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Messages - kmfkewm

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3286
Security / Re: US customs running massive check on all inbound mail
« on: March 03, 2012, 02:53 pm »
For one it is dumb to assume you wont be raided and sent to pound me in the ass prison for a small personal use interception, people go to prison for personal use amounts of drugs on a regular basis and you are not special just because you get your drugs shipped to you.

Second of all, it would be primarily for importers. RFID would be able to send the signal 100 feet away if it is battery powered, you should be able to covertly get a reading on it. Also could use chips that send signal via cellular network for even more distance.

3287
Security / Re: WTF is wrong with SR?
« on: March 03, 2012, 02:49 pm »
Quote from: DaMan on March 03, 2012, 07:09 am
kmfkewm

Let me point you your pointless fucking long trolling "I'm a noo...sorry... hacker" article and the biggest misconception/flaws/sensationalism you put there: Did you ever took a look at a fucking onion?
Let's say your IP is 1 you own 4 which happens by chance to be the rendezvous and the server is 7, at each node your packet headers will be modified, creating a new layer, by encrypting the data inflates, so instead of:

your fucking packets -> 1 -> 2 -> 3 -> 4 (your fucking packets) <- 5 <- 6 <- 7
you get:
your fucking packets -> 1 -> 2 -> 3 -> 4 (gibberish you can't understand, they don't match anything that has leave 1) <- 5 <- 6 <- 7

This is how Tor works, at each node the data is re-encrypted and changed, the headers are modified, the contents are modified, the size ain't the same anymore.

BTW Have you ever looked at what you are calling an onion? There are not 7 hops there are 6, and the client always selects the rendezvous which can be a node it owns.

Client <-> Entry Guard <->  Middle Node <-> Rendezvous <-> Servers Final <-> Servers Middle <-> Servers Entry <-> Server

The client can force the server to open circuits to as many rendezvous as it wants

Server <-> Entry(a-c) <-> Middle1 <-> Final2 <-> Malicious RendezvousA
Server <-> Entry(a-c) <-> Middle3 <-> Final4 <-> Malicious RendezvousB
Server <-> Entry(a-c) <-> Middle5 <-> Final6 <-> Malicious RendezvousC
Server <-> Entry(a-c) <-> Middle7 <-> Final8 <-> Malicious RendezvousD
Server <-> Entry(a-c) <-> Middle9 <-> Final10 <-> Malicious RendezvousE
Server <-> Entry(a-c) <-> Middle11 <-> Final12 <-> Malicious RendezvousF
Server <-> Entry(a-c) <-> Middle13 <-> Final14 <-> Malicious RendezvousG

etc

If you own node # whatever (and even faster if you own multiple nodes) you are going to have the hidden service use it on one of the circuits it builds eventually. And you can force a hidden service to open and close as many circuits as you please, and send data for any of these circuits. I could have SR server open a thousand new circuits for me, that means it is going to have circuits leading to it with up to 2003 unique nodes being used (of course nodes can be re-used in different circuits, and probably will be, so it will not be that high most likely). And then I can send a little data through all of them, close all of them and then make it open a thousand new circuits. If SR stops opening circuits on demand it is DOSed, it can't tell my circuit creation request apart from anybody elses since we are all anonymous. And if it re-uses multiple circuits for multiple clients there will be serious linkability attacks to start worrying about.

Each of these circuits use an entry node from the smaller selected pool of 1-3 guards, but the middle and final node are taken from the total selection available in the Tor network, and each circuit created uses different nodes selected from the total available consensus. An attacker who owns some of the nodes on the network is obviously going to own some of the nodes on a circuit to the hidden server after they force it to create an arbitrary number of circuits to rendezvous points.

Now they send this pattern to the server via interpacket time delays

O-----O--O------O-O-O----O--------O----------------O-O

Even though O changes to P changes to J etc at each hop, the interpacket timing characteristics are not modified so the attacker can detect this stream of packets at any of their nodes they happen to pass through. They know they are either final, middle or entry.

Server <-> Entry <-> Middle <-> Final <-> Malicious Rendezvous

They can determine if the are final since they know the rendezvous IP address.

They can determine if they are potentially middle if they get data from a Tor relay IP address and send data to a Tor relay IP address (although it is also possible that they are entry guard and the hidden service is a relay)

They can determine if they are potentially entry if they send data to an IP address that isn't a public Tor relay (although they could also be middle and the hidden service uses a bridge for entry guard). If the hidden service uses a bridge for entry guard, it can be determined by trying to treat the identified non-Tor IP address as a bridge. If  acts as a bridge, then it is the entry guard for the hidden service, if it does not then it is the hidden service and you are the entry guard.

If you never send data to a non-Tor IP address from any of your nodes, that means the hidden service is not using a bridge and that one of the IP addresses you eventually send data to either belongs to the hidden service or to one of its entry guards. You could just do the attack for long enough and see if three distinct IP addresses stick out, if so they are the hidden services entry guards. If four IP addresses are identified three of them are the entry guards and one of them is the hidden service, but if this happens one of the identified entry guards should be one of your malicious Tor nodes so you will be able to deanonymize the server. Otherwise you have traced it to its entry nodes and now you just need to pwn one of them to deanonymize the server (again, the best route for this would be a trap and trace, as far as LE level attacker goes).

3288
Shipping / Re: Bulk RC Shipment Stopped At Customs
« on: March 03, 2012, 02:12 pm »
Quote from: moksha on March 03, 2012, 04:40 am
I still think the fact that it's legal tends to negate a lot of the paranoia going on here, I agree with most of what people are saying but this is not a red flag to customs, once they can tick a box saying it's not illegal they go home and forget about it.

It is legal to rent a hotel room but if some meth vendor makes a post about how he rented a room out at a specific hotel but the lady at the desk told him he couldn't have a pet stay with him, he shouldn't be surprised if a narcotics officer asks the lady at the counter at the hotel about the man who tried to bring an animal with him. Shitty example, but meh. Measuring things as discrete actions, and thinking they are not risks to your freedom if they are not illegal, is a naive as hell viewpoint to hold. It isn't illegal to post your full name and address here, so why don't you do it , not like you can be arrested FOR it ....course you could get arrested FROM it

3289
Security / Re: WTF is wrong with SR?
« on: March 03, 2012, 12:48 pm »
I didn't say you could correlate based on the actual data stream, you need to insert artifacts such as interpacket arrival patterns (or just use the patterns that naturally arise). It doesn't matter if you can't decrypt O (the packet) if you can detect the unique timing pattern between packets.

lets say you have

O----O--O-----O-------O---O-O--------O

a stream of encrypted packets that goes through multiple relays, with each relay performing decryption operations on another layer:


O----O--O-----O-------O---O-O--------O -> 1 ->  P----P--P-----P-------P---P-P--------P -> 2 -> etc

Even though the content of the packets changes, the interpacket arrival characteristics are not obfuscated and they work perfectly well to determine that one stream of packets is linked to another stream of packets that was observed at another point.

Quote
by encrypting the data inflates, so instead of:

The encryption mode that Tor uses actually doesn't increase data size with additional layers of encryption.


Quote
your fucking packets -> 1 -> 2 -> 3 -> 4 (your fucking packets) <- 5 <- 6 <- 7
you get:
your fucking packets -> 1 -> 2 -> 3 -> 4 (gibberish you can't understand, they don't match anything that has leave 1) <- 5 <- 6 <- 7

You don't need to be able to understand it, you can correlate the stream based on interpacket timing characteristics. Tor is low latency it doesn't hide that pattern and it has been proven in so many different papers that I can give you a billion citations if you want.

Quote
This is how Tor works, at each node the data is re-encrypted and changed, the headers are modified, the contents are modified, the size ain't the same anymore.

The size of the packets actually stay the same because Tor uses padding. Sizes staying the same is a good thing. However the size of the stream doesn't change. Also the interpacket arrival times don't change.

Quote
You know that your theory was used several times by FBI to try to catch those pedo sites around, don't you? Or you think you're the fucking genius who saw the light alone?!

It ain't my theory its an attack that some academics came up with. I doubt that FBI tried to use this attack to catch pedo sites simply cuz if they did they would have traced them all. Another possibility is that they have traced them all and wait for you to use a poisoned entry node to deanonymize you when you visit them. Another possibility is that they don't care because they already have their man power exhausted from following up on IP addresses detected trading CP on public P2P networks. e

No I did not see the light alone but a shockingly large percentage of people seem to be incapable of understanding this attack (or anything else) even after they read the damn technical paper on it. I think anyone who downloaded that .pdf has seen the light, altho if they actually took anything from that encounter is a different question :P.

Quote
Then you've folks who add entropy to another network weakness by doing something somewhat unsafe at Tor but much unsafer at surfacewebs these days in some countries; download torrents. They generate a huge amount of traffic in the network that could otherwise be used to trace hidden services by traffic analysis.

Huh?

Quote
But still, even if Tor is safe by now, it doesn't mean in the future, near or distant, something may come up to make it unsafe, so keep using it as if it was compromised is a good way to go.

Yes it really is best to assume that Tor can be compromised. It is actually known that Tor can be compromised, but it is best to assume that the attacker who you worry about the most can pwn it.

Quote
- You've convinced me that tor isn't as secure as everybody thinks.

Indeed most people think Tor is a lot more secure than it really is.

Quote
- I still think we'll see the hidden CP sites get busted first.

I doubt they take the hidden CP sites down they will use them as honeypots first.

Quote
I think the level of sophistication required to conduct the attacks you refer to is only possessed at an institutional level by agencies who only concern themselves with issues of national security.

It really doesn't require much skill at all, you simply need to read a whitepaper and know how to work with a programming language, and have a spare node or two to add to the network.

Quote
- I think the law enforcement is more concerned with funding and headlines than actually stopping clever people from buying drugs. They will continue to "attack" whoever is dumb enough to wave their dicks around and get caught. I would have to think (admittedly made up statistic to follow) that 90% of the busts that happen with regards to narcotics are from somebody getting busted and ratting somebody out. After that, 9% are from people who make stupid mistakes, and finally 1% are in the wrong place at the wrong time. When you have so many stupid drug dealers running around, it's hard to put in the effort to go after the really sophisticated ones.

I don't think it is good to assume you are secure because nobody is there to attack you. LE job is bust people who buy and sell drugs.

Quote
Just to address what I know your first response would be, is any of that worth risking your security on? And my response would be, where does the paranoia end? Nothing is secure. Nothing. Point at something and claim it's secure, and it's only a matter of time until you're wrong. So, all we can do is evaluate risk and reward, do our best to stay as safe as possible, and it never hurts to have a few people in your pocket :)

Yup yup.

3290
Off topic / Re: A story of a PRIVATE Board
« on: March 03, 2012, 12:02 pm »
What was the name of the private forum / acronym? Wasn't DZF was it?

3291
Security / Re: WTF is wrong with SR?
« on: March 03, 2012, 01:57 am »
Quote from: padawan65 on March 02, 2012, 10:34 pm
I agree that services can be found within TOR, but it is much more difficult than just tracing 6 packets and find their intersection.  Tracing 6 TOR packets will just give the relay that they each packet enters the TOR network.  After this what is required is to trace from the relays, through how many levels of relays/anonymisers they have, until they arrive at the server.  This would be extremely difficult because you would only have limited access inside the TOR network, but with adequate resources/tools it is not impossible.

That is called a correlation not an intersection, two totally different sorts of attack. And yes it really is that easy. Researchers have done this attack against the live Tor network and traced hidden services in a matter of minutes to days prior to entry guards. Now entry guards can be traced in a matter of hours to days. When you can force the server to open as many circuits as you damn well please, it really isn't going to take that long for some of your nodes to be on the circuit enough times to enumerate the entry guards. Give me 12 high bandwidth VPS for a month and I will trace any hidden service you want to its entry guards.

from the paper

Quote
                            In this paper we demon-
strate attacks (not simulations) on the deployed Tor
network that reveal the location of a hidden server.
The attacks are cheap and fast: they use only a sin-
gle hostile Tor node and require from only minutes
to a few hours to locate a hidden server.

Quote
   From the experimental results we can also con-
clude that we need far less data to pinpoint the lo-
cation of the Hidden Server than we gathered. A
rough estimate is that within the order of an hour or
two we should have a positive match of the location
of the hidden service using the predecessor attack.

hmm lets see how entry guards changed the attack

Quote
Experiment - Attacking Entry Guard Nodes:
Letting the Hidden Service use three permanent,
preferred entry guards we found that these nodes
combined represented all identified connections
through Alice’s node, as shown in Table 2. A
quite unexpected result, but caused by the imple-
mentation feature in Tor described earlier: we were
never Node 3, only Node 2 (Node 1 being the entry
guard).
   As in our previous experiments, identifying the
entry guard nodes through our attacks never took
more than a few hours.

Quote
    We have demonstrated that an attack with one
compromised node in the anonymity network takes
only minutes if the service is located at a client, or a
couple of hours when located on a server node. By
using two nodes in the network it only takes min-
utes to find the Hidden Server regardless of where
it is located.

Damn I even remembered this paper wrong, I thought it had taken them days to weeks to trace the hidden services and that they had used multiple nodes, not minutes to hours with a single node. And entry guards were the defense to this attack, and now the entry guards are traced in minutes to hours instead of the hidden service itself. Even with the significant increase in Tor network size following this attack (a few times as large) it isn't going to take longer than a week at the max to do this same attack.

Really if you guys want to argue with linked citations, quotes from traffic analysis experts and someone who has been studying this shit for years, go right ahead and knock yourselves the fuck out. What if I get a quote from one of the Tor devs saying that I am right will you believe me then? Cuz I already know that they all know this attack will trace entry guards without any problems. They also all know that FBI can trap and trace the shit out of the entry guards if they are in USA, and MLAT the shit out of them if they are in any other country, to deanonymize the hidden service. In the #tor IRC Arma, the person who implemented Tor in the first place, said that hidden services are fucked, and that is more or less a direct quote.

Please tell me geniuses what more do you need to convince you? If cited papers from world experts, full of technical details, including how this attack was carried out live against the Tor network, plus the words of someone who has been studying traffic analysis for years, plus the words of the person who implemented the fucking network in the first place, are not enough to convince you that you don't know what the hell you are talking about, then please tell me what it will take. Put up a fucking hidden service and buy me some VPS nodes and I will tell you its entry guards, will that convince you?

If you don't even know how to fucking spell *Tor* then why are you acting like you know more about it than I do?

People learning misinformation from idiots like you guys talking about shit you heard from other idiots talking about shit they heard from other idiots talking about shit they heard from DISINFO agents is why there are so many people who think Tor hidden services offer protection from anything other than Joe Blow putting a complaint in to a sites hosting provider. Actually that is going too far, it can also protect  substantially from someone who can add nodes to the network but not order nodes on the network to be monitored at their ISPs after the node that has direct contact with the hidden service is identified. Entry guards boosted it up from 'Joe Blow' not being able to pwn it to 'Someone with a moderate level of computer knowledge and a little bit of money to spend on it, who gets a bit of bad luck and doesn't spend much effort on it' not being able to pwn it without a bit of extra work. It is still fully in the 'law enforcement can pwn it with little work' and 'someone with a moderate level of computer knowledge, a bit of money, a bit of luck, and a significant amount of effort, can still probably manage to fully pwn it' category.

I know I can trace hidden service to its entry guards with little work, and I know if I was law enforcement I could then order the ISP to give me the logs from the entry guard (and start logging if they are not already), since trap and trace can be done without a warrant if LE can prove that it directly relates to a criminal investigation. Guess what being able to technically prove that a trap and trace will deanonymize a targeted hidden service is more than enough legal justification to use one for the literally few seconds required to obtain the hidden services real IP address after its entry guards are identified. And if you think entry guards being outside of USA is going to help at all look up MLAT I don't have time to explain every single detail of every little thing over and over to people who are content to argue in the face of overwhelming evidence, seems like a complete waste of time to me.



 Then again I shouldn't be so hard on Tor, I am not certain if the feds realize how easy it is to trace hidden services either, their traffic analysis operations are almost entirely focused on spidering P2P networks with (extremely expensive) simple spidering programs looking for CP files. Then again I wouldn't be surprised at all if they are already passively monitoring all of the interesting hidden services, with 50% of a correlation attack already done, waiting for clients to use their poisoned entry guards to deanonymize themselves. With out proper intelligence it is impossible to know their true capabilities, especially at the level where they start trying to keep the information secret / compartmentalized (for example, not something they give a shit about with the P2P spidering, the entire name and technical details of operation fairplay against the CP traders can be discovered with simple google searching and digging around academic articles on law enforcement oriented traffic analysis......but if there were an ongoing traffic analysis operation against Tor users the average agent would probably not even be aware of it....and a lot of published LE documentation shows that they struggle with much easier things than Tor, but who knows maybe it is misinfo to an extent, and who knows about the documentation that has a classification level stamped on it). Regardless I would have to assume that at least a significant number of people who would go into FBI traffic analysis would independently learn about ways to trace hidden services (I had a copy of a cyber career path guideline for FBI that shows their educational structure and if I am remembering correctly they started training agents who selected this specialty about traffic analysis after 8 years worth of other general computer and computer forensic / security / etc training). Who knows what they know, but I know that they can pwn Tor hidden services and we should assume that they know they can too.

3292
Security / Re: Browser Security
« on: March 02, 2012, 08:25 pm »
Quote from: DropGuy751 on March 02, 2012, 07:57 pm
I recommend you use an VPN as an extra layer of protection it's the difference between everything it takes your security to a whole new level pm me if you need to know a good one.

Don't use stuff like large company like hidemyass vpn as they will just get ripped open like a can of tuna when it comes to FBI finding out about someone using the service.

PM me if you wanna know a good VPN sounds a lot like something a fed would say

3293
Security / Re: Is it possible to break PGP Encryption?
« on: March 02, 2012, 08:22 pm »
If the password is generated with a PRNG and a random seed anything over 37 chars is over kill since the encryption key could be brute forced first. If the password is not random having more will be helpful though.

3294
Drug safety / Re: anyone have any experience with 4-AcO-DMT?
« on: March 02, 2012, 07:48 pm »
4-aco-dmt is a lot like shrooms but infinitely cleaner feeling. I don't like shrooms. 4-aco-dmt is nice.

3295
Shipping / Re: Bulk RC Shipment Stopped At Customs
« on: March 02, 2012, 07:21 pm »
1. She sells illegal drugs here
2. She had a package stopped by customs and announced it here, including the exact country of origin, exact contents, exact shipping service
3. Customs can now check their records for such an interception, and find her shipping address, with no problems (plus I doubt she called fedex from a burner phone)

why don't you just post your address here for customs it seems to me like you think they don't care so much that you could vend with your SSN as your pseudonym and never be busted. I really hope none of you get the wake up call that you seriously seem to be begging for, because it isn't going to be fun for you at all and despite being dumb as rocks you really don't deserve it.

btw bulk RC shipment stopped at customs is what got enelysion put under surveillance and eventually raided, he wasn't importing anything illegal either. You pretty much posted your shipping address by making this thread and you are known to sell illegal drugs. At least Enelysion didn't make a post saying omg my methylone was intercepted shipped from china via fedex, and then I called about it on this day!!! Your anonymity is gone unless it was sent to a box with a fake ID or similar situation with absolutely no link to you, and you used a burner phone with absolutely no link to you. If these things are not true, you might as well change your nym to the number of the phone you called from and put your address in your signature.

Take it for what it is worth I guess, i'm really just trying to look out for you and your customers, but the fact of the matter is if customs wants you they got you and it doesn't matter in the slightest that your order was of legal substances what matters is that you leaked your real identity by making this thread.

3296
Security / Re: WTF is wrong with SR?
« on: March 02, 2012, 05:38 pm »
Can not tell if you are trolling or just stubborn and retarded. I am really tired of trying to educate people about Tor today, particularly people who you would think would know better (not you, I don't expect you to know jack shit). Traffic analysis of Tor is not almost impossible. All you need to do to deanonymize a Tor user is be able to see traffic from them and/or to them enter and exit the network (or in the case of a hidden service, reach its final destination, the hidden service server).

observing 6 packets at multiple points in the Tor network is more than enough to link them together, regardless of who sent them. This is true of all low latency networks that don't use some latency blending protocol like Alpha or Tau mixing. Actually, observation of a single packet at two points  on a circuit is all that is required to break Tor anonymity: www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-dc-09/Fu/BlackHat-DC-09-Fu-Break-Tors-Anonymity.pdf (Single cell is enough to break Tor's anonymity) although to be fair the author of that paper is just a sensationalist who pretty much re-invented the timing attack.

Regardless, yes the attacker is the one who sends the packets in this attack. Remember, to deanonymize a Tor user you only need to observe traffic to them entering the network and arriving at them also. Well, if you send packets to a hidden service you can certainly watch them enter the network. Now all you need to do is watch them arrive at their destination!  Okay, now the next part of the attack is being able to watch the packets reach the destination, in this case the hidden service. How to do this?!?!

What you do is this. Every time you connect to a hidden service you tell it a rendezvous node to build a circuit to. A client can tell a hidden service to connect to as many damn rendezvous nodes as it wants, and the hidden service builds a new circuit to the rendezvous node. So what you do is add some nodes to the network, this is called a sybil attack and it is the basis for all other active attacks. Now you tell the hidden service to build an arbitrary number of circuits to an arbitrary number of rendezvous nodes. Each of these circuits consists of nodes selected from the Tor network. Now, since you own some of the nodes on the Tor network, and since you can force the hidden service to open as many new circuits as you want, eventually some of these newly created circuits are going to use nodes that you own! The only likely exception is the entry nodes of the hidden service, because it selects three nodes once every month to two months, and always enters traffic through these nodes if they are up. So unless it selects one of your nodes as its entry guards, it will never enter traffic through your nodes.

Now from the client you send a stream of packets to the hidden service down all of the opened circuits you have built to it. You introduce a specific interpacket timing pattern to your stream and now you monitor at all of your Tor nodes looking for packet strems that fit this pattern. Once you detect the pattern at one of your sybil nodes you know that they are on the path to the hidden service. Now there are a few things you can do. First of all, you own the rendezvous node and every Tor node can see the IP address of its direct neighbors. So if you detect the pattern you introduce, the first thing you can do is see if the pattern came from the rendezvous node you selected. If it did, you know that the node that detected the pattern is the third node from the hidden service, which directly connects to the rendezvous. If it didn't you know that the node is either the middle node or the entry guard of the hidden service. If the node you detect the traffic pattern in forwards that traffic on to a known Tor relay IP address, but doesn't get the traffic from the rendezvous node, you know that the node you are sending traffic to is either the hidden service and that it is a Tor relay, or that it is one of the entry guards of the hidden service. If the node you detect the traffic pattern in doesn't get the traffic from the rendezous and forwards it on to an IP address that is not a publicly listed Tor relay, you know that you are either forwarding the traffic to the hidden services IP address and that you are one of its entry guards, or you know that you are sending the traffic to a bridge that the hidden service is using as an entry guard.

Now there are a few things you can do if you determine that you may be the entry or middle node on the hidden services circuit. If you know you are either sending traffic to the hidden service IP or a bridge IP, you can try to make a bridge connection through the IP address and see if it treats it as a bridge connection. If it doesn't, you know it is the hidden services IP, if it does you know it is a bridge and the hidden service is using it as an entry guard. If you know you are the middle node and want to see if the hidden service is the relay you forward traffic on to or if it is an entry guard, there are a few things you can do. First of all, you can DDOS the node and see if there is a down time correlation between it being DDOSed and the hidden service going down. Or you can just keep doing the attack for a period of time and then use statistical analysis on the resulting dataset to come to a conclusion on if the hidden service is the relay or if the relay is an entry guard.

In either case doing this attack will quickly trace either the hidden service, if you own one of its entry guards, or all of its entry guards, at which point you can order a trap and trace on it (via MLAT if required) to get its IP address. Or if you are not an attacker powerful enough to do legal passive analysis, there are plenty of other things you can try to do to get around the entry guard. You could try to hack the entry guards. You could simultaneously DDOS the entry guards forcing the hidden service to select three new ones, and keep doing this until you run out of bandwidth to DDOS with or the hidden service selects one of your nodes as an entry guard. Or you could locate the entry guard and illegally tap it. Or you could social engineer the person who runs the entry guard into giving you access to it. Or you could blah blah blah. Harder for an attacker who can't legally order passive monitoring, but not impossible.



Quote
Bottom line, your fucking "abstract" is so outdated and long shot that doesn't even figure in the list of Tor reliable attacks. To not mention you take LEA as some sort of Chinese triad or mobsters not bothering to tackle as many innocent in the way to get through... like apprehending servers at random despite they're the server or simple relays.

The thing is they can get a positive identification of the hidden services IP address before a single server is seized.

Would you like to keep arguing with me and look more an more retarded with every post, or do you just want to admit that you were wrong (of course not, people like you never admit they are wrong they just get more and more retarded). Fair warning: I have been studying traffic analysis for several years now, if you have not then chances are you are not going to be proving me wrong.

But by all means if you want to live in some fantasy world where Tor is super anonymous and totally impossible to pwn go right on ahead, you will be in good company with the vast majority of its users and probably 98% of the people who would bother trying to attack it if they thought it was even remotely possible. Unfortunately, you guys live in a fantasy world. As far as anonymity goes Tor is a toy, the real powerful networks barely ever get further than mathematic formulas and whitepapers , largely because they require significant time delays and everybody wants low latency.

3297
Off topic / Re: Sorry, you are not using TOR
« on: March 02, 2012, 05:09 pm »
The 'are you using Tor' sites are not perfect. If you are using an exit node that was just added to the network it might not show up on the check site yet and will give you a false negative.

3298
Rumor mill / Re: 'envious' Discussion
« on: March 02, 2012, 01:06 pm »
Quote
Its not you man, its the acid.  It is all low quality impure lsd.  i get the same reaction to the silk road lsd.  but when i take good local lsd from the greatful dead family, i have an orgasmic trip.

Envious acid is from GDF.

3299
Rumor mill / Re: 'envious' Discussion
« on: March 02, 2012, 12:50 pm »
I took two hits of these blotters and had a nice strong clean trip. Wasn't as strong as it would have been off two of the "250 ug" euro tabs, but was much cleaner feeling. As per usual, euro peeps lays on low quality crystal thick and USA peeps lay on high quality crystal lightly. I was happy with two.

3300
Shipping / Re: Bulk RC Shipment Stopped At Customs
« on: March 02, 2012, 12:29 pm »
Quote from: foxymeow on March 02, 2012, 05:18 am
Meh talked to FedEx, they said it hasn't been detained and they don't need any information. Customs is just backed up and they haven't examined it they said. I don't know how to take that, but there is nothing I can do because I tried calling customs directly and they said that only FedEx can contact them and that customers cannot contact customs directly.

Customs doesn't need a warrant LOL, they can open any package they want.

Whatever, I already have another 5g of 25C coming via EMS.

Why do you habitually say what you have coming via which shipping service and from where when you already revealed your identity to customs :/ .

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