We all seem to agree that network layer attacks are harder than application layer attacks, which is why I focused on the application layer in my guide. I still have my doubts about the effectiveness of the hidden service deanonymization attacks. We'll see what intel comes out of the Marques case. If you think those attacks are effective and they didn't identify the FH server through an attack on the hidden service, you have to explain why. Even longterm entry guards and Tor over Tor only slow down the attack. kmf calculated it increases the time of the 2006 attack from 1-2 hours to about 40 days, but they were investigating FH for a year, so why didn't they do it? Sure you can. For #5, get people to run more relays (see the guide I just posted ). For #6, diversify the network outside of the cooperating intelligence agencies zone, which is my main suggestion in the relay guide. I agree and said so myself. Tails is probably secure enough for most SR users as long as they manually set bridges.