Silk Road forums

We really need to organize the people on SR to start doing things like this, throwing in a bit of coke with all the other mail at a bunch of blue boxes. If enough people do this it will seriously hurt their ability to use not only electronic noses, but real drug dog noses. Turn their sensitivity against them to make them hit on everything . After all a hit is a hit as far as a drug dog goes anyway, an electronic nose can probably filter out noise a little better though.

meth is serious business, while government adds might well be showing worst case scenarios its not the same as the 'reefer madness' at all.

It IS really addictive, it IS really bad for your body and mind.

That said your not gona get physical cravings after afew bumps/burns or whatever, your teeth arnt gona fall out if you use it sparingly. but still be careful, potentially really bad stuff if it turn out to be your drug of choice

I disagree. Smoking meth a few times can cause you to develop spontaneous cravings for it (although I am not sure if I would consider them physical....it really is best compared to a nicotine craving. I don't know if even heavy use of meth will cause physical cravings though...that is the heroin route of addiction. With meth it is mental) , and apparently they don't go away much if at all over time. For me, the spontaneous cravings are sometimes intense even, but pass after a few minutes. And they are very rare. But I was by no means a heavy or even regular meth user. I smoked it about a dozen times and sniffed it once. I think smoked it is probably far more addictive, a lot of the craving is just for the feel of the smoke and the full process of melting it down and twisting the pipe and blowing out a huge ass cloud of smooth cool chemical smoke.

for me I define a meth craving as a spontaneous thought about meth, with a strange sort of vivis/primal recall about the effects and process of smoking it in the past (remembering what it is like to feel the high, have the smoke in my lungs etc), and an almost subconcious desire / drive to repeat that process , despite my actual concious state not wanting to experience that drive / desire / 'sensory recall'

Know why there are not comparable prices on SR? Because if Ene did sheets for $350 here he would have to keep the money in escrow and risk doing sheets for $175 if a customer decided to scam him. Plus he would need to pay the 10% or whatever it is SR fee. It just isn't feasible to offer products so cheaply when you are paying a per order fee + risking 50% of the total income on every sale. This is made up for by nearly doubling prices.

Then again, one could very well say the reason SR is still around is the fact that it is essentially self sustaining from a profit perspective. Making money from SR is a good move on SR admins part. and the vendors not selling single sheets to hundreds of people. Enelysion sold over 100k hits on OVDB. And escrow would have come in handy on OVDB toward the end when tarp fucked off and fairy fucked off.

http://www.allbusiness.com/public-administration/justice-public-order/945883-1.html

Illicit drug use is a disruptive and dangerous element in the prison environment. In 1996, the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC) began a comprehensive program of drug interdiction and inmate drug testing and treatment that highlighted this point. Within two years, program evaluators saw a dramatic reduction in inmate drug use, with a corresponding reduction of assaults on staff by 57 percent and on fellow inmates by 70 percent. An additional far-reaching benefit of stopping inmates' drug use is their improved chances for rehabilitation and successful reentry into society.

The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) and the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) are looking for ways to give correctional officers a high-tech helping hand to defeat drugsmuggling attempts aimed at the prison mail system. Once a scientific luxury, drug detection systems that can detect drug residue to levels less than a nanogram (0.000000001 grams) now are affordable, reliable, portable and commercially available. The U.S. Customs Service, law enforcement organizations and correctional institutions already are using these systems in a variety of settings with great success. NIU and BOP want to know if they will work as successfully in prison mailrooms. To answer that question, NIJ partnered with the Department of Defense's (DOD) Counterdrug Technology Development Program Office (CDTDPO) to study mailroom operations, survey available detection technologies and evaluate those technologies for improving mailroom drug screening.

Drug Interdiction in a Princen Mailroom

Last August, the CDTDPO team visited the mailroom at the U.S. Penitentiary (USP) in Leavenworth, Kan., to observe, document and analyze the processes undertaken by mailroom staff on a typical day. The idea was to obtain practitioner input prior to planning the technical evaluation. The team monitored mailroom personnel throughout the entire process of inspection and distribution of incoming mail - starting with picking up mail at the post office and concluding with the placement of mail in inmates' mailboxes. From their observations, the team concluded that:

* Mail undergoes a thorough, intrusive manual inspection;

* Several thousand items are screened each day by a small number of personnel;

* Relatively small drug quantities are smuggled in individual pieces of mail;

* Drug detection technologies will augment, not replace, existing inspection processes;

* To check every piece of mail, drug detectors would need to support a relatively high throughput rate (several thousand items per day);

* A low false alarm rate is desired; and

* To determine the value of drug detection technology to support prison mailroom inspections, systems should be evaluated in a mailroom or similar environment.

Drug Detection Technologies

Generally, drug detection systems are categorized as trace detectors or bulk detectors. Using trace detectors, inspectors can determine if items have been in the presence of drugs, e.g., touched by people who have been using, handling or hiding drugs. Another use for trace detection is in the nonintrusive inspection of cargo and containers. Drug residue on the exterior, or vapors seeping from the interior, can be detected to signal inspectors that an enclosure needs further scrutiny. Most trace detection systems in use today are based on ion mobility spectrometry (IMS). The maturing of this technology has made robust, highly portable equipment available with capabilities that, until recently, were confined to the laboratory.

Trace detectors operate in two basic modes: vapor detection and particle detection. Inspectors use convenient handheld "sniffers" for detecting drug vapors. However, drug vapors are not always present and particle detection is more likely to be successful. In the particle-detection mode, the inspector vacuums or swipes the surface of an item of interest. He or she then inserts the collection filter from the vacuum or swipe into the detector's intake device so that the collected particles can be extracted, analyzed and identified. If target drugs are present, the detector alerts the inspector and provides an identification of the substance.
IMAGE TABLE 10

Table 1:

Another available trace detection technology is one that uses a "wipe and spray" method to detect drug residue. A suspected item is wiped with specially treated paper, then sprayed with an aerosol can. The paper's color change indicates the presence of drug residue. Bulk detectors are typically much larger, less mobile and less sensitive than trace detectors. Originally developed for medical imaging and diagnosis, X-ray and computed tomography (CT) scanning are the most commonly used bulk detection technologies. Airport baggage screeners are a well-known example of X-ray equipment. A CT scanner can be thought of as an X-ray system that gathers a large number of X-ray images from many angles, then uses computer reconstruction of the image data to provide a three-dimensional view of an object's interior. X-rays readily penetrate most elements, including metals, and their use in detection equipment allows inspectors to search (nonintrusively) for drugs hidden within a wide range of enclosures from small packages and briefcases to large motor vehicles and cargo containers.

Table 1 gives a general comparison of drug detection systems applicable to mailroom-size operations. Information was taken from vendor literature and has not necessarily been found technically accurate by the government. Also note that the minimum detection levels displayed are representative values. Minimum detection levels are dependent on many factors, including drug type and environmental conditions. For bulk detectors, the method of drug placement and dispersal also affects detection performance.

Some of these systems have been tested thoroughly in the laboratory and some have not. None of them have been evaluated for the mailroom detection tasks identified for prisons. Some concerns include:

* Will use of the detection equipment reduce overall mail screening efficiency?

* Are any of the detectors truly sensitive enough to be of value for the relatively small quantities typical of the mail system?

* Will the false alarm rate be a problem?

* Will vacuuming or swiping batches of mail cause contamination of "clean" mail?

* How will performance be affected by possible background levels of illicit substances found on "clean" mail?

* How reliable is the equipment?

* What is the overall cost of ownership, including training and maintenance costs?

Evaluating the Drug Detection Systems

Based on the observations at Leavenworth, the CDTDPO team recommended performing a technology evaluation of drug detection technologies, as well as a mailroom scenario evaluation for those technologies that showed promise from the technical evaluation. The CDTDPO team chose the Thunder Mountain Evaluation Center (TMEC) to design and perform the evaluations. TMEC personnel have a vast amount of experience evaluating drug detection technologies, and are employees of the federal government so they will see no benefit should one technology outperform the others. Upon recommendation from the CDTDPO team, TMEC personnel have planned a two-phase evaluation based on the evaluation methodology proposed in "An Introduction to Evaluating Biometric Systems."

The first phase of the evaluation is a laboratory-based technology evaluation. As the overall goal is to identify technologies that could assist mailroom drug detection, TMEC has designed the technology evaluation to help select the most promising of the available technologies to be included in the second phase - a mailroom scenario evaluation. TMEC personnel will analyze several drug detection technologies and determine the minimum amount of drugs that need to be present for detection by each system. They then will use the data to decide which technologies are suitable and what drug levels are appropriate for the scenario evaluation.

Most of the technology evaluations will be conducted at TMEC. However, drugs such as LSD and methamphetamine present contamination, volatility and personnel danger issues that require more specialized laboratory facilities. For these drug types, the technology evaluations will be conducted at another government laboratory.

The second phase of the evaluation is a scenario evaluation that will be performed at a mock mailroom within TMEC. To determine background levels of substances within the postal system, evaluators will mail a large volume of envelopes and packages to the Fort Huachuca, Ariz., post office from multiple locations. Once the mail is received, evaluators will use calibrated trace detection instruments to measure background levels of substances on or in the mail. This information will help estimate the false alarm rates for the detection technologies.
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH 19

Top and right:

Following background level measurements, each of the technologies will be tested against varying amounts of drugs concealed within mailing envelopes. One team of testers will place drugs in envelopes using typical concealment methods (under stamps and mailing labels, inside the pages of publications, etc.) and carefully document the type, amount and placement of the contraband. Another team, operating the drug detection equipment, will be presented either with mail with concealed drugs or clean mail, without being informed which is which. This team will document if a drug is detected, along with its identity and suspected location.

Conclusion

At the end of testing, a third TMEC team will compare and analyze the data from the concealment and detection operations to determine the performance of the tested systems. From this careful and systematic evaluation, the CDTDPO team expects to be able to objectively determine the sensitivity and accuracy of the evaluated equipment and, in addition, will gather subjective impressions from the test teams regarding the equipment's ease of use, potential throughput, and other pros and cons. The CDTDPO team, with assistance from NUI and BOP, will use this information to determine if any of the available drug detection systems are ready for an extended operational evaluation at a prison or if further development efforts are required. An evaluation report from this effort will be made available through NIJ and the Counterdrug Technology Information Network (http://www.ctin. com).

This is an affidavit for the arrest of a member of a highly secure CP group. Everyone who used VPN was arrested, everyone who used Tor was not traced via the network. It explains their MO pretty well and is an interesting read.

http://www.rep-am.com/newsdocuments/affidavit.pdf

www.eurofinas.org/uploads/documents/policies/Europol_report.pdf

publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/PS64-9-2005E.pdf