Quote from: astor on April 13, 2013, 11:39 pmI actually hold the opposite opinion. I think hidden services are more dangerous than clearnet sites, because the operators know that the people visiting hidden services have something to hide. Do you think that operators of google.com, hotmail.com or cnn.com give a shit about people coming from exit nodes? Someone running a hidden service has a reason to be much more interested in their visitors' identities.I generally browse hidden services with NoScript enabled, but I browse clearnet sites with NoScript disabled, 1) because blocking javascript breaks 80% of clearnet sites, and 2) because I figure they are far less interested in who I am. Even sites that make money through advertising and tracking, they can trivially track 95% of their users with cookies. They don't care about the people behind proxies.We need a better mechanism for secret webmail. Some kind of open system like the bitcoin block chain, where all emails are accessible, but in which traffic analysis is impossible, and all non-PGPed emails are dropped. Then there is no incentive to seize the servers and the service can be endlessly replicated by people not connected to the service operators.You should know that any website could probably make an educated guess that you're on Tor without checking your IP. Here take a look:***** CLEARNET WARNING !!! ************ EXTREMEEE DANGER ******https://panopticlick.eff.org/****** EXTREMEEE DANGER *********** CLEARNET WARNING !!! ******      :D Couldn't resist.Although Tor is the most resistant against a panopticlick style fingerprinting, it'd still be easy to use it as an educated guess. As for everybody else with a clearnet browser, with Flash and Java and JavaScript switched on. Well. They're fucked really, a big number of them are unique.