We're still not 100% sure that the server is in the hands of LE. They could have injected an exploit without taking physical control of the server, but the fact that the server was offline for a couple of days before coming back online with the exploit, and this happened after the presumptive admin was arrested, is pretty good evidence that LE had physical control of the server. For security reasons, we should operate under the assumption that they have physical control of the FH server, including the Tormail email database. That hard drive has a massive trove of data for them to sift through. Besides all the CP, there must have been tens of thousands of Tormail accounts, and potentially millions of emails. They will likely prioritize the biggest targets: major CP and drug distributors. If I was tasked with sifting through the data, I'd go through the list of SR vendors, starting with the highest percentage rank, and see if they have Tormail addresses. Conveniently, StExo's archives are on that hard drive with all vendor profiles, so they don't have to crawl the SR server. Email addresses will be listed in the profiles or their PGP keys. About half of SR vendors had Tormail addresses, so they wouldn't be hard to find. That may not be how LE sifts through the data, but it seems logical to me, so if I was a top SR vendor, I would be extremely cautious right now, if I had a Tormail account with unencrypted emails in it. As for you, it could take months to years, or possibly never, before they get around to reading your emails, but to err on the side of safety, I would never use that shipping address, and probably never use that Chinese source again. Consider them both watched.