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Messages - kmfkewm

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3226
Security / Re: Truecrypt Q's
« on: March 06, 2012, 10:42 pm »
Did you select to encrypt system partition or entire HD? Is your D drive a different physical hard drive?

Yes they can get the key required to decrypt your truecrypt drive if they have access to your machine while it is in its decrypted state.

Yes they could possibly get the key even if you use a USB drive, for example if it is swapped out from memory to the HD.

There are a few ways that you can make a high probability guess that someone has a hidden volume, but afaik there is mathematic security against this (meaning in theory they can't tell you have a hidden volume, but using data leaked to the OS or other things, they will probably be able to determine that you probably have a hidden volume).

Fuck if I know,  how many drives do you have tell me the configuration of your machine and which Truecrypt options you used.

3227
Security / Re: Importance of privoxy?
« on: March 06, 2012, 10:37 pm »
you shouldn't even be using privoxy just point firefox right at Tor and set network.proxy.socks_remote_dns to true in about:config

3228
Off topic / Re: what do you identify as politically?
« on: March 06, 2012, 10:17 pm »
anarcho-capitalist but I don't completely deny the legitimacy of the state as an institution, it should provide only courts and defend against foreign invasion.

I think that makes you a libertarian.

3229
Meh that wikipedia article is actually seriously lacking. They don't put enough emphasis on *The node shuffles the message order* which as far as I am concerned is a requirement for a network to be considered a mix network.

3230
Get Tor to take anonymity more seriously than latency and/or implement a network that defends from these things. I guess you could have PHP scripts that add random padding to loaded pages to try to obscure their fingerprint, and add [padding][/padding] tags to the forum that drop what is in the padding. That might help.

Choices:

> Lag
> Incarceration

It's like being between Scylla and Charybdis  :o

If you had a network with different 'update' cycles. Almost like time zones. Where e.g. this entire forum updates itself every 5 minutes instead of per request, then that might be acceptable. Faster moving applications like the Road, that's a bit of a problem unless you could isolate the wait time to one specific occurrence per login, it'd be ok then.

Sounds kind of how a mix network works.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mix_network

I am working on implementing a mix network right now actually :). For data transfer of a more complex system that I hope will make shutting down /attacking the free market a little bit harder, even if it is already secure enough ;P.

3231
Security / Re: Possibility of imprisonment with Tor Hidden Server
« on: March 06, 2012, 09:50 pm »
If the actual server can be traced to you and you do things that piss off the government I would say the chances of imprisonment are substantial

If the server can not be traced to you and you only access it via Tor chances of imprisonment are substantially less

3232
Honestly Tor so far seems to be fine by itself. The people who are attacking it and pwning it are really really smart people who generally have lots of formal and informal education. But then they throw the whitepapers out there, and it is a lot easier to implement an attack from a whitepaper than it is to come up with it on your own. Also Tor generally tries to make attacks against it harder when they are discovered, but often times they are putting a bandaid over a deep wound.

Yes Tor is weak to a lot of technical attacks, yes hidden services can be traced pretty damn easily (especially by an attacker who can order passive surveillance at specific points), no Tor will not keep you anonymous for very long from an attacker with a bit of money and know how, and there are a million and one ways that it can be attacked and pwnt.

No, nobody except for academic researchers (and signals intelligence agencies, but they don't apparently act on the intelligence gathered, or particularly give a tenth of a shit about even highly criminal Tor users) have apparently done any attacks against Tor that resulted in hidden services being traced or clients deanonymized (although LE have hacked hidden services to trace them they never pwnt Tor directly so far), yes Tor is the best (implemented) system for low latency anonymity, no Tor can not even begin to compare to the anonymity that could be offered by high latency solutions, no there are not any cutting edge high latency systems that have been implemented, the majority of this sort of shit never leaves the whitepaper or research lab (attacks and defenses) (except for prob by intelligence agencies, and no they don't give a shit about you) (even though you should never assume that attackers interested in you are too stupid to do interesting things) and nobody knows anyone who was busted via Tor being pwnt (and there are case studies that show people who used Tor getting away from the FBI and Interpol even with significant international resources focused on tracing them).

That pretty much sums it up as one big huge run on sentence. If you take away "Tor is secure!" from this or "Tor is insecure!" from this will largely depend on your outlook on things / personality type ;) (and perhaps who you think is after you....secure from who/what is a much better question after all...)

3233
Get Tor to take anonymity more seriously than latency and/or implement a network that defends from these things. I guess you could have PHP scripts that add random padding to loaded pages to try to obscure their fingerprint, and add [padding][/padding] tags to the forum that drop what is in the padding. That might help.

3234
Security / Re: How do cops find Tor Hidden Services?
« on: March 06, 2012, 09:12 pm »
Those hidden services were traced after being hacked by the police. Some of them were not traced, because they used isolation that the police could not break out of (pretty sure they were using virtualbox for isolation actually, although of course hardware or paravirtualization or OS virtualization are better as was discussed at length in other threads).

Not a failure of Tor in these cases but a failure of the people who ran those sites to keep them fully patched.

3235
publicintelligence.net/wikileaks-cables-show-dea-has-become-international-spy-network/

Quote
    The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration has become a vast international spy network, cables revealed by WikiLeaks show.

    The cables depict drug agents juggling diplomacy and law enforcement in countries where politicians and traffickers are enmeshed and drug rings rival state power, The New York Times reported Saturday.

    The DEA now has 87 offices in 63 countries and close partnerships with governments that distrust the CIA, such as Nicaragua and Venezuela. Many nations are eager to take advantage of the agency’s drug detection and wiretapping technologies.

    Some collaborations seem to go well, with the agency helping to bring down whole cartels. But the cables also cite scores of informants and a few agents who have been killed in Mexico and Afghanistan.

    In Paraguay and Panama, the cables show, governments pressured the DEA to spy on their opponents, leading to friction with Washington.

    In Guinea, the prime minister admitted to the U.S. ambassador in 2008 that the country’s top kingpin was Ousmane Conte, son of President Lansana Conte. After his father’s death, Conte went to prison.

    Later, a publicized burning of confiscated narcotics turned out to be a hoax.

WikiLeaks reveals US drug agency’s intelligence role (The Economic Times):

    The US Drug Enforcement Administration , an agency tasked with the job of tracking drug traffickers around the world, has over the years transformed into a global intelligence organisation with its tentacles extending far beyond narcotics, according to secret American diplomatic cables .

    The organisation has an eavesdropping operation so expansive it has to fend off foreign politicians who want to use it against their political enemies, the New York Times reported on Sunday, quoting a cache of cables published by WikiLeaks . The body’s vast network of informants also had on its roll David Headley, an accused in the Mumbai attacks case, who worked as a double agent for the DEA.

    In far greater detail than previously seen, the cables offer glimpses of drug agents balancing diplomacy and law enforcement in places where it can be hard to tell the politicians from the traffickers, and where drug rings are themselves mini-states whose wealth and violence permit them to run roughshod over struggling governments, the report said.

    Quoting the cables, the report cities an example when the President of Panama sent an urgent message to the American ambassador, demanding that the DEA go after his political enemies: “I need help with tapping phones.”

    In Sierra Leone, a major cocaine-trafficking prosecution was almost upended by the attorney general’s attempt to solicit $2.5 million in bribes. In Guinea, the country’s biggest narcotics kingpin turned out to be the president’s son, and diplomats discovered that before the police destroyed a huge narcotics seizure, the drugs had been replaced by flour.

    Leaders of Mexico’s beleaguered military issued private pleas for closer collaboration with the drug agency, confessing that they had little faith in their own country’s police forces.

    Cables from Myanmar, the target of strict United States sanctions, describe the drug agency informants’ reporting both on how the military junta enriches itself with drug money and on the political activities of the junta’s opponents.

    Officials of the DEA and the State Department declined to discuss what they said was information that should never have been made public, the Times said.

    Though the cables did not offer large disclosures, they provided an insight into the story of how an entrepreneurial agency operating in the shadows of the FBI has become something more than a drug agency, the report said.

3236
Security / Re: LE posing as a vendor
« on: March 06, 2012, 08:43 pm »
Nah federal police agencies would be involved. If real intelligence agencies gave half a shit about SR it would be long gone, and anyone they wanted busted on it would be busted, customer or vendor. They don't concern themselves with SR level traffickers, and half the times they concern themselves with drug lord sized traffickers it is to carry out mutually beneficial smuggling operations with them.

Federal police do intelligence operations but are generally not considered intelligence agencies, other than maybe FBI. Intelligence agency is more like CIA, NSA, etc, federal police are more like ICE, DEA, etc. FBI is kind of a hybrid post 9/11. But even some local police agencies have intelligence units these days. And really traditional police work is essentially the same thing as human intelligence, they just are generally more restricted by the law in regards to what they can do. For example CIA HUMINT it is probably standard procedure for a sexy agent to fuck someone and start a relationship with them to covertly spy on them, but it is generally frowned upon for local police department to do such things in their undercover operations, although it has happened before (undercover police have started families with surveillance targets before....but it isn't standard procedure).

One of the characteristics of Local LE / Federal LE / Intelligence agency post 9/11 is the bluring of lines between these things though. This is generally recognized by libertarian minded people as 'not a good thing'. DEA has a massive international signals intelligence arm, but I dunno if it would be correct to consider them a SIGINT agency. I also tend to imagine that they are about as l33t at SIGINT as the FBI apparently is.

http://publicintelligence.net/wikileaks-cables-show-dea-has-become-international-spy-network/


http://federatedit.com/services/analyticsupport/dea-sigint
Quote
Project Profile – DEA Signals Intelligence Collection and Analysis (DEA SIGINT)

Federated provides expert and experienced Analytic services in the realm of collecting, analyzing, and reporting Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) data through the interception of information promulgated via radio and electronic transmissions. In this effort, Federated personnel monitor, translate, and interpret real time bi-lingual exchanges over related communications equipment such as High Frequency direction finding devices. Based on the raw data extrapolated from various transmissions, our team utilizes qualitative applications of this information and details these findings in tactical actionable intelligence reports. These reports are distributed in an interagency effort that includes Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Intelligence Community (IC) partners and Department of Defense (DOD) organizations to advance and promote shared missions.

Federated also contributes to the mission through temporary duty deployments to foreign and domestic locations in support of this operation. Throughout these operations, the duties performed include the conduct of communications intercept operations, site assessments, radio frequency evaluations and the testing of advanced technical equipment in mobile and fixed locations. Our Analysts have received 8 Superior Performance Awards, 7 Special Awards for “Life Saving Actions” and 22 Letters of Appreciation for their timely and accurate analysis of intercepted communications that directly led to thwarting transnational threats.

If the DEA actually had really good SIGINT people working for them, it would be safe to say that they can trace hidden services and do some serious damage against Tor. But even if they have the best people working for them, access to signals matters too. NSA can gather signals from IX's for their analysts, but DEA analysts would not have such access and would need to resort to other signals gathering techniques. So skill isn't the only thing involved, so is the ability to position yourself to gather signals in the first place.

3237
Well for hidden services it doesn't help to load multiple sites at once because you use a dedicated circuit for hidden service connections. For clearnet it helps to load multiple things at once via the same circuit, because it significantly distorts the fingerprint of any given thing that you are loading.

3238
Off topic / what do you identify as politically?
« on: March 06, 2012, 08:31 pm »
Of course it has ambiguity involved

3239
Security / Re: How do cops find Tor Hidden Services?
« on: March 06, 2012, 08:25 pm »
You are going to need to give a link to a specific case for me to comment on it

3240
Security / Re: How do cops find Tor Hidden Services?
« on: March 06, 2012, 08:22 pm »
The only time LE have demonstrated that they traced hidden services, it was the result of applications being hacked. If you root a hidden service, you can get its IP address, unless you root an environment that is isolated away from external IP address, in which case you would need to break out of the isolation.

There are numerous ways they could trace hidden services with pure traffic analysis, but so far they have never revealed that they have actually done this.

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