LOL, that's a great description, and of course that means clearnet is Windows. A lot of the eepsites are also hidden services, so you can access them over the safety of Tor. Irc2p has an onion address, and I've chatted with the I2P folks there. In general, I find them to be a friendly, enthusiastic group of people who are doing innovative things with that technology. However, there's not a lot of hardcore criminal activity on the network (mostly bittorrent), so they have no serious adversaries like LE. As such, the security of the network is untested and they are in a honeymoon period. As soon someone decides to distribute massive amounts of CP or run a large drug market or terrorist forum on the network, their illusion of safety may come crashing down rather quickly. Tor has already demonstrated its resistance to investigations and attacks by the FBI, Dutch police, and Anonymous hackers, among others. I think that number is closer to 3 million, based on annual browser bundle downloads (36 million), and adjusting for re-downloads of monthly releases (divided by 12). Yes, and they also (potentially) know all 20K IP addresses, whereas they know 0 Tor user IP addresses unless they run entry guards, and then they know some single digit percentage of IP addresses. Adding 1750 nodes (or even a small number of nodes that add 50% more bandwdith) will be much more noticeable on Tor than on I2P, so in practice you may be worse off with I2P, since you would simply stop using Tor. It's not really comparable, because most I2P activity is internal to the network. So when discussing a correlation attack, it's only fair to compare "Tor use that only involves hidden services" to I2P, or to compare "I2P use that only involves outproxies" to Tor. On Tor you have 800 exit nodes, but as far as I know there are a scant few I2P outproxies. In fact, an attacker could easily run outproxies and control most of that activity. A large percentage of the SR community only uses hidden services, specifically the market and this forum. So from that perspective, they are not susceptible to correlation attacks, their IP address is more difficult to enumerate (than on I2P), and they are part of a much larger anonymity set. Setting aside attacks on the services, would you say SR users are safer on Tor or I2P? Yes, Tor's focus on allowing safe clearnet access is a huge benefit, and (I believe) the main reason it is the most popular anonymity network. However, another big weakness for I2P is that there is no safe web browser, leaving I2P users much more vulnerable at the application layer (regardless of network layer considerations).