that is not the problem with networks like Tor, at all. The more people who use an anonymity network, the better it is. Physical anonymous communication sounds, well, not feasible at all for a large group of people around the entire world to do? Not very anonymous probably, depending on how it is implemented? We saying scrap Tor and start from scratch because Tor model is fucked. I2P model is fucked. VPN model is fucked. Proxy model is fucked. These were always toy technologies to begin with. The real anonymity has always been in the mix network designs. When they made these low latency solutions they said "high latency is not really that user friendly, but it assumes a super strong attacker. Let's try to make it user friendly by assuming a vastly weaker attacker, and hope that there are no super strong attackers". There was a super strong attacker, it was NSA. And GCHQ. And other SIGINT agencies. And they shared intelligence with police, which was a surprise to many including myself. And they networked together into essentially international massive intelligence cooperatives, Australia + UK + Canada + USA SIGINT = tremendously powerful attacker, the type of attacker that the mix networks hoped to protect from but way way past what Tor was ever meant to protect from, way way past what I2P or proxy or VPN was ever meant to protect from. Not only that, but research into these technologies ended up showing over time that they were not even as good against the weaker attackers they set out to protect from as they hoped to be at first. And that research is just stacking up paper after paper. They aimed to add user friendlyness to anonymity by making these technologies, and the cost was to protect from a much weaker attacker than the mix networks. But they under estimated the strength of the attackers in reality and they under estimated how much their designs would weaken the anonymity properties of their networks against the weaker attackers they aimed to protect from. The end result is that their networks are not safe to trust your life to, because not only are there big powerful attackers in reality who they thought they didn't need to protect from because they thought they didn't exist, but the weaker attackers they tried to protect from who they knew existed turned out to be able to do a lot more against their networks than they originally thought they would be able to do. It is a double whammy combo punch and the result is these technologies are KO'ed. Time to bring in the heavy weight boxers, and those are the mix networks, the PIR based solutions, the DC-net based solutions, the covert channel based solutions, etc. Not the low latency proxy with some fancy encryption and padding solutions.