undercover agent asks the suspect to accompany him outside. When they approach the second agent’s vehicle, the agent places a gym bag on the front passenger seat of the vehicle. The door is locked and the window is closed. He or she unzips the bag and shows the suspect the money inside. The agent fans the bills of each bundle to prove they are all one hundred dollar bills, and bundle counts the ten stacks, each containing ten thousand dollars. He or she then immediately drives off as the first undercover agent and suspect return to the restaurant to continue their discussion about the delivery of the drugs.
To reemphasize, once the money is displayed to the suspects, the agent controlling the money should immediately depart the area. Having the money on hand will increase the danger level to an unacceptable level and make the agents prone to robbery.
In 1988 in Pasadena, CA, two DEA special agents were murdered by a suspect who knew he was going to see $80,000 in cash to buy heroin and insisted the agents accompany him, with the money, to his source of supply’s home. Instead they arrived at a residence picked at random, whereupon, exiting the undercover vehicle, the suspect shot and killed the two agents, shot another one, and stole the flash money.
Once the money is flashed, the question of whether or not the undercover agent has the money to purchase the drugs or not is no longer an issue. The ball, so to speak, is now in the suspect’s court. At this time the primary undercover agent should tell the suspect he will not see the money until he or she sees his drugs.
Many greedy suspects will become motivated to immediately go to their source of supply to ascertain the availability of the drugs. During this time in between the flash and the delivery of the drugs, the primary undercover agent should depart the area to become inaccessible to the suspect except by telephone. Surveillance agents should be standing by to follow the suspect to his source of supply in an effort to identify him and possibly later obtain a search warrant for the premises.
Toll records of telephone numbers called by the suspect immediately after the money flash may reveal the identity of his source of supply.
Use of an Informant to Display the Money
CIs should never be trusted with the government’s funds for money flashes. Informants cannot be trusted to this point and should be told that policy prohibits them from performing this role. Some informants have been known to be in collusion with the suspects for the sole purpose of stealing the flash money.
Informants can, however, do the negotiating and call an undercover agent to conduct the surprise money flash. Any scenario is permissible so long as the informant does not have control and dominion over the flash roll.
Seeing Drugs before Displaying the Money
Both suspects and experienced undercover agents know that the element of danger increases when money and drugs are brought out in the open. Undercover agents should first ask the suspect to prove he has drugs before considering displaying money. Usually, suspects will decline, but they have been known to do so. In any event, the undercover agent should be prepared to show money, especially if the suspect appears reluctant to deal with the agent.
Case agents should keep in mind that many suspects negotiating drug deals do not have the authority to show drugs without first seeing money. Others will bring drugs out with the understanding that the money is in the immediate area, held by another, waiting for word on when to deliver it to the suspect. One of the goals of money flashes is to force the suspect into revealing where his drugs are so law enforcement can seize them.
Flash Roll Preparation
Preparation is key to convincing the suspect he is not dealing with the police. Suspects believe that law enforcement has access to unlimited resources,
money, and manpower to carry out their mission, none of which is usually true. If the traffickers see a flash roll of newly printed currency, neatly stacked and banded in brand new paper band adhesives, it will raise suspicions that the money came from a government source. The money flashed to the suspect must appear to be the proceeds of other drug transactions or criminal activity.
Drug dealers amass large amounts of cash, in various denominations, and usually use rubber bands to hold various amounts of money together. This same thing must be done when preparing money for a flash. Any paper adhesive bands provided by the city treasurer or Federal Reserve Bank must be removed and replaced with various colored rubber bands. The agents should insist on a variety of denominations and then count out bundles, or stacks of money, for quick and easy bundle counts, e.g., stacks of $1000, $5000, or $10,000 are normal.
Some agencies have sealed flash rolls that have been precounted with the serial numbers recorded for use in an operation on short notice. If the precounted flash roll consists of $100,000 and only $50,000 is needed, the balance should remain in a safe and not taken out to the street. Undercover agents should never display more money than the suspect expects to see. Showing more money than absolutely necessary telegraphs to the suspect that he is dealing with someone who is inexperienced and, therefore, prone to making judgment errors. If the situation was reversed, the suspect would never do it, and he will not show you more drugs than he expects to sell.
Summary
Money flashes have long been a successful tool in undercover drug operations. They help convince the suspect that the undercover agent has the means to purchase the drugs he is negotiating for. Displays of money need to be done in a safe manner and in controlled environments.
Using a second undercover agent will enhance the safety of the flash, and show the suspect the undercover agent is professional when it comes to handling and safeguarding money. Because they cannot be trusted, informants should never be allowed to handle the money. A sworn law enforcement officer is a much better choice.
Drug agents should only show the money to the suspect once, and refuse any attempts by him to see it without first insisting on seeing his drugs. Once the flash occurs, the money should immediately be removed from the premises. A second money flash may be the time the suspect intends to rob the undercover agent. Agents should ask to see the drugs before agreeing to show the money again. Once the drugs are shown, the suspects should be arrested.
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Looks like a good read pine! I'll check them all out in the morning! As always your post never fail to deliver
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That works too! lol
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just download the whole book instead http://depositfiles.com/files/uw9nyc4mj
Yes, but until we obtain an intelligence subforum, I will continue this slightly spammish campaign.
- It raises awareness by taking up more screen real estate.
- People are more likely to read a couple of posts than an entire textbook.
- Anybody going to download the entire thing will do so anyway, I've clearly marked its origin.
- Often there is no relationship between a thread's volume of posts and its practical usefulness. It's not enough to say stuff, you must obtain page views too if transmission of information is actually your goal. I mean, if we had a lively indepth forum discussion for each chapter from that book, that would be great.
- Some people don't think LE is looking at them because of the nature of a web forum, to some naive SR members LE agents seem like almost mysteriously mystical creatures when they are nothing of the sort. The 'amazon.com'/'ebay.com' nature of the site is beguilingly normal in that regard.
- Raises Paranoia Level to Pine. This is like Bush's color code thing for terrorist threat level, only there are only two options instead. :P
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what's needed is people to analyze intel, these wall-o-text-o-ramas usually have only a nugget or two of good info hidden somewhere in the middle
while we're posting text dumps, here's one on how to turn dumps into something useful ;)
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/Tradecraft%20Primer-apr09.pdf
Yes I read it. It's great, legitimately good work done by a government official, but it's mostly too high level for what we need here.
Like you say, we need hordes of amateur intelligence analysts poring over this kind of material.
The problem is that:
- Some intel is useful for SR
- Some intel is useful for RL operations (much of what I've posted so far, but there's SR goodies later on)
- Generally speaking, it's hard to say what data is useful for us all. It's trival to pick out data useful for yourself, but more difficult to judge on what's useful for everybody else. Of course there's a general array of data that should be useful to everybody, but still.
Hopefully these threads will provoke some thought about intelligence gathering, intelligence analysis. The vast majority of useful data in practice is open source, not behind any locked doors/firewalls or even paywalls. Not that I would mind some closed source data e.g. internal SR related memos... I mean, plenty of cleaning staff work in DEA offices across the world, some of them are bound to become SR users at some point. Ditto for the USPS postal inspectors and so on.
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Massive LOL that DEA agents need to be told metric amounts. Backward-ass mother fuckers.
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I didn't know it was traditional, but I guess it is now!
;)
Thanks for all this awesome info Pine!
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Massive LOL that DEA agents need to be told metric amounts. Backward-ass mother fuckers.
While the book is well written and informative, it is clear that even high level DEA agents believe we are really quite stupid, actually almost a sub-species from my experience in conversing with them. While annoying, this is also interesting because it strongly implies the DEA are compartmentalizing a great deal, which is always indicative of close minded thinking or higher degrees of religiosity than normal, where something is being accepted on the grounds of belief rather than from the empirical evidence. This is not an aberration in religious circles since the entire point of faith is that it is not evidence based, but it is positively ridiculous for a government agency to adopt beliefs.
There is extreme levels of cognitive dissonance here.
For example, observational evidence suggests the price of most drugs has declined with respect to inflation since the Drug War was declared by Nixon. It is indisputable that young people in particular have little or no difficulty in gaining access to illicit product, in fact it is often when young people move away to work or higher education that they lose access. Also demographics suggest older people become less likely to take illicit products over time in any case, so any so called 'evidence' that drug use declines with age due to DEA influences ought to be examined cynically (something I've been hearing from interviews in the past). The fact of the matter is that the DEA almost never uses rigorous benchmarks, they usually adopt "petitio principii" arguments, basically assuming their premise is true and proceeding from there, which can sound convincing if you're not able to spot it, but any logician or student of philosophy would catch it instantly, it's effectively a circular argument that only entrenches different sides in their original positions. They are not the only side of the 'drug legalization' debate to do so, but I expect better from high ranking government agency officials.
Anyway, cheaper drugs and more widely available drugs could have a lot of reasons offered in explanation, but it definitely doesn't gel with the idea of 'stoopid drug dealers'. It does chime with the claims of criminologists in more recent journals that essentially the DEA is being 'fed' an endless supply of individuals that fit 1 personality profile i.e. cannon fodder by more experienced/intelligent criminals.
The funny thing is that they already must know this, really, but it doesn't matter because this process has simultaneously educated them to be razor sharp, even hyperactive on spotting stereotypical 'black/latin gangatas' vs any other profile and more importantly the DEA is financed by public fears and moral panics so they become biased to producing results by volume of arrests, number of minor busts etc. This is complemented at the atomic level by self interested individuals who know they're more likely to be promoted on volume (so called 'results'). Actually this is classic problem for any government agency as libertarians will already be aware. It must be very frustrating for DEA agents at mid level who've worked out the first problem, but don't quite grasp the second one.
This means the truth is perversely that the DEA has absolutely no underlying economic incentive, no matter how vitriolic/passionate its supporters become, to actually stop the supply of illicit product. There is a reason why organized crime cartels indirectly sponsor 'just say no' campaigns in schools, it creates the right mix of conditions to keep prices up (via demand by indirect advertising) and allows more supply to be absorbed (widening of consumer base) to produce uber-profits. I would go further and predict that within months of the DEA being wound up, that overall drug *demand* would plateau among the youth population due to psychological factors.
The other almost cinematic illusion they and the media suffer from is that there is a criminal super genius somewhere who monitors and controls the 'drones', and that if we could only nab that fellow, it'll all be over. Well, that's been tried too, and it hasn't worked. The strength of the black market lies in the network, not in particular individuals.
As for the approach of conspiracy laws (get 'em all), I think their very premise is completely unjust. They literally come from the Dark Ages, as you'll see later in more updates. More importantly they don't work either, because the market's network is bigger than the DEA's network. A critical network component could easily be a law abiding citizen as an actual criminal with a plan. In any case the network with the biggest GDP wins, that's the lesson of every real prolonged war in history, that rule hasn't suddenly changed.
tldr; There is a symbiotic relationship between the DEA and organized crime on a multitude of levels. DEA = Didn't do Economics Agency.
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Massive LOL that DEA agents need to be told metric amounts. Backward-ass mother fuckers.
While the book is well written and informative, it is clear that even high level DEA agents believe we are really quite stupid, actually almost a sub-species from my experience in conversing with them. While annoying, this is also interesting because it strongly implies the DEA are compartmentalizing a great deal, which is always indicative of close minded thinking or higher degrees of religiosity than normal, where something is being accepted on the grounds of belief rather than from the empirical evidence. This is not an aberration in religious circles since the entire point of faith is that it is not evidence based, but it is positively ridiculous for a government agency to adopt beliefs.
There is extreme levels of cognitive dissonance here.
For example, observational evidence suggests the price of most drugs has declined with respect to inflation since the Drug War was declared by Nixon. It is indisputable that young people in particular have little or no difficulty in gaining access to illicit product, in fact it is often when young people move away to work or higher education that they lose access. Also demographics suggest older people become less likely to take illicit products over time in any case, so any so called 'evidence' that drug use declines with age due to DEA influences ought to be examined cynically (something I've been hearing from interviews in the past). The fact of the matter is that the DEA almost never uses rigorous benchmarks, they usually adopt "petitio principii" arguments, basically assuming their premise is true and proceeding from there, which can sound convincing if you're not able to spot it, but any logician or student of philosophy would catch it instantly, it's effectively a circular argument that only entrenches different sides in their original positions. They are not the only side of the 'drug legalization' debate to do so, but I expect better from high ranking government agency officials.
Anyway, cheaper drugs and more widely available drugs could have a lot of reasons offered in explanation, but it definitely doesn't gel with the idea of 'stoopid drug dealers'. It does chime with the claims of criminologists in more recent journals that essentially the DEA is being 'fed' an endless supply of individuals that fit 1 personality profile i.e. cannon fodder by more experienced/intelligent criminals.
The funny thing is that they already must know this, really, but it doesn't matter because this process has simultaneously educated them to be razor sharp, even hyperactive on spotting stereotypical 'black/latin gangatas' vs any other profile and more importantly the DEA is financed by public fears and moral panics so they become biased to producing results by volume of arrests, number of minor busts etc. This is complemented at the atomic level by self interested individuals who know they're more likely to be promoted on volume (so called 'results'). Actually this is classic problem for any government agency as libertarians will already be aware. It must be very frustrating for DEA agents at mid level who've worked out the first problem, but don't quite grasp the second one.
This means the truth is perversely that the DEA has absolutely no underlying economic incentive, no matter how vitriolic/passionate its supporters become, to actually stop the supply of illicit product. There is a reason why organized crime cartels indirectly sponsor 'just say no' campaigns in schools, it creates the right mix of conditions to keep prices up (via demand by indirect advertising) and allows more supply to be absorbed (widening of consumer base) to produce uber-profits. I would go further and predict that within months of the DEA being wound up, that overall drug *demand* would plateau among the youth population due to psychological factors.
The other almost cinematic illusion they and the media suffer from is that there is a criminal super genius somewhere who monitors and controls the 'drones', and that if we could only nab that fellow, it'll all be over. Well, that's been tried too, and it hasn't worked. The strength of the black market lies in the network, not in particular individuals.
As for the approach of conspiracy laws (get 'em all), I think their very premise is completely unjust. They literally come from the Dark Ages, as you'll see later in more updates. More importantly they don't work either, because the market's network is bigger than the DEA's network. A critical network component could easily be a law abiding citizen as an actual criminal with a plan. In any case the network with the biggest GDP wins, that's the lesson of every real prolonged war in history, that rule hasn't suddenly changed.
tldr; There is a symbiotic relationship between the DEA and organized crime on a multitude of levels. DEA = Didn't do Economics Agency.
You make a very good point, what I was inferring is that it's a bit retarded that they need to be schooled in the Metric system and that America is pretty backward to still use Imperial. :P
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What we REALLY need is more IT and cyber related intel and countermeasures.
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DEA = Didn't do Economics Agency.
Do you have a source for this?
Just kidding -- that's a pretty good one. So obviously true.