This is bad because a majority of clearnet sites are hosted in the United States. So if you select an entry guard in Sweden, which you keep for a month, the chances are extremely high that you will use an exit node in Sweden several times before rotating that entry guard, and most if not all of those times, the middle node will be outside of Sweden. There's been a lot of talk about circuit path selection based on ASes. Considering the recent revelations of state intelligence agency surveillance, perhaps path selection should be based on border crossings as well. This doesn't factor in the reality of the vast amounts of data that they have to deal with. There are probably terabytes per second crossing the borders of the United States. The Tor network is currently pushing 2.5 GB/s so about 1 GB/s of that is crossing the US border, second after second, day after day. Tens of thousands of simultaneous circuits. I suspect it's incredibly difficult to pull anything useful out of that. Our biggest protection is that we are needles in a haystack.