I wasn't arguing that blind mixes needed improving as a concept kmfkewn. I was saying that the way it is delivered is important. Unlike GPG or the Tor software, LEA has a very great motive to surveillance/exploit such software as that which compromises a blind mix. A judge would never give the go ahead for exploits in something like everybody's copy of GPG, but in "money laundering software"? Yes I think so.Source code auditing is always important, but I'm trying to put across the point that it is extremely so in this case and even that it would be better if we had some method of guaranteeing per software use that the software only did what it was supposed to, since not everybody can be expected to read lines of code and then compile from source each them they use it. Maybe it is not possible, or more probably not very easy, but it is not a ridiculous idea considering that such software would ultimately become the defacto foundation for the entire black market bitcoin economy. It's pretty much got to be a bulletproof way of preventing exploits becoming possible.Vague thought: If we had one 'perfect' never changing version of a blind mix. Then we could audit it in such a way to guarantee there was no exploit trickery e.g. lots of experienced eyeballs staring at it, and then have it written to read only disks/special write-once flash drives etc. Then those could be distributed throughout the community and copied, but not altered. Could use SHA hash to validate that each disk/flash drive contained the legitimate copy.Anyway, I am not feeling well today and don't have any wonderfully original ideas to offer, I just think it's a super important issue and now I must go discover some caffeine dispensing apparatus in the lobby.