Essentially I think that Tor is the RSA-1,024 of anonymity networks. In 2004 it was more than good enough. In 2013 it looks like it is probably already breakable by the most powerful attackers. Data retention laws are becoming more prevalent, NSA is monitoring as much of the internet as it can, the FBI is well past carnivore, more and more sophisticated attacks are being discovered, etc. Tor is roughly as untraceable as a single hop proxy. If the attacker is monitoring the site you visit, the middle and exit nodes are all but worthless. If the attacker owns your entry node, you are fucked. Entry guards rotate every 30 to 60 days. We need a network that protects from edge timing attacks, and we need a network that provides deniability in the event that an edge timing attack is successful. The only way we can obtain this, that I am aware of, is via time delayed mixing, uniform padding, variable path length and all nodes routing.