Quote from: kmfkewm on August 14, 2012, 12:27 amThey could encrypt it when they are not using it ?? Then hide it in a video file with stego ?Of course, but it is not physical discovery of the file that concerns me. It's a factor, but not a terribly important one unless anonymity is compromised, my real concern is below:Quote from: dkmonk on August 14, 2012, 12:34 amThat wouldn't implicate them anymore than using tor or PGP. It is just another tool to stay anonymous and we have every right to practice this.Like the other poster above me said you could put it on your encrypted USB if you are worried.I'd be more cautious about advocating my rights and more especially in expecting them to protect me, I don't expect LE to play by Marquis of Queensbury rules and neither should you. Unfortunately they are no gentlemen in that regard (this is something that has changed over the course of the Drug War), even though many smuggling organizations do adhere to a strict honor code, usually inspired by ethnicity bonds and issues of practicality in evasive tactics. The Snakeheads for example, despite a fearsome reputation in the general media, are almost always honorable men that have done a great many invisible good deeds in this world and Capitalism owes them a debt. They are nothing less than modern day heros in South East Asia. If we didn't there would be a far more fearsome body count. When I said the DEA were outnumbered, I wasn't using a metaphor, they cannot afford open war against the black market no matter what they claim in public. They are Chihuahua to our Doberman, and would emit a brief high pitched squeak if they ever encountered their real opposition directly ;-) If you want evidence for my world view, there's plenty to spare in Mexico.--More to the point, I am not concerned about physical discovery of such software because of anonymity.No, I am more worried about one of us working for a LEA and installing an exploit into such a software on the client OR betraying data on transactions via the server by using a bait and switch. That is not an accusation, simply that this would clearly be an extremely affective way at undermining the black market using B$. Temptation beckons! A poisoned chalice it would surely be too for any such subscriber.Of course I don't trust the current bitcoin laundry facilities either, but it seems to me that working out a solution that doesn't rely on trust is the key thing here. For example, I would assume GPG and Tor *could* contain exploits, but that they would only be used in times of extraordinary conflict, not on something like SR. As I've said before, we have a unique kind of political protection. A bitcoin laundry is another matter. That is why I have always advocated using two factor bitcoin anonymity, both physically in the real world by obtaining bitcoin with cash, and virtually by using mixes.Perhaps I am spoiled with cryptographically assured trust systems like signed PGP, but it seems to me a real solution has not been yet purposed that doesn't depend on a lack of corruption among the developers. Not arguing for perfection here, just think it should be conceptualized differently to the way things are normally done. Blind mixes are fantastic idea, but only if they work as advertised without 'features'. How can one guarantee such a thing? Some genuine out of the box thinking is required. I mean look at cryptographically signed certificates on the normal web, what a bunch of crap that is. It depends on the persuasive power of the agency wanting to compromise them, i.e. we are cryptographically back to square one, with cryptography operating in favor of the strong but not the weak, not exactly at peace with crypto-anarchy there are we.Argumentum ad verecundiam may be often completely correct, witness the peer review process of science, but because it is an argument on the bias of expecting future perfection indefinitely it is at heart a horribly flawed piece of logic.tldr; We can do better than this.