In some cases it can prevent them from seeing what you are sending, but it cannot prevent them from seeing who you are sending it to. And in many cases knowing who you are sending something to is enough for them to determine what you are sending. If NSA is correlating my traffic right now, they can see I sent a message of a certain size to SR forum. Quick timing and stream size analysis will allow them to determine this is the message I sent, despite the fact that it was encrypted all the way to the server. We are not by any means only worried about the NSA cracking 1,024 bit DH and RSA. We are also worried about traffic analysis, and hacking of Tor relays to aide in traffic analysis. Also, some people now think the NSA can crack 1,024 bit DH and RSA without the key. Freenet is the only network I am aware of that provides plausible deniability. It is kind of mid-latency. Mix networks do prevent timing correlation attacks, but they also prevent a hell of a lot of other attacks. Also, I see no reason why they cannot be used for commerce. Do you really need to get updates every two seconds? Or can you wait an hour or two after someone makes a post before you can see it? Do you need your posts to be visible right after you hit post, or can you wait and hour or two for people to see it? Even adding an hour or two of delay between messages being posted and messages being available will give the possibility of having exponentially more anonymity than Tor has. Wrong, timing attacks still work against I2P, especially in the face of a global external attacker. At best I2P might be able to (I bet it can) add plausible deniability from timing attacks if the attacker is only internal at the target (IE: the clients entry node, not the clients ISP). If everybody was a relay and the botnet was as well, the owner of the botnet would have broken Tor anonymity entirely. They have 5,000,000 nodes, there are like 500,000 legitimate Tor users a day. If Tor had the same model as I2P this Botnet would have totally deanonymized everybody.