People have different opinions about this. I also think most people don't understand how to be anonymous, but maybe I'm wrong and they are right. Here's my opinion, anyway. Unless you are a high value target -- unless your adversary is actively looking for you, and they know you use Tor, so that can be used as circumstantial evidence against you -- you're better off using Tor like everyone else, and looking like everyone else. You're better off mixing into the crowd. As such, there are 500K daily Tor users (connecting to regular relays) and only 30K daily bridge users. Even fewer of those bridge users are going through VPNs or doing other complicated things to hide their Tor use. If you are not an existing target, but you don't want to be picked out of a fishing expedition, then you should act like everyone else. Use regular relays. Sure, somebody could see that you are using Tor, but so what? So are millions of other people. It's the ones who are taking extra precautions to hide that will stick out to our adversaries. And no, I don't think a VPN will protect you, because legal businesses rarely fight LE demands for data. And all this stuff about VPNs that don't log? Yeah, that's a promise that can be revoked (thanks to an LE demand) at any time without your knowledge. The whole point of the Tor design is that you don't trust any entity that can see your whole circuit. That's privacy by design, rather than privacy by policy. No that's bad, because then your "bridge" or entry point is effectively the middle hop in your circuit.