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In response to overwhelming criticism over the centralized nature and vulnerability of the bridge authority server and possible (read: pretty much 100% certain) exploitation by national governments, especially the USA, of this centralized infrastructure.
The new concept of a Bridge Community changes all of that.
You run your own bridge authority, and possibly a pool of bridge relays, then publish the IP:port pairs to that bridge authority. Your community members can then use a few IP:port pairs you give them directly to connect to the bridge community. These bridges then relay all traffic for that community into the wider public relay pool.
To keep up with the inevitable arms race that will ensue when obfusproxy becomes more common among normal tor users, obfusproxy version 3 uses "pluggable transports" where you can easily design a new module for exploiting unintended features in underlying cover protocols.
The problem is, though... the more they make life hard for the spammer, the harder it is for the legitimate users too. It's like piracy and DRM. You're only fucking over the good guys. The bad guys either don't suffer from it(piracy) or don't care(SRF).
We can't do anything but delete it because of the nature in which tor and hiddenservices operate. As far as the forum knows, every piece of spam comes from the same IP address (127.0.0.1). The only way we could reliably block the spam permanently is to block that IP address.
