^ Agreed with the above. As Guru has said, perhaps we have not emphasized enough that those people selling USB 'security' solutions on here are not to be trusted. Even if the software is validated as legit when you get it, there could easily be a hardware exploit on the chip, these are very difficult to spot, in fact there is famously a political problem between China and America because neither party is quite sure whether to trust each other's hardware. Cisco and others are distrusted by China, and America doesn't trust Huawai, probably correctly. They have numerous sorting plants for analyzing each others stuff to ensure in the event of a war that all our comms wouldn't suddenly melt down when somebody in China or America flips a switch. The Europeans are especially naive in this area to be honest, they rely on American intelligence on this stuff way too much, they seem to think it's somebody else's problem because, well, they're retarded. I mean, UK/Germany/France probably know what's up, but I think it's very unlikely most of their satellite states are being proactive about the potential for a catastrophe. Anyway, that's a bit OT :DNot only do ISPs and VPNs keep logs (often by being incredibly vague or economical with the truth e.g. not storing your info directly, but info about your info), but they also sell this information to 3rd parties. Whether this is even legal is a moot point, the point is that it happens in practice, this is not conspiracyplanet.com here it's practically standard business practice, so watch it.A: You cannot trust anybody else.B: There is an exception to (A) that proves the general rule, you can trust yourself.So, even if you are not the world's greatest security guru (lowercase 'g'!), you don't need to be. You just need to fully understand what it is that you're doing, and take small incremental steps until you understand more and can do more interesting stuff. I sometimes think people get nervous when they people on the forum talking about hi-tech security concepts, and then maybe they feel the need to shell out $ to some expert to make themselves feel up to date. Don't win a battle and lose the war. In other words, in short:You cannot outsource your security.--More philosophically, we are approaching an era of swarming intelligence, where networks are composed of semi autonomous nodes capable of self determination. The hierarchical structures of organized crime are now obsolete. Today, we are all independent contractors, working in a marketplace. It's going to take quite a while for even ourselves to understand the full implications of this if I'm honest.LEO will try to categorize us into a "conspiracy" because that's the only thing they know when faced with complex organized crime. But this is not actually a conspiracy, this is a market. We are working for DPR in the same sense a citizen of the world is working for the president of some particular country. There can be many citizens, countries and presidents, but it does not follow that we are all aware of, and being directly told what to do. To categorize SR as a conspiracy, which they almost certainly are thinking of it as, is as stupid as thinking a citizen of the US snorting a line of coke is working for the Colombian cartels. It is connected yes. It is organized, yes. But it is not the same thing.This is of course difficult for LEO to swallow, since it implies anybody captured or intercepted beyond DPR should not face conspiracy charges. Trouble is that DPR could be literally just one person, and you need >1 person for a conspiracy. So this is somewhat troubling for LE from a legal perspective. Either they adopt somewhat Orwellian approaches (buyers being charged with being part of a criminal network, such that they are responsible for any crimes committed by other members of that network, even if they were unaware of them) or they become much more liberal about online darknet markets. It might stick in their craw, but the second option is preferable to any pragmatist even if they're against decriminalization.Edit:http://www.rand.org/pubs/documented_briefings/DB311.html