Silk Road forums

Yeah, here's what it actually looks like with the command line client, which is more verbose than the GUIs. I've removed the other people's key IDs and email addresses in case they don't want that public.

First, I encrypt and decrypt normally:

$ gpg -r Nightcrawler -r SelfSovereignty -r astor -e hello.txt

$ gpg -d hello.txt.asc

You need a passphrase to unlock the secret key for
user: "astor <astorx@tormail.org>"
4096-bit RSA key, ID CC925AD7, created 2012-12-19 (main key ID 706EE207)

gpg: encrypted with 4096-bit RSA key, ID <KEYID>, created <DATE>
      "SelfSovereignty <email@example.org>"
gpg: encrypted with 4096-bit RSA key, ID <KEYID>, created <DATE>
      "Nightcrawler <email@example.org>"
gpg: encrypted with 4096-bit RSA key, ID CC925AD7, created 2012-12-19
      "astor <astorx@tormail.org>"

Hi there!

Then I encrypt with throw-keyid and decrypt:

$ gpg --throw-keyid -r Nightcrawler -r SelfSovereignty -r astor -e hello.txt

$ gpg -d hello.txt.asc
gpg: anonymous recipient; trying secret key <KEYID> ...
gpg: anonymous recipient; trying secret key <KEYID> ...
gpg: anonymous recipient; trying secret key <KEYID> ...
gpg: anonymous recipient; trying secret key <KEYID> ...
<It says that a bunch of times>

gpg: okay, we are the anonymous recipient.
gpg: encrypted with RSA key, ID 00000000
gpg: encrypted with RSA key, ID 00000000
gpg: encrypted with RSA key, ID 00000000

Hi there!

As you can see, I as the recipient would have no idea that the message was also encrypted to Nightcrawler and SelfSovereignty, even though I have their public keys.

Pay other people to receive the packages or pay them to setup mailboxes if you have to

If they get busted, do you honestly think they won't flip?

This is how it will go down. They get busted and tell the cops it's not their stash, they are just receiving it for someone else. The cops say it doesn't matter, they will get charged for it unless they cooperate. They call you up and say the package arrived safely. You go to pick it up / meet them somewhere, and of course it's a sting at that point. You get arrested.

When the shit hits the fan, nobody will be willing to go to jail for you, and nobody will be your patsy.

@elmerjfudd

-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----

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7kx7qTFZywQOlk+11ZuEhG5FefvCJWJMSDLbYQwMa3UcnxVQ86XqIOW9B2NTv8n/
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hj8SPRvrt7QbhWGsjYT7ci2umfkcoReeDDvpAcC2A5klBr/qzvHBOHB7a1fyEkvw
30LdR4/3yAIQsQa5LabwsjHHijau1/X8MSUlnboc0sCJAYf5zGlDdBYjsSkK1m2y
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P/u3pJdb9FffI8rh/OoZPfdrta/uC2gN0VU8RhEnlLS2vHC7dSHJXIR1OF4jSQiF
EGG01wCHEmHLul5ORfufpBHbahe09g4+vqdYANpcrdvEQ+DNzh8OG3BKliNw23Kx
KYrTHErUExcN6rXsLTnYeRY8cwXmnwDbF8DF2nynEWiu0c1GynuBjxt9lUQH+ZaI
oZcfE/woMAQCKg4JPB6JKsUXyNNP9ziAYNlXrFDAjmJd3adSJpgM6CwsUF4TSAqk
tXRO55VPcnZdxuoFk09KQm984uIIp/REON0=
=qFQK
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----

It doesn't require your entry guard to be pwnt for an attacker to enumerate your entry guards, although it does require a pwnt entry guard for it to be used to link a client to their destination.

Right, that's the main thing to worry about.

How about this as a mitigation strategy: never close your client with circuits open to sensitive web sites. After you are done browsing sensitive web sites, do some mundane browsing for 15 minutes, then close your client. The attacker may be able to identity you, but you will be uninteresting.

blockchain.info lets you backup your wallet very easily. Now would be a good time to do that.

Interesting attack.

Clients send most of their circuits through high bandwidth nodes, which maintain hundreds to thousands of simultaneous connections. So, what is the circuit close frequency on those nodes? If it is at least once per second, then a timing attack probably would not be effective. This also requires that your entry guard is pwned, and you cycle through them very slowly.

@murderface2012

gpg: Signature made Tue 06 Feb 2013 02:48:48 AM GMT using DSA key ID 3FD62A51
gpg: Good signature from "murderface2012 <murderface2012@tormail.org>"

murderface, your message verifies, but your key is too weak, as I wrote on January 8:

http://dkn255hz262ypmii.onion/index.php?topic=30938.msg711442#msg711442

pub   1024D/3FD62A51 2013-01-08
uid                  murderface2012 <murderface2012@tormail.org>
sub    512g/888C3F06 2013-01-08


This key is not safe. 512 bit keys can already be cracked and 1024 bit keys will probably be cracked in the next 5 years. I *strongly* recommend you use a different PGP program, like GPG4USB for Windows (follow the tutorial in my signature) or GPGTools for OS X. Set your key size to 4096 bits and post your new public key.