I would like just make some words regarding PGP keys and their life expectancy, as well as comment on the poor use of them which is evident on this forum. After reviewing the last few months some things are evident to us: 1. In almost all cases, brute forcing the password of a PGP key is easier than brute forcing the underlying encryption 2. LE amass large quantities of data against individuals, even if it is encrypted so that when raiding them if they choose to handover their keys (or they may bruteforce the password) they can decrypt the data and therefore prove the entire dataset was belonging to that individual 3. Humans have a habit of using strong crypto and technology to protect themselves but make an utter balls of basic OPSEC, highlighting it is us (not the technology) that is failing Now let us assume a market was started in January 2012 just like SR and the other markets and Vendor 1 operated there from day 1. He was a highly popular vendor who received thousands of orders which was great as all his orders were encrypted so he had a smart customer base. Unfortunately for Vendor 1 he was then busted in December 2012, but this is where the story splits into 2 parts: In this case we set the date using the time frame that Silk Road was imaged versus being seized, which was 2 months I recall but others have been known to continue operating for over a year so this is actually only a fraction of the real possibilities. Law enforcement had been watching the server since October in our fictional scenario and even though the market actually did delete order data, it was not before each time law enforcement spied on it and stored the encrypted PGP messages elsewhere. At this point for law enforcement data collection is arbitrary. Upon arresting vendor 1 his laptop was either unencrypted or he used a password which was brute forced using the intelligent keyword analysis which finds all words you have typed onto that computer and combines them like a dictionary attack to yield better results than standard brute force attacks. At this point, law enforcement now have at least 2 months worth of customer addresses (which can then further be used to prosecute others, especially in cases where vendors are selling to each other) and with the private PGP key on the computer that is very strong evidence against them if it reaches a full trial. It would also be reasonable to assume at this point law enforcement will name Vendor 1 as the same person both from the start of the operation in January right up to the end in December with the same PGP key being used throughout. In this case a vendor had been storing customer addresses, we will use the example period of 3 months assuming he didn't start storing them until after 9 months of business (although this is unusual as most would probably begin from the start of their vending period). During those 3 months of storing data law enforcement made 2 orders from the vendor in their investigations and found both packages arrived to different addresses from different accounts. Upon the vendor being arrested we again assume the hardware was unencrypted or used a password which can be intelligently brute forced. This yields both addresses which were encrypted to the vendor previously from the purchases through the market and would likely be an address which is not public and indistinguishable from others, therefore there is no way it could be publicly gathered data. Furthermore vendors are likely to store the username along with the address so this would make the case against them stronger. It is not hard to imagine that law enforcement at this point were also watching any postal items the individual was sending and if the addresses stored matched those they had managed to see them sending out it would be a very strong case for the prosecution. In both scenarios outlined in our fictional demonstration of some issues, there are real life comparisons which I don't need to insult your intelligence with by pointing them out. The problem in both cases is that the encryption kept them safe for a while, but the problem with public key cryptography (PKC) is that its use is also the downfall because it can prove a person is who they say they are. Something like this WILL be used against you and you have to assume if the hardware that has been used can be compromised by law enforcement through exploits, unencrypted drives or intelligent brute force methods, then the PGP private key will almost certainly be an easy target. So - how does limiting the life of keys help? Ok, it is obvious limiting the life of a key isn't a perfect solution by any means but it certainly will help introduce doubt into any case law enforcement may try to bring against you. In the first case of a market seizure, the information encrypted to the key the vendor held at the time was limited to 1 month if he had chosen to use a monthly key rotation. In the second, the damage control measure is not as useful (another reason not to store data to add to the long list of existing ones), but it at least still provides that the key law enforcement originally encrypted to for the orders they made is not the one currently in use. How useful that small benefit is on the 2nd case would depend on what way your lawyer wants to fight the case but it is at this point at least useful to point out - AT LEAST IT IS SOMETHING. The accumulation of small difficulties in cases are usually what is going to help you the most if you are unfortunately caught. Lawyers are not there to dispute facts with the prosecution, they are there to undermine the confidence in evidence that the prosecution puts to the jury which ultimately is what they are told to base their decision on. Is this going to make the ultimate difference in security? No. But if you are looking for a golden bullet then you are probably mistaking the idea of 1-step ultimate security for convenience from what I have witnessed. My own PGP key has a life of 3 months, I am not a vendor and I am nothing to do with the operations of Silk Road either, so it is reasonable to assume this is proportionate to the threat level I face. Vendors should ideally change at least once a month and sign their next key when changing to then put (the obsolete key) in deep storage far away from yourself or outright the secure deletion of it. Other very knowledgeable people are here volunteering their time to help in matters such as PGP, general OPSEC and specific/more specialized forms of security - make use of what knowledge they are willing to share. I intend to write much more specific and advanced topics in future covering a wide range of issues and I hope if you have read this far then what I have said above will at least get you thinking of some of the threats I outlined. Hux Fingerprint: 85B20E7623AAE8D07FF68A79A6B54E14E4193CEB Topic/Source: http://silkroad5v7dywlc.onion/index.php?topic=13717.0 Profile: http://silkroad5v7dywlc.onion/index.php?action=profile;u=17927  Tip: To verify the above signature, quote the contents into a reply and paste that into your PGP program to verify it as it uses BB coding which will not show up if you copy the unquoted form.