AHH second time I try and make this fucking post I hope it sticks this time (copy to clipboard this time at least): Indeed there are several ways in which you can minimize the risk of this sort of attack. Clearly not carrying a cellphone with you is a good idea, additionally you can use Tor bridges. However, there are still some potential things to keep in mind. One thing is that some cities have license plate geopositioning technology that is nearly as accurate as cellphone geopositioning. Additionally there is always the risk that simply moving in a random fashion could be enough to flag you as a suspect. I imagine that very few people move in a truly random fashion. Of course there are taxi drivers and delivery people, however they can likely be filtered out to a large extent as their movement patterns fall inline with those you would expect of someone who holds such an occupation, they will not be the same movement patterns that a vendor who drops of packs at random boxes will have. This presents a sort of catch-22, on the one hand you may make yourself more vulnerable to geopositioning intelligence flagging you for moving randomly, on the other hand you will certainly make yourself weaker to traditional surveillance if you always follow the same schedule and use the same set of drop boxes for sending outgoing packages. I am inclined to believe that given a choice between the two, it is better for you to make yourself weaker to being flagged for moving randomly than it is to make yourself weaker to traditional surveillance by always sending from the same small set of boxes in a set schedule. Another thing to keep in mind is that the sort of attack discussed does not entirely rely on cellphone geopositioning data or even on license plate geopositioning data. It relies on geopositioning data in general , without regard to how that data was gathered. For example imagine an assassin, a hitman for hire. One month he kills someone in Alicesville, the next month someone in Bobsville and the next someone Carolsville. For the most part he is secure, except while he is in each city he uses his credit card to purchase a cup of coffee. Now law enforcement with access to financial transaction data can intersect the sets of credit cards identified as used in these cities, and they will see that some number of credit cards were used in all three cities. They will additionally be able to see that some of the credit cards were used in the three cities in the same order that the assassinations were carried out. Depending on the closeness of the cities and how cross contaminated the set size of credit cards used in them is, this attack could very well be enough for them to narrow in to only one person; the assassin. Another possibility is that the assassin has paid for an airplane ticket to each of the three cities in which the hits were carried out. The fundamental attack here is an intersection attack. Intersection attacks can take crowds that by themselves are essentially meaningless and then filter the noise away, leaving only the most likely targets. The list of credit cards used in Alicesville is not going to by itself help the investigators identify their target, the list contains credit cards belonging to far more people than their targeted assassin. However, as soon as they intersect that list with the list of credit cards used in Bobsville, they will filter away an enormous amount of that noise. Normally it doesn't take very many intersections before a target is identified. This sort of crowd intersecting attack is one of the fundamental methods used in a large amount of intelligence and investigatory work. Another fundamental attack is a correlation attack, whether it involves a correlation between the timing characteristics of packets at two points on an encrypted tunnel or a correlation between tire marks left in the mud at a murder scene and the tires on a suspects vehicle. Sorry, I wrote this out a bit nicer the first two times, but now I am sick of writing this large post out and just pounded it out from memory the best I could.