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Messages - kmfkewm

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1081
Off topic / anonymous grassroots anti prohibitionist activism and organization
« on: May 30, 2013, 08:23 am »
I think that we should use the member base we have here to actively promote drug legalization. Pretty much there are several strategies that drug users can use in an attempt to fight prohibitionists. On the one hand we have things like SR, an Agorist approach; defensive protection of drug users and dealers. The goal is to allow users and dealers to ignore the current laws, not to change the current laws. Another tactic is violent action against prohibitionists, as enjoyable as this would be I highly doubt we can rally the troops. We cannot convince people that detonating a suicide vest in a police station will result in them going to heaven and getting 72 sheets of acid, and nobody really gives such a fuck about the drug war that they would put their life at serious risk for free in order to fight it. Perhaps an assassination market model would work, but I don't want to spend this entire post talking about how we can bring about the deaths of prohibitionists. Another strategy is passive education, this is what Erowid is doing. People interested in learning the truth about drugs can visit Erowid and get mostly accurate information on pretty much any drug they are likely to encounter. This is great for people who want to pull drug information, but it doesn't really help push out the ideology of legalization. Most people going to Erowid are either medical professionals or those already in favor of legalization. An additional strategy is pushing information out to people who are not even particularly interested in it. It doesn't even need to be information about specific drugs, rather it needs to be information that influences the way people perceive drugs and the way people perceive the war on drugs. I certainly see this happening in some cases, for example the television show Weeds is a great example of pro legalization propaganda: people who are not particularly interested in marijuana watch it and it paints a perception of marijuana users and legalization in their minds. Weeds is not delivering the facts about marijuana but it is certainly influencing people towards legalization.

Now the people on SR cannot really make something like Weeds, but I think we can still all participate in actively creating and spreading propaganda. I always see people on internet forums, news sites that allow comments, etc, commenting on drug threads/stories. A lot of them are against legalization, even more of them don't particularly give a shit either way. These are the groups that we need to target, not people who are already interested in drugs or who already support legalization. I think we should have an entire sub-forum or separate community even that is dedicated to creating and disseminating targeted content to these groups. They are not going to pull the content from us, but we can use our man power to push the content to them through the internet. We can think of effective ways to influence their opinions, collaborate on creating content to expose them to, etc.

SR is great in itself but it is only taking advantage of one of the strategies that we can use to fight the war on drugs.

1082
Security / Re: FBI shared child porn to nab pedophiles; Washington home raided
« on: May 30, 2013, 08:05 am »
Quote from: astor on May 30, 2013, 07:34 am
You can make the same argument about drugs. LE infiltrates a drug ring and allows dealers to sell to buyers. Suppose one of them dies. Under the law, the vendor gets 20+ years for contributing to the death of a person, not LE.

I'm not saying it's right, I'm just saying that's how liability works under the law. LE gets off for a lot of shit. They basically have no equivalent of a good Samaritan law.

If you couldn't tell I was being extremely sarcastic. Anyone who thinks this LE operation resulted in 12,000 child rapes is a fucking retard. Anyone who thinks that it didn't result in 12,000 child rapes but that the pedophiles viewing the images did is a fucking retard and brainwashed. The only logical conclusion is that neither the FBI nor the pedophiles viewing the images caused any child rape at all. The illogical conclusion is that the FBI caused 12,000 rapes, the illogical and hypocritical conclusion is that the FBI didn't but the people downloading the images did.

1083
Security / Re: FBI shared child porn to nab pedophiles; Washington home raided
« on: May 30, 2013, 07:51 am »
Quote from: Jack N Hoff on May 30, 2013, 01:21 am
Quote from: kmfkewm on May 30, 2013, 12:34 am
Quote from: Jack N Hoff on May 30, 2013, 12:32 am
Quote from: onesickpuppy on May 29, 2013, 11:17 pm
Quote from: Jack N Hoff on May 29, 2013, 09:56 pm
They only catch mentally challenged and stupid pedophiles like this.  Pedos have it easier than us.  If they are following the same security measures as us then they will never be caught.  Anyone with the skills to use SR successfully could also trade CP successfully.  I don't support CP or pedos though, just stating the facts.

You're assuming that this was a clearnet website and not a hidden service on the tor network. If it was a hidden service, then your premise is wrong; they could catch us as easily as they caught the peds.

There are plenty of pedo hidden services.  You can trade that shit and remain anonymous on them.  If they found the server of a pedo hidden service, all of the users are still anonymous.  You don't give your fucking name or address or anything like we have to do.

There are plenty of busted pedo hidden services too, the past two years have seen dozens of CP traders and hidden services on Tor being pwnt by feds.

I don't do any research on the subject.  How were they deanonymized?  I feel pedos are dumber than us in general because of the stupid shit I have read about them doing.  Surely these busts had to of been the pedos fault...  I'm sure they did something wrong.  Pedos were stupid enough to download a firefox plugin called "Honey Pawt" with pedobear as the logo and they got the link to the download from the CP page of the hidden wiki.  Things like this make me feel like pedos are generally much dumber than us.

There is actually evidence supporting the idea that on average pedophiles have below average intelligence. One study showed that the lower a persons age of attraction is below societal norms, the lower below average their IQ is likely to be (with pedophile average IQ being significantly below average, hebephile average IQ being slightly below average, and teliophile IQ being average). There is also a positive correlation between childhood head injury and pedophilia. Of course there are always exceptions though, some of the online pedophile groups clearly consist of members with superior intelligence.

1084
Security / Re: FBI shared child porn to nab pedophiles; Washington home raided
« on: May 30, 2013, 07:25 am »
Quote from: astor on May 30, 2013, 03:55 am
I am not a lawyer (or am I?), but I bet this rests on the technical details. LE can allow a drug ring to distribute drugs, they just can't distribute real drugs to people. If the buyers ODed and died, it would be a huge liability for LE. But if buyers OD and die on drugs that dealers supply -- that LE allowed those dealers to supply, but that they would have supplied anyway if LE hadn't infiltrated the group -- then they have no liability for it.

So did they take over a forum and allow other people to trade CP, or did they supply CP to the forum that didn't exist there before? It's not clear to me. But the latter would be on a par with providing people with drugs. If it's the former, then it's in line with the other types of investigations that they do.

But if every time a pedophile views CP “The children portrayed … suffer real and permanent damage” , then the FBI must have just victimized thousands of children! If the forum had 5,600 members, let's say that only 600 of them viewed the forum over the two week period that the FBI was monitoring it for. If we assume each of them viewed about twenty images, that comes to a total of 12,000 times a child was viewed portrayed in CP ! The inaction on the part of the FBI therefor led to 12,000 instances of a child suffering real, permanent damage!

As a matter of fact, each and every single time one of those images was viewed, the child in the viewed image was raped all over again! Therefor we must conclude that the FBI directly caused 12,000 child rapes. They don't even dispute the facts! We must conclude that the FBI is a secret pedophile organization hell bent on raping children.

1085
Security / Re: FBI shared child porn to nab pedophiles; Washington home raided
« on: May 30, 2013, 01:28 am »
Quote from: Jack N Hoff on May 30, 2013, 01:21 am
Quote from: kmfkewm on May 30, 2013, 12:34 am
Quote from: Jack N Hoff on May 30, 2013, 12:32 am
Quote from: onesickpuppy on May 29, 2013, 11:17 pm
Quote from: Jack N Hoff on May 29, 2013, 09:56 pm
They only catch mentally challenged and stupid pedophiles like this.  Pedos have it easier than us.  If they are following the same security measures as us then they will never be caught.  Anyone with the skills to use SR successfully could also trade CP successfully.  I don't support CP or pedos though, just stating the facts.

You're assuming that this was a clearnet website and not a hidden service on the tor network. If it was a hidden service, then your premise is wrong; they could catch us as easily as they caught the peds.

There are plenty of pedo hidden services.  You can trade that shit and remain anonymous on them.  If they found the server of a pedo hidden service, all of the users are still anonymous.  You don't give your fucking name or address or anything like we have to do.

There are plenty of busted pedo hidden services too, the past two years have seen dozens of CP traders and hidden services on Tor being pwnt by feds.

I don't do any research on the subject.  How were they deanonymized?  I feel pedos are dumber than us in general because of the stupid shit I have read about them doing.  Surely these busts had to of been the pedos fault...  I'm sure they did something wrong.  Pedos were stupid enough to download a firefox plugin called "Honey Pawt" with pedobear as the logo and they got the link to the download from the CP page of the hidden wiki.  Things like this make me feel like pedos are generally much dumber than us.

Always server misconfigurations that leaked IP address or allowed feds to hack into it. Some users were busted too, it seems at least a lot of them were busted with photographic forensics but nobody really knows if any were traced with technical attacks.

1086
Security / Re: FBI shared child porn to nab pedophiles; Washington home raided
« on: May 30, 2013, 12:46 am »
Quote
“Distributing of child pornography – images and videos of real children experiencing the worst moments of their young lives – is not a ‘victimless’ crime, and the heinous nature of this offense should never be diminished by referring to it as ‘just pictures,’” Ellsworth told the court.  “The children portrayed … suffer real and permanent damage, for the rest of their lives, each and every time their exploitation is shared over the Internet.”

Let's do a double blind experiment. We can hook up one of these abused children to all kinds of medical devices that measure pain, their brainwaves, heart rate, fucking everything. Then we have someone in a different city load their CP images 20 times with random time intervals between them. If the best medical experts in the world can detect changes in the child that correlate with the images being loaded, then we can accept the claim this dumbshit is making. Otherwise it is conclusively and empirically disproved. Anyone want to bet on the odds?


Quote
One of those children – a girl whose father shared images of her being abused that has since become widely shared online – put it more bluntly in a statement to the court filed last year.

“I wish I could feel completely safe, but as long as these images are out there, I never will,” she said in a victim impact statement.

“Every time they are downloaded, I am exploited again, my privacy is breached, and my life feels less and less safe,” she continued. “I will never be able to have control over who sees me raped as a child. It’s all out there for the world to see and it can never be removed from the internet.”

Maybe she should opt out of the program she is in where she is notified every single time when someone is busted with one of her CP files, if it is really causing her so much damage. Of course then she wouldn't be able to demand restitution from all of the people caught with her images, which is currently making her a small fortune. I mean it sucks that she was molested, but maybe they should find somebody who isn't the poster child for making money off their past abuse to be their poster child for 'people downloading CP with me in it causes me horrible pain every single time'. Just a thought!


Quote
The Seattle-area man targeted in the investigation is alleged to have accessed a “jailbait” girls section of “Website A” 10 days after investigators took control of it. Specifically, he’s alleged to have accessed photos showing two men raping a 10 to 12 year old girl.

Well that is a huge indication that it is a Tor hidden service. Clearnet jailbait = 14+ , Tor jailbait = 9+ .

1087
Security / Re: FBI shared child porn to nab pedophiles; Washington home raided
« on: May 30, 2013, 12:34 am »
Quote from: Jack N Hoff on May 30, 2013, 12:32 am
Quote from: onesickpuppy on May 29, 2013, 11:17 pm
Quote from: Jack N Hoff on May 29, 2013, 09:56 pm
They only catch mentally challenged and stupid pedophiles like this.  Pedos have it easier than us.  If they are following the same security measures as us then they will never be caught.  Anyone with the skills to use SR successfully could also trade CP successfully.  I don't support CP or pedos though, just stating the facts.

You're assuming that this was a clearnet website and not a hidden service on the tor network. If it was a hidden service, then your premise is wrong; they could catch us as easily as they caught the peds.

There are plenty of pedo hidden services.  You can trade that shit and remain anonymous on them.  If they found the server of a pedo hidden service, all of the users are still anonymous.  You don't give your fucking name or address or anything like we have to do.

There are plenty of busted pedo hidden services too, the past two years have seen dozens of CP traders and hidden services on Tor being pwnt by feds.

1088
Security / Re: FBI shared child porn to nab pedophiles; Washington home raided
« on: May 30, 2013, 12:31 am »
THe FBI says that looking at pictures of children being molested is just as bad as molesting children, but it is a common tactic for them to share child porn to get membership in CP distribution groups, so I wonder if they also rape children to gain membership in child molestation groups.

1089
Security / Re: FBI shared child porn to nab pedophiles; Washington home raided
« on: May 30, 2013, 12:23 am »
probably pedoforum.

1090
Security / Re: Hidden services security doesn't look too good.
« on: May 29, 2013, 07:31 am »
Quote from: astor on May 29, 2013, 06:47 am
Quote from: Miah on May 29, 2013, 05:59 am
I think that's the scary part of all this. Ideally there should be some sort of mechanism that would recognize a guard node being taken over. I'm sure there's some algorithm that can figure that out.

Well, kmf is actually talking about a different attack from the one published in the paper that started this thread.

He's talking about a well known attack published in 2006 which you can read here: http://freehaven.net/anonbib/date.html#hs-attack06

I think there have been other successful direct attacks on Tor. Traffic classifiers have 'predicted'/'identified' encrypted websites loaded through Tor with over 60% accuracy, and that was before hidden markov models were used. I think there was a fairly recent research paper that took into account hidden markov  models, called something like 'missing the forest for the trees'. I don't recall the results, but I am sure that the accuracy jumped up significantly over 60%. Essentially the classifier that got over 60% accuracy only took a single loaded page into consideration to fingerprint a webpage, whereas with hidden markov models classifiers take an entire sequence of loaded pages into account to fingerprint a website. There was also an attack that could fairly accurately geolocate servers by measuring clock skew, not really a direct attack on Tor though. There are probably some others that I am not recalling as well. However as far as purely direct attacks on Tor go, pretty much in all cases they require the target to use at least one attacker controlled or monitored entry guard.

Quote
That one doesn't require an entry guard to be taken over. It just requires LE to identify an entry guard by opening up many connections to the hidden service, and it's a lot scarier because it only takes 1-2 hours to find the entry guard, although probably days to weeks longer to monitor it and find the hidden service. However, that's way shorter than the 4-8 months it takes to carry out the attack in the recent paper. The best defense against the 2006 attack is layered entry guards, which are discussed in the original paper and still not implemented.

Yeah way more worried about the attack from 2006 than this "new" one. This new attack is like 50% the 2006 attack anyway, "own the hidden services entry guard to deanonymize it". But instead of brute forcing circuits against a specific hidden service, they just hope they can enumerate enough hidden service .onions to own an entry guard used by some of them. They really are taking a kind of alarmist tone with their paper, from what I can see, considering that it is nothing really new. The only new part is the technique of forcing yourself to the position of a particular hidden services HSDIR (I guess, I still have not read the full paper). From what I can tell they are taking a completely different approach than I would, once they can detect all clients attempting to connect to the hidden service I would try to get the clients to that specific hidden service with an end point timing attack between the HSDIR node and the clients entry guard. I have no idea how many hidden services they enumerated, but the % of hidden services they deanonymized with this attack should extrapolate to the % of clients they can deanonymize connecting to any particular hidden service. That is the scary part and it seems they completely overlooked that attack angle.

1091
Security / Re: Hidden services security doesn't look too good.
« on: May 29, 2013, 05:44 am »
Quote from: astor on May 29, 2013, 04:45 am
It's still worth noting that no hidden service has been deanonymized through a direct attack on the Tor network.

Test hidden services have been deanonymized by researchers, but so far nobody knows of a targeted illegal hidden service being pwnt by LE (via a direct attack on Tor anyway).

1092
Security / Re: Liberty Reserve shut down by US authorities
« on: May 29, 2013, 05:39 am »
Quote from: Miah on May 29, 2013, 03:31 am
Quote
Seriously feds, pretty consistent pattern. I can tell what you are going to go after next, because it is what I was using three years ago. It is weird, like you are always trying to catch up almost lol.

Well that's pretty true but the fact is the more popular the Bitcoins get and the more coverage it gets the more the Feds will get a raging hard on to shut that mother down. From what you see you have two main users of Bitcoins and correct me if I'm wrong but you have us the people that use Bitcoins to buy or sell our drugs and you have the die hard Bitcoin lovers that mine coins and want to uphold the integrity of the Bitcoin. I think the latter group is the more serious threat of the Bitcoin ever demising. It's been proven in the past that a decentralized currency without a regulating body will not be tolerated by the Government. The irony is not lost on me that all these so called 'Democratic states' have nothing Democratic about them.

LR was a centralized target. Shutting Bitcoin down will be like playing whack a mole. They might shut down an exchanger here or there, and then new ones will pop up. But the actual currency will not be shut down, and it is consistent across any new exchangers. LR getting shut down means that the money in LR is gone in a poof, a Bitcoin exchanger being shut down means that it is time for another one to pop up.

1093
Philosophy, Economics and Justice / Re: Society's distorted view on substances.
« on: May 29, 2013, 04:39 am »
Quote from: Capslockian on May 29, 2013, 03:44 am
Anger is probably not the right thing to feel when confronting ignorance. I try to respond with pity. When something like "drugs are bad" is this engrained, this universal, and this accepted by the vast majority of society there is little you can do. Weed will be legal with in the next 20 years across the entirety of the US most likely but we are centuries away from reform for hard drugs. I'm the kind of person who have exhaled in her face like in the scene from American History X, but yeah, don't let it get to you.

Perhaps a "bombs for drug prisoners" exchange program would speed things up a bit.

1094
Security / Re: Hidden services security doesn't look too good.
« on: May 29, 2013, 04:18 am »
Quote from: Miah on May 29, 2013, 03:43 am
Quote
hear people claim that attacks against Tor are only theoretical but I never quite understood this idea. Many of the theoretical attacks against Tor have been carried out against the live Tor network with success. For example, certainly timing attacks have been proven to work against Tor. This new attack is simply a timing attack in which the attacker positions themselves at the HSDIR and hopes to own one of the clients or hidden services entry guards. From the quote I have read here on the first page of posts, it seems like the researchers are taking the wrong angle when approaching this method of attack. If the hidden service has a bad entry guard it can be deanonymized by the owner of the entry guard so long as the entry guard owner knows the .onion address. It seems the researchers are enumerating hidden service .onion addresses and then carrying out a trivial timing attack to see if one of their entry guards was selected by any of the hidden services. This is interesting, but many of the interesting hidden services are already public knowledge, in which case the attack is a simple timing attack that has already been in literature for many years. I think that more importantly, this attack allows the attacker to position themselves such that they only need to own the entry guard of a client connecting to a hidden service in order to deanonymize the client. The client connects to a HSDIR that is attacker controlled, so the attacker has half of a timing attack, if the clients utilized entry guard is also attacker controlled then the attacker can link the client to the hidden service. That is a bit more interesting, it is nothing really ground breaking though. It is also clearly not simply a theoretical attack, and indeed it could be easily carried out against the live Tor network, the only issue is owning the entry guard utilized by the connecting client, which is the hard part.

I imagine that for the most part the Tor developers will say 'meh' about this paper. None of this is really new, except for perhaps the ability for an attacker to become the HSDIR of arbitrary hidden services. Entry guards protect from this attack to the extent that they can, and we are left again with what is essentially trusting a single hop proxy.

Ok fair enough. If you were to put on your ToR developer hat what would you do to strengthen the integrity of the ToR network?


Honestly, having a network that resembles Tor rules out some of the things that can be done to enormously increase anonymity. But even something that looks a lot like Tor can be much more anonymous than Tor. The first step is to reduce the number of entry guards selected by the client, beyond a doubt to two and it is possible that even using only one is the best option. The second step is to increase the number of nodes on a circuit and introduce layered guard nodes. The third step is to greatly reduce the frequency with which guard nodes are rotated, especially first layer guard nodes.  The fourth step is to use PIR for HSDIR requests and to remove the concept of  using a set of introduction nodes that persistently introduce for a specific hidden service. Perhaps something like SURBs, the single use reply blocks of type III remailers, can be used instead. In such a case the hidden service would layer encrypt a packet that routes toward it, publish the packet to the HSDIR, and the client would query the HSDIR with a PIR protocol to retrieve one of the signed SURB packets. Then the client would create a circuit and send the SURB to the first node specified, which would remove a layer of encryption revealing the second node specified, etc, all the way up to the hidden service. Something like this. Then the attacker would need to own the hidden services first layer entry guard to do an end point timing attack against connections to the hidden service. Additionally, they could only brute force up to the position of the layered guard node that they own that is closest to the hidden service. Additionally, there would no longer be a centralized set of introduction nodes to DoS. An additional measure that could be taken is using some system to encrypt hidden service addresses. My first thought was that hidden services could be queried for by the hash of their .onion address rather than their .onion address (of course with PIR in either case, but the hash would be used to obscure the list of all .onion addresses from the HSDIR nodes), with the retrieved information encrypted symmetrically with the actual .onion address of the hidden service. However, there have been issues identified with this hash based system. However, rransom, one of the Tor developers, proposed a different (much more advanced) solution that uses elliptic curve cryptography and blinding to get the same security properties without any of the pitfalls.

I think that this is essentially the best that Tor can hope for without fundamentally changing itself into something else. Even this proposed set of changes includes significant reworkings of the hidden service protocol.

1095
Security / Re: Hidden services security doesn't look too good.
« on: May 29, 2013, 03:52 am »
Quote from: astor on May 29, 2013, 01:22 am
Quote from: jameslink2 on May 29, 2013, 12:27 am
That makes a couple of assumptions.

One is that they can observe the traffic from the guard node.

Well, the attack is successful when they own the guard node, but becoming the guard node through random selection by the hidden service is what takes so long and costs so much money.

Quote from: jameslink2 on May 29, 2013, 12:27 am
It is possible to configure your own nodes for guard nodes which blocks this attack.

Yep, that's basically what I was saying. Alternatively, if the hidden service operator didn't want to deal with anonymously purchasing extra servers for the entry guards, they could change the length of time that they keep entry guards:

Code: [Select]
/* Choose expiry time smudged over the past month. The goal here
* is to a) spread out when Tor clients rotate their guards, so they
* don't all select them on the same day, and b) avoid leaving a
* precise timestamp in the state file about when we first picked
* this guard. For details, see the Jan 2010 or-dev thread. */
entry->chosen_on_date = time(NULL) - crypto_rand_int(3600*24*30);

Change 30 to 180 and you've got entry guards for up to 6 months at a time, minus churn. Then it takes 4 years and $44,000 to achieve a 90% success rate with this attack. Adjust as needed.

Quote from: jameslink2 on May 29, 2013, 12:27 am
The second and more common configuration of a hidden service is to proxy the traffic through tor. Although it gets more complicated to explain it makes it much harder to De-anomize a hidden service. Think of it this way, the hidden service has to connect to other stuff. By proxying it through a tor client it hides the tor requests for a hidden service from the guard nodes.

Are you talking about Tor over Tor, ie you run two Tor instances and proxy one instance (which serves the hidden service) through the SocksPort of the other? Because all hidden services work over Tor. In any case, I don't think Tor over Tor (or even layered entry guards) helps here, because the probability of the attacker becoming one of the first-layer entry guards is the same.

Quote from: bitfool on May 29, 2013, 12:46 am
What about the DoS attack based on taking over the hidden services directory? How difficult to implement, and protect against is that one?

That is more worrying. It looks like it's easy for an attacker to pull of, and there's not much a hidden service can do to defend against it. It's not like messing with your entry guards or intro points, because in order for your visitors to figure out your configuration in the first place (like which intro points they can talk to you), they need to find your descriptor. That requires mutual assumptions made by both parties: for example, that I as your visitor can find your hidden service descriptor at a relay whose fingerprint is closest to the hash of your public key and the date.

They can make the descriptor ID unpredictable, for example by concatenating a random string to the hash of the public key and the date, and hashing that again, but that kind of solution needs to be implemented by the whole network, and new browser bundles must be distributed to users. They are working on it thought:

https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8244

Astor first I would like to say that everything you have said in this thread is very accurate, thanks for helping people to understand this attack. The second thing I want to say is that, although using persistent non-rotating entry guards can perfectly protect from this attack, it doesn't save hidden services from LE. They can still trace to entry guards, and then once again Tor is reduced to trusting a single hop proxy (well, actually three single hop proxies). So although the Tor configuration you suggest protects from an internal attacker (ie: the researchers in this paper), it doesn't protect from an external attacker who can monitor a targeted entry guard. If any of the entry guards are in the USA, tough luck because the feds don't even need a warrant for a pen register / trap and trace. Using layered guards can help to protect from this though, the trace always begins at the position of the attacker controlled node closest to the hidden service though. Layer enough guards and get lucky and you might have a moderately difficult to trace hidden service. Vanilla Tor is dangerously weak though. And the truth is that even some of the core Tor developers have essentially admitted this fact. They have taken to saying that you are even more screwed if you don't use Tor, which is an accurate although not very reassuring way to put things.

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