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Messages - kmfkewm

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1831
Security / Re: Does TOR really encrypts what I see to my ISP?
« on: October 29, 2012, 07:50 am »
Tor is encrypted up to the exit node if you access clearnet and up to the hidden service if you access hidden services. Actually it is better encrypted than normal SSL, as it is in multiple layers (and the packets are padded to the same size!) .

1832
Exactly my point. Some site members (kmfkewm im speakin' to you bro) believe that these LE agents shouldn't just be fired - they should be tried and executed as criminals themselves. But the thing is that what they are doing is totally legal within the definitions we allow ourselves right now. We could split hairs on how a constitution is interpreted but whatever the outcome of that debate, a case could be made for justifying what is happening.

How about this system. We have a vote for legalizing the killing of all remaining drug enforcement agents. As it approaches the magical 50.0000001 percent margin of passing, drug enforcement officials will quickly start to retire and we can solve the drug war problem with less than 50% of the vote! Hell even at 10% I think DEA agents will start to just think twice. Then when we have officially legalized killing drug law enforcement officials , those remaining will die. Perfectly legal!

it doesn't seem very just to me though. We cannot just excuse the crimes committed by those who abandoned their cause when they saw it would fail. They still ruined real peoples lives and for this they must be held accountable. How about in our new legal framework we pass a law saying that people who oppress others will not be protected by the law? Since being lawful or not seems to matter to you so much. What if a society exists where it is lawful to rape babies? I imagine you will be the first one defending the rapists and preaching the merits of law and order over justice and peace. 

Quote
My point is that our politicians are a reflection of us, more specifically, of who vote and demand to be heard.

You are blinded by an idealistic image. What happened first, did the average man dislike drug use or did the government create propaganda demonizing drug use? Our politicians are no reflection of us, we are a clay sculpture molded into whatever they want us to be.

1833
Seriously the worst part about USA is that they pretend to be something they are not. They should change the name to the United States of Jesus land and implement a judicial system that quotes the scripture because essentially that is what the country is. Know the real reason why you can't smoke weed or take LSD? Because it will piss the all mighty sky wizard off! They should change the official title of the vice police to the religious police and be done with it. I guess we should be grateful that we can dance in the street and not be beheaded.

1834
Philosophy, Economics and Justice / Re: Rothbardianism VS. Agorism
« on: October 28, 2012, 10:59 am »
Rothbard, huh?

His theories are all nice and fine, but I bet you shit on them when your house is on fire and not a firefighter in sight because you live in a not-so-profitable area no private fire department wants to serve...

Yes much better for us to hire some armed men to steal money from others for us (for a cut to them!) so that we can fund a million dollar fire department for buttfuck nowhere population ten people.

1835
They are really sneaky fucks too. In some places in USA courts have ruled that you cannot be sentenced to NA or AA as they are christian religious organizations. But then they will try shit like oh well you are not sentenced to go to NA or AA but as terms of your probation you must go to AA or NA so if you go to AA or NA meetings you can serve your sentence outside of prison on probation but otherwise you serve it in prison, but no of course you are not SENTENCED to AA or NA. They have a million and one tricks.

http://legallad.quickanddirtytips.com/does-mandatory-alcoholics-anonymous-violate-constitution.aspx

talks a bit about how God Damn unconstitutional forced NA is (despite the fact that it is commonplace).

here is another site that is for the people sentenced by the courts to become members of these christian religious cults

http://leavingaa.com/?page_id=14

but really AA and NA are not even the worst that you can be sentenced to. Some of the in patient rehabilitation facilities you can get sentenced to are pretty much combinations of fascist re-education centers and Jesus Camp. Authority is there to be obeyed not questioned! You are addicted to drugs for the rest of your life (ie: you have used drugs ever in your life) and your only cure it to turn your life over to Jesus Christ and continually put your faith in him! I shit you not. This is where the court will send you if you are lucky enough to avoid getting sentenced to prison and ass rape but unlucky enough to be sentenced to something worse than probation and AA/NA christian indoctrination.

1836
Being forced to go to AA or NA is pretty standard here if you get in trouble for anything even remotely related to drugs or alcohol.

1837
wow carnt imagine having to put up with that id last about 5 seconds ,the women i see maybe arnt that bad after all

are these jesus centres what u have to go to if arrested to avoid jail ,in uk if 1st time drug personal offence u get sent to compass/lifeline were i live for 1 meeting and thats it

I've been to approx 2000 NA or AA meetings over the years and heard the word Jesus maybe twice! Not sure about the USA but in the UK - it's all about one addict trying to help another addict stay clean. And trust me I've seen hundreds of down and out junkie's turn their lives around through NA and AA.

You don't get any 'professionals' at meetings, the only people that go are addicts.

In the USA it is about 95% people who don't want to be there but have to be there poorly pretending to give a flying fuck so they can get their sheets signed off for the state, 4% religious fanatics who found Jesus and quit drugs (these people tend to run the meetings), and 1% people who are actually addicts and get help from AA/NA without being addicted to Jesus.

1838
seriously totally not the christian God. The 12 step prayer may be BASED on a prayer to Jesus but they totally modified it and now it is religion neutral (it can be any God after all ... well provided it is a single male God).

Quote
God, give us grace to accept with serenity
the things that cannot be changed,
courage to change the things
which should be changed,
and the wisdom to distinguish
the one from the other.
Living one day at a time,
Enjoying one moment at a time,
Accepting hardship as a pathway to peace,
Taking, as Jesus did,
This sinful world as it is,
Not as I would have it,
Trusting that You will make all things right,
If I surrender to Your will,
So that I may be reasonably happy in this life,
And supremely happy with You forever in the next.
Amen.

of course we also have the good old Lords prayer, another primary feature of 12 step meetings!

Quote
    "Our Father in heaven,
    hallowed be your name.
    Your kingdom come,
    your will be done,
    on earth as it is in heaven.
    Give us this day our daily bread,
    and forgive us our debts,
    as we also have forgiven our debtors.
    And lead us not into temptation,
    but deliver us from evil."

Some straight up scientifically proven anti addiction medicine right there. There is NO OTHER CURE to addiction (ie: having used drugs ever). Nothing works at all except turning your life over to JEBUS HALLELUJAH AMEN LAWDY LAWDY.  Of course there ARE competing ideas to cures for addiction, I have heard from reliable sources that turning your life over to THE CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY and paying them to audit away all of the frozen volcano alien souls implanted in you by LORD XENU (the one male alien supreme lord of the universe)  to cause your addictive ways can also work, but I am not sure how many steps NARCONON has.

1839
Only in good old USA can being caught with marijuana get you sentenced to turning your life over to the (totally not Christian only!!) one single male God and chanting prayers for His Glory. Turning your life over to the (I swear not Christian!) single male God and singing his praises is totally the cure to marijuana addiction (which is defined as having used marijuana), that shit is like scientifically proven man.

1840
Quote
They are not supposed to talk about religion in those meetings but a lot of dumb asses really ruin it by getting all obsessed with saving everyone and talking about Jesus and scaring new people off.

Not supposed to talk about religion in the meeting? Just save it until the end when they say

"God, grant me the serenity
To accept the things I cannot change,
Courage to change the things I can,
and wisdom to know the difference."

Of course this is not the Christian God but merely God as you understand Him so that makes it okay. Because there is one God. And it is a male God. But it is The one male God as you understand capital h im. Not the Christian God. 

1841
Heroin is not the disease but the short term solution to the disease of addiction.....

If you look into the disease theory of addiction, and the solution (12 steps), you'll see what i mean.

Even the DSM classifies drug addiction as a mental illness.

1. Admit that you are not a good enough Christian (or even a Christian at all!!)
2. Desire to be a better Christian
3. Say as many Christian group prayers as possible
4. Turn your life over to the Christian God and Jesus, you obviously suck at living it yourself as you use the Devils substances
5. Worship Jebus!
6. Hallelujah
7. Amen!!
8. Get your slip signed for the Christian parole officer / judge / probation officer
9. Give your slip to the Christian parole officer / judge / probation officer
10. Talk about how you totally love God and Jesus and like totally hit rock bottom smoking that devil Negro weed man
11. Finish up requirements to get off probation / parole or out of rehab or whatever
12. Smoke a bowl and try not to get busted by the Christian police again

1842
Off topic / Re: Suggestions for reducing smell/amount of meth smoke.
« on: October 28, 2012, 08:20 am »
Put dryer sheets at both ends of an empty toilet paper roll or another cylindrical object with holes on both sides and exhale your smoke through that. It'll both catch meth particles and refresh the bad smell into a new one. I prefer Downy Lavender Serenity sheets myself :)

Also works well for reducing the smell of smoked marijuana, although it is not perfect as some smoke still leaves from the pipe and isn't sanitized ;).

1843
Security / Re: Silent Circle: A Cryptography Godsend?
« on: October 28, 2012, 08:05 am »
To put things another way, security measures generally are only good for buying time. The amount of time bought generally negatively correlates with the amount of resources spent by the attacker. This is not always the case, for example a message encrypted with a one time pad will never be decrypted unless the key is compromised. However, in the majority of cases a security measure can only buy time even if it is properly implemented. In the case of strong encryption such as AES, the amount of time bought is more than enough. It is so long that the universe will die prior to the amount of time bought running out. An attacker can spend enormous amounts of resources trying to reduce the amount of time bought, but even if they spend trillions of dollars they can not reduce the amount of time bought to a level that makes it practical to spend resources. In the case of anonymity networks, especially low latency anonymity networks, the amount of time bought is much less. It might be measurable in hours or days instead of millenniums. Or it might even be measured in weeks or months or years. And attackers are much more capable of reducing the amount of time to practical levels. If you halve ten billion years you still have five billion left. If you halve a year you are left with six months. Even most high latency solutions can only provide anonymity for a number of messages (against global passive attackers). Maybe they will allow you to send fifty messages before you are identified, perhaps one hundred. Exact numbers aside, the point is simply that even rather strong anonymity systems are simply not comparable with strong encryption systems in regards to the amount of resources that it takes for an attacker to compromise them in a practical amount of time.

1844
Security / Re: Silent Circle: A Cryptography Godsend?
« on: October 28, 2012, 07:45 am »
warning: rambling alert

The honest truth of the matter is that low latency anonymity networks are just not very good at providing anonymity, and they are even worse at providing anonymity for hidden services. Here is one thing worth mentioning that not many people realize: when accessing a hidden service it is theoretically possible for a single malicious node to deanonymize you. When accessing the clearnet, it is not possible for a single Tor node to deanonymize you. Allow me to elaborate:

this is what the path from the hidden services perspective looks like:

Hidden Service <-> HS Entry <-> HS Middle <-> HS Final

This is what the path from the clients perspective looks like:

Client <-> Client Entry <-> Client Middle <-> Client Final (rendezvous)

giving us this:

 Client <-> Client Entry <-> Client Middle <-> Client Final (rendezvous) <-> HS Final <-> HS Middle <-> HS Entry <-> Hidden Service

HS entry is capable of determining if it is an entry node for the hidden service simply by sending the hidden services  a specifically modulated stream through Tor and looking to see if it relays a stream with this modulation after sending it. Additionally, there is nothing preventing HS Entry and Client Entry from being the same exact node. If they are, then the node operator can link the client and hidden service with an end to end timing attack. When a client accesses the clearnet this is not possible

Client <-> Client Entry <-> Client Middle <-> Client Exit <-> Website

as the client selects the entire path it will avoid using the same node for entry and exit. Additionally, it will entirely avoid using nodes from the same family. Thus, clients connecting to hidden services can theoretically be deanonymized by an active attacker with a single node, but clients accessing the clearnet cannot be deanonymized by an active attacker with less than two nodes (traffic fingerprinting attacks aside).

This is not to say that clients are better off accessing clearnet websites though. Accessing hidden services gives a big advantage in that it makes it more difficult for an arbitrary attacker to position themselves so that they can eavesdrop on traffic to the hidden service. This probably makes doing end to end timing attacks more difficult in the end, even though it does open up the possibility of a single node carrying out an end point timing attack the probability of this being possible to carry out against a large number of clients is small (although it is very likely that some of the clients connecting to such a popular site as SR, are indeed using at least one of the same entry guards as SR is, making them vulnerable to the single node attack I mentioned)

I feel like I have strayed from the point I originally set out to make, but only to illustrate a point about hidden service connections that I think many people do not realize (that they are weak to single active node attacks, unlike connections to the regular internet). Back to the point though, using low latency anonymity techniques only can afford so much anonymity. The goal of an anonymity network is to prevent an attacker who can see Alice from determining who Alice communicates with. Likewise, the anonymity network attempts to prevent an attacker who can communicate with Bob from determining who Bob actually is. There are a variety of techniques used to accomplish this goal. Networks like Tor rely on an attacker having only being able to view a small portion of traffic on the network. They protect anonymity entirely by preventing an attacker from watching the traffic leaving from Alice AND the traffic arriving to the person Alice is communicating with, or the traffic arriving at Bob if they are the people communicating with Bob. Tor attempts to do this by having a very large geographically diverse network of volunteer operated nodes.   

Once the attacker can see the traffic at both ends of a connection, the communicating parties are deanonymized. Unfortunately for Tor and similar networks, tracing communicating parties to their entry guards has proven to be a somewhat trivial task, particularly (although not exclusively) in the case of hidden services. Once a target is traced to its entry guards, deanonymizing it is simply a matter of obtaining logs from the entry guard (either actively or passively) . The situation is equally grim in the case of Alice who uses Tor to visit a website, with the trace starting at Alice rather than the website (in some situations the trace starts at one end, in other situations it starts at the other). If Alice visits honeypot.com which is run by the FBI, they will immediately be able to deanonymize her if they are already monitoring the traffic from her (traffic confirmation). Tor prevents traffic analysis, it does not and cannot prevent traffic confirmation. Even if Alice is visiting notahoneypot.com and the FBI gets logs from it, they can immediately determine that Alice is visiting notahoneypot.com if they are already monitoring her traffic. Tor is really meant for the specific situation in which the feds gather logs from (nota)honeypot.com  and they have not yet been able to determine that Alice is someone they are interested in (traffic analysis). Unfortunately even when it comes to traffic analysis Tor leaves a lot to be desired, as mentioned earlier the feds could very well just run several entry nodes and wait until a client that visits (nota)honeypot.com uses them.

I don't mean to sound like I am fear mongering, really I do like Tor and I recognize that it provides a lot of anonymity working in the low latency framework that it does. I just also recognize that it is somewhat of a toy compared to high latency anonymity solutions. In a high latency mix network, an attacker can watch Alice send traffic and they can watch that traffic arrive at its destination. Still they are incapable of linking the traffic. In fact in some high latency designs the attacker is capable of watching Alice send a message, passively AND largely (but only partially) actively watching Alice's message on its path all the way to it arriving at her correspondents IP address, and still they cannot link Alice to her correspondent. In some high latency systems, the attacker can send a message to Bob, follow the message all the way to the point that it is delivered to Bob's IP address, and still they cannot determine that Bob's IP address is linked to Bob the pseudonym they communicate with. Comparing high and low latency networks is somewhat apples and oranges, but the difference in the anonymity guarantees between them is extremely massive. I do not believe that low latency networks, including Tor, will continue to hold up to focused attacks. I do believe that a lot of the success of these networks is due to a lack of technical competence on the part of those who wish to attack them. I believe that Tor will continue to provide some degree of anonymity, particularly to people who use it for a very brief period of time before discontinuing its use. It will also continue to provide anonymity to people who desire anonymity but who do not have significant attackers (ie: abusive boy friends, not federal police). But I also strongly believe that it is not the appropriate tool to be using for things upon which your freedom depends. I do believe that currently it will work for these purposes, but I do not think it is the strength of Tor protecting you but rather the weakness of your enemies.


1845
Security / Re: Silent Circle: A Cryptography Godsend?
« on: October 28, 2012, 07:07 am »

VOIP over TCP(the only protocol tor supports) is problematic because TCP will keep retrying old packets and delaying new ones. In a voice conversation if a bit of info was lost then it is better to just play what is coming next and forgetting about it, that is why UDP is used.

Real time protocols don't really play well with anonymizing networks. Far better to just use chat.

At this moment I am working on a chat client/server that opens a tor hidden service to facilitate secure communication.

Sounds like Tor Chat (or libertes cables system). This is a flawed design, hidden services have much less anonymity than regular Tor clients and having chat protocols where two parties both run as hidden services decreases the anonymity of both of them. It would be better for anonymity if they communicated through a hidden service as regular Tor clients.

How exactly are tor services less anonymous than tor clients? I would love to know about that, can you point me to an article on the subject?

The design I am working on only requires one of the parties to run a hidden service, the other connects as a tor client. Hidden service to client communication involves two tor circuits connecting to the same node and engaging in end to end communication.

No single node or party to this connection is privy to the location of both parties, and only the parties themselves are privy to the information. It is not like using an exit node where someone can sniff you.

The only vulnerability in hidden services I am aware of is that a hostile node has a chance of discovering your .onion address and potentially impersonating your client. However tor support a trusted client model where a hidden service can only be connected to by someone who has entered the correct client key into their own tor daemon.

This is after all the exact same security model that silk road itself is using. If hidden services are vulnerable then it behooves you to warn us of its exact nature. Please, I really need to know this, my freedom depends on it.

I have done a lot of research on tor and am very surprised by your statements. Please enlighten me as to what crucial information I am missing.

http://freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/hs-attack06.pdf

The bottom line is: Hidden services create new circuits every single time a client asks them to. If the client is malicious, this could be ten times in one minute. Clients use roughly one circuit every ten minutes. Essentially this hidden service design allows an attacker to 'artificially' speed up the rate at which a hidden service instance of Tor will use one of their malicious Tor relays to relay traffic for their malicious client. Conversely, a hidden service cannot so easily force a client to open circuit after circuit nonstop. This makes hidden services much easier to trace to their entry guards, and once you have identified the entry guards you are only one hop from the target.

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