Silk Road forums

@mikezolinski

Did you get any error messages?

Anyway, this is encrypted to your new key.

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-----END PGP MESSAGE-----


Edit: I just realized this is the 2000th post in PGP Club. Let's keep it strong for 2000 more!

I don't get it. Could you decrypt it?

Find someone with a Freedom Hosting invite code (pro tip: I got one by asking on the forum, but I haven't had an account long enough to earn any invite codes myself, and I don't know if that person has any more or is willing to part with them so I won't name names). Then you can upload pics to your own static web site, no PHP, no bullshit. FH is much less likely to get hacked as whole. Actually, Onion Image Uploader is hosted on FH, but the owner ran his own (obviously insecure) PHP code.

I see that as a dangerous attitude and that people here are starting to come under some sort of illusions.

There can be big differences between theory and reality. There are lots of theoretical attacks against SR. Hidden services can be deanonymized more easily and cheaply than the attack outlined here, yet SR is still up. So, if I were a vendor, I would implement the defenses because they are easy to do, but I wouldn't lose any sleep over this attack.

They removed the CP links.

The Cleaned Hidden Wiki started out as a mirror of THW without the CP links, but now it is more of a fork, because it has active maintainers who reorganized a lot of stuff, and it was more up to date than THW. I was recommending it over THW for months, because it was more up to date, and because you may not want to introduce someone to onionland by saying "check out this huge list of hidden services", and it has all that CP shit.

@Nightcrawler

It's sad how many keys you see like that isn't it? The other problem is that a lot of people "dump and dash", posting their keys and never returning to the forum (look how many people have one post). I warned someone above and even PMed them and never received a reply. I don't understand why people post their PGP keys in this thread and never return to the forum, when the primary use case is to link it in your signature so that other people on the forum can send you private messages. Or are people sending vendors links to the forum? lol

At least if they came back to check, the warnings would be useful.

kmfkewm has addressed each aspect of the treat, often providing links to the material opined.
He has confirmed that the infrastructure for cell phone tracking is already in place and we all know already through various media reports it is being actively used by LE ('stingers' are a new LE cell phone tracking technology which is even more powerful).
He has confirmed that the infrastructure is in place to determine tor usage at ISP's and that in fact no warrant is required.

That was never in question. We know that mobile phones can be geolocated. My doubts are about the practicality of the attack viz a fishing expedition -- ie, starting from zero knowledge and the assumption that some people are using the mail to ship drugs, LE would obtain all geolocation data and look for patterns to identify suspects for further investigation (which doesn't have to include Tor use, after all, I bet a majority of online drug vendors don't use Tor). I find that scenario utterly impractical. kmf added the idea that a seized package's drop location can be determined. That is a little more practical, but not something worth doing, IMHO, unless you're looking for a major drug distributor.

kmf and I agree that there are trivial ways to defeat the attack, such as not bringing a geolocation device, mixing up your drop locations, and obfuscating your connection to the Tor network.