Nice job! This tutorial gives people another option in securing their setup. I have some thoughts below. One thing I'd like to point out is that if your primary goal is unlinkability, the Tor Browser Bundle is safer than running regular Firefox. You will be in a much smaller anonymity set if you run Firefox 23, and Tor Browser includes many patches that reduce linkability. However, if your primary goal is untraceability, this setup is safer than running TBB on Windows. Also, I'm not sure that newer versions of Firefox are more secure, since Firefox ESR receives security updates. Firefox 22 and 17.0.7 were both patched against the FH exploit. This makes it less secure than Tails, because the VM is exposed to exploits on the host OS, especially if you are running this on Windows. For example, malware could read the contents of the Truecrypt volume when it is decrypted, or it could steal the encryption key when it is in RAM, or a keylogger could steal your password when you open the Truecrypt volume. Of course, Whonix on Windows is subject to the same problems, which is why I've held off on publishing my Whonix tutorial (yet again). A shared clipboard is a security vulnerability. If you copy a password on Windows, an exploit in the VM could read it, or vice versa. Shared folders and clipboards should be disabled for maximum VM isolation. I love disposable VMs and use them a lot myself. So why not add a separate Tor VM? In fact, why not modify this setup and run it over the Whonix Gateway? Excluding huge swaths of exit nodes like this harms your anonymity by making your circuits more fingerprintable, and can potentially make the Tor experience terrible with long lags and frequent time outs, while at the same time providing minimal benefit. This option doesn't affect hidden services like the Silk Road market and forum, and most clearnet sites are in the US anyway, so your connection will cross the US border and be exposed to the NSA. Other than these things, it's a nice tutorial though!