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Messages - astor

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466
Silk Road discussion / Re: SR down?
« on: August 06, 2013, 07:25 am »
Up for me.

467
That's because the browser bundle is portable. Just delete folder where it was extracted and it's gone, although it does leave some traces on your computer. If you need to get rid of all evidence of Tor, you basically need to do a full disk wipe.

468
Tails tunnels everything through Tor anyways though, so it's I2p peer connections only reveal Tor exit nodes if analyzed by a powerful adversary which is why it takes forever to gather peers. Again I admit I haven't used Tails in ages so I'm assuming they still torify everything.

I'm not sure if they do, but now we have the double requirement of getting everyone to use I2P and Tails just to use this messaging service. Kind of a nonstarter. :)

Quote
If the host has properly DMZ'd/firewalled, it should only give up internal IP anyways. All the networks with real physical isolation I set up as a hidden service were using carp/pfsync to lock down traffic to Tor only and the web server/db back end and tor network facing daemon in the DMZ were just using internal IP with no way to break out of firewall rules to find real IP. If you custom build Nginx from source you can rip out the error pages that show IP but they should only show internal anyways (same as using a VM).

The smaller hidden services I set up used OpenVZ Debian VM to just run tiny private stores, but they would run out of memory all the time if traffic picked up. A lot of VPS software will limit the number of sockets available to each guest, which is usually a limit tor will run into quickly. A tor node handling a significant amount of traffic will start using ridiculous amounts of memory after running for a couple days. I solved this problem by buying a dedicated virtualization server and becoming my own OpenVZ host so I could configure the settings myself instead of every single host out there which seems to limit sockets. This was also many years ago, could be Tor had a bug back then I don't run the servers anymore I sold them and the idiot who bought them was busted in the carder.su sweep.

Could also be I was renting oversold VPS that was lying how much hardware and bandwidth was truly available.

Yeah, VPSes are often too small, especially to run relays with the conntrack limits. The other problem is the host OS can see what the VPS is doing. Even if you rent the VPS anonymously, you run the risk of the provider noticing you're doing something illegal and canceling the service or notifying LE.

On the other hand, a lot of people can't afford multiple dedicated servers for physical isolation, or it's just not worth it for them. While physical isolation is better, one dedicated server with some VMs is still way better than running naked services over Tor, and it's within more people's budgets.

469
Well, like I said, if it rooted Tails you wouldn't be safe, since then it could bypass Tor. Whonix is safer in that regard.

470
Security / Re: Will TorMail Come Back Online?
« on: August 06, 2013, 06:59 am »
The FBI seized the server. Tormail is definitely not coming back online.

471
Yes, my understanding is that it was a temporary exploit that didn't leave malware on the your computer. However, if you visited another site with the exploit code (most likely other FH cp sites), it would activate again, grab whatever cookies were there, and send them to the NSA again.

472
Security / Re: Verification
« on: August 06, 2013, 02:24 am »
The signature verifies for me. Probably an encoding problem when copying the text out of the forum post.

473
Silk Road discussion / Re: Urgent Notice for BlueGiraffe Clients
« on: August 06, 2013, 02:17 am »
And this is why I say: fuck RxKing and any vendor who refuses to take PGP encrypted messages. You think Privnote or even the SR server are 100% safe from being taken over by LE next?

Always PGP encrypt sensitive info, and boycott any vendor who refuses to use it, or who re-sends your info unencrypted.

474
Since Tails is a Linux distribution and the JavaScript exploit was specific to Windows (it worked by making calls to the Windows API), you are safe. Even if it worked on Linux, Tails *may* have prevented it with its transparent proxying, unless the exploit also rooted your Tails instance, which would be considerably harder than what it was designed to do. Everyone who recently switched to Tails was safe, which turned out to be a great move in this community, considering how many people used Tormail.

475
I2p-Bote messages, bitmessage (the protocol/network.. not centralized bitmessage.ch front end) newsgroups/nym servers, and tox.im are all decentralized too.

That's true, but I2P is a weak anonymity network with little research, some of which recently revealed that users can be easily identified by attacks on the netdb:

Practical Attacks Against The I2P Network
http://wwwcip.informatik.uni-erlangen.de/~spjsschl/i2p.pdf

BitMessage has serious security flaws as well:  https://bitmessage.org/forum/index.php/topic,1666.0.html

Nym servers are ok. kmf has talked about some the PIR methods that are information theoretically secure, so as long as they are implemented in safe ways, they can be a good alternative.

I hadn't heard of tox.im so quickly read up on it. It hasn't been released yet, but hopefully soon. It looks interesting in that it uses DHT, but it does not appear to be anonymous, ie it relies on finding a user's IP address. This is bad for most people in this community, who want to remain anonymous to each other. The only way to address people over Tor is with the onion pseudo-domain protocol, so maybe that will be added later.

Quote
VMs are not any good for any sort of popular Tor service, memory is eaten up by the all the encrypted connections.

Most hidden services are small and don't take up much memory anyway. Tor networking is CPU-bound because of the crypto operations. Relays max out their CPUs long before their bandwidth. But even if that weren't true, VMs provide orders of magnitude better security, which is a trade off worth making. Some well known hidden services have leaked their IP address because of misconfigured web servers and other services, including our very own Silk Road! DPR is just lucky the wrong people didn't see it.

The only way I would ever run a hidden service is in VMs so the service people interact with does not and essentially cannot know its public IP address.

476
This is a good list for the short term, but for robust censorship resistance, we need decentralized services (including forums and markets and payment systems) so there is no central point of failure. Out of everything on that list, only Torchat doesn't rely on a central server. The trade off is it turns everyone into a hidden service, which in the default configuration makes users vulnerable to attacks that may identify them.

What we really need is better security for hidden services, and then decentralized services built on top of them.

We also need something like a Qubes Server Edition that has preconfigured LAMP and LEMP stacks with VM isolated components (web server vs mysql database, eg), plus VMs for Tor, ssh, any other services you would care to run (xmpp server, ircd, etc.). It would be like Tails / Whonix for hidden services, a complete out-of-the-box anonymous and secure server OS that would make it easy to spin secure hidden services.

477
The most recent browser bundles are 2.3.25-9 for Windows and OS X, released on June 12, and 2.3.25-10 for Linux, released on June 26. They had to update the Linux version because of a bug that caused crashes on 64 bit Linux. If you updated your browser bundle within a few days of the latest release, which you should always do, then you were almost certainly protected against this exploit  (even if it was on the server since before August 3, as claimed in the HW discussion, it was unlikely to be there for more than a few weeks).

We should use cases like this to learn and improve our security. Although I always update my browser bundle on the day a new version is released, admittedly I have been lax in allowing JavaScript. I will definitely be more strict about enabling it going forward.

More importantly, we must find out how the FH server and/or admin were identified. Was it an attack on the Tor network, a exploit of the email or web servers, or tracking of bitcoin transactions? (Those are the 3 ideas I've heard so far, although it may turn out to be something completely different.)

478
The Hidden Wiki discussion page has the most comprehensive explanation of the attack that I've found. The only part I don't agree with, simply because there is no evidence, is the claim that the FH admin was identified through bitcoin cashing out. It is factually incorrect that Onion Bank was started months ago. It was started like 10 days before the bust. However, the FH admin may have been accepting private bitcoin donations, particularly from the CP site operators and users. After all, someone was paying the bills to keep the site running. It's possible that the FBI made a donation and tracked the payment, and if the FH admin didn't take proper precautions in cashing out, he was identified that way. All this will come out in the discovery during his court case.

I do agree that the compromise of Tormail accounts could be very bad for some members of our community, especially if they didn't encrypt their emails and routinely delete read emails from the server.

Here's the Hidden Wiki discussion of the attack.


1. It runs only if Javascript was enabled and affects Firefox 17 on Windows. The exploit used (MFSA 2013-53) and was fixed in Firefox 17.0.7 which is the one used in the latest Tor Browser Bundle, and relies on Windows libraries to execute its payload. If you were using an outdated Tor Browser on Windows and you had Javascript enabled (it is by default) then you have definitely been compromised. If you were using Tor on any other OS, had disabled Javascript, or had the latest version of the Tor Browser Bundle (Torbrowser - Help - About shows the version, which must be 17.0.7 or higher) then you are safe and your public IP has not been transmitted anywhere.
   
2. The exploit has only been online since after the servers came back on August 3rd, 2013. Now read on for the details...
    By default, the Tor Browser comes with NoScript set to "Allow All Javascript Globally", meaning that Javascript is enabled by default. They do this to make it convenient for users which is why it's the default setting even though it's not safe.
   
3. If you were running an exploitable version of the Tor Browser on Windows and didn't either manually set NoScript to "Forbid Javascript Globally" or disabled Javascript entirely via the Firefox settings, then you are absolutely 100% busted. But if you had disabled Javascript like smart people kept telling you, using either of the two methods mentioned, then the code never executed and you are safe.
   
4. The FreedomHosting compromise consisted of a small, non-existent image <img> tag injected into all Freedom Hosting sites, and this <img> tag contained an <img onerror=""> event attribute. The fact that the image was missing meant that the "onerror" code ran and retrieved the rest of the code from another Onion site. They did it this way via a small, hidden image to avoid drawing attention to any obvious <script> tags.
   
5. The main payload (main exploit code) from that onion site then created an iframe and set a cookie in it (the sole purpose of which was to reliably identify your unique browser as you traveled between different compromised FH sites, to build a list of which FH sites you've been visiting) and more importantly ran some 0-day exploits using heap overflows to run any code they desired and escape the Tor sandbox.
   
6. The 0day exploit code executed some functions that revealed your public internet IP address, MAC address, local hostname (such as "LarrysPC") and what Freedom Hosting site you were browsing (they used a unique UDID for each compromised website) and sent it all to a clear-net IP in Washington. This is no joke. I wish I was kidding. It really did this! They transmit your unique browser ID (cookie value) over the clear internet to their public-internet server, thus giving them a physical person tied to the "random person" they've been observing browsing the different FH sites. With this connection performed, they know your public IP, they have the computer's hostname & MAC address to conclusively identify your computer, they have your unique browser ID cookie, and they have a full list of Freedom Hosting sites that have been viewed by that unique browser. They know exactly how deeply you are involved and their lists allow them to target the people that are clearly intentionally seeking out illegal content.
   
7. The use of 0day exploits means that the attacker had the huge resources required to find such completely new exploits, and is therefore most likely the government.
   
8. The fact that FreedomHosting was compromised means that the attacker either physically seized the servers and installed the code (government), or managed to exploit the webserver software (other malicious attacker). Considering recent news reports, it is clear that it was the government.
   
9. The fact that the clear-net IP collecting all the data is in Washington and that FreedomHosting is now down without a word suggests that the attacker was in fact the FBI.
   
10. The attacker now has the public IP addresses + what FreedomHosting site you were viewing of everybody that had Javascript enabled on Windows with an outdated Tor Browser Bundle. You better prepare to be raided. Destroy all the evidence now, if your freedom depends on it.
   
11. The cookie is called "n_serv" and can be viewed under Tor Button - Cookie Protections. By default, Tor is set to erase all non-protected cookies on browser restarts (and to make all cookies non-protected unless explicitly told by the user to protect certain cookies). This means that the "n_serv" cookie will not persist between browser restarts, unless the FBI has made part of their exploit code tell Tor Button to protect the cookie. That is very unlikely, though, as it would be difficult to do so and wouldn't do them much good, since the cookie changing its value doesn't actually harm their operation. They will still get your public IP for every unique browser ID that's being transmitted to them, so it doesn't matter to them if the cookie gets cleared and the browser ID changes. Therefore, due to the fact that the cookie clears itself on restart, the only way to know if you've been affected if you're running a vulnerable browser bundle is if your browser has been running non-stop since before FreedomHosting went down. Meaning that your browser has been running for at least 1 week, preferably 2 or more. If you've got no "n_serv" cookie in a session that has lasted that long then you conclusively know that the exploits have never successfully executed on your machine. The cookie only clears on browser restart. I've always been using NoScript in "Forbid Javascript Globally" mode, my last browser restart was over 2 weeks ago and I am 100% sure I have browsed some FH sites before they went offline and without restarting this browser and I don't have the cookie. People that have either set NoScript to globally forbid, or disabled Javascript entirely in the Firefox settings, are therefore conclusively safe. Everyone else will have been infected and can check for the existence of that cookie to verify that fact (will only be there if their browser hasn't restarted in the past few weeks). Note that the cookie will be created if Javascript is enabled, but the exploit that transmits your public IP to tie that cookie to your identity is a separate action and will only run on exploitable (outdated) Tor Browser Bundles on Windows. Therefore, the existence of the cookie is not enough reason to panic yet. If you're using Windows and you've got a Javascript-enabled Tor Browser that's older than 17.0.7 then your identity has absolutely been compromised.
   
12. Previous news reports from July 29th, 2013 shows that the FBI performed a nationwide "child sex trafficking" bust, freeing 105 children and arresting 150 pimps/ring leaders (www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2013/july/operation-cross-country-recovering-victims-of-child-sex-trafficking/operation-cross-country-recovering-victims-of-child-sex-trafficking).
   
13. Other news from July 29th, 2013 shows that the FBI is trying to extradite "the biggest child-porn facilitator on the planet" from Ireland (www.independent.ie/irish-news/courts/fbi-bids-to-extradite-largest-childporn-dealer-on-planet-29469402.html). Seems that the FH admin was a 28 year old that was arrested in Ireland and that the javascript exploits were set up in a joint-operation between the FBI and the Irish law enforcement since all collected IPs were sent to the FBI. If this is the guy, then Freedom Hosting is never coming back, and he's looking at a lot of jailtime.
   
14. Also consider the fact that the attackers installed code that uniquely identifies each FreedomHosting site you were visiting, since FH served much more than just child porn. The FBI wouldn't want to bust down the doors of people that were looking at relatively harmless stuff from FreedomHosting. They really cared about knowing which specific sites you were viewing and took many steps to ensure that they accurately tracked which sites you visited, through the use of per-site UDIDs and a tracking cookie.
   
15. Timeline of events: FreedomHosting admin starts accepting BitCoins a few months ago. The FBI traces his BitCoin transactions to withdrawals into a real-world bank account via currency exchange services, thus revealing the identity of the FH admin, and an arrest is made on July 29th, 2013 in Ireland. The servers were then shut down. On August 3rd, 2013 the sites came back online with the exploit code installed.
   
16. It is pretty conclusive: Get a fucking move on if you were too stupid to disable Javascript, keep Tor Browser Bundle updated, were running Windows, and visited any of the FH sites after they came back online. You do not have much time. Someone in Washington, otherwise known as the FBI, now has your public IP and a list of which FH sites you were browsing. GET A FUCKING MOVE ON! NOW! Destroy everything before you end up behind bars! Remember to run multiple secure wipe-passes of your entire hard drives so that NOTHING can be recovered, and remember that encryption alone is not safe enough, data leaks out of your encrypted containers into the operating system's thumbnail caches. They might not be able to view your actual encrypted TrueCrypt images, but they sure as hell can see what kind of images you had been looking at in the past (Windows has a global thumbnail database containing smaller versions of all Thumbs.db contents from every drive on the system, Mac OS has a QuickLook cache of everything you have ever viewed, and Linux has similar leaks depending on what image viewers you were using). Also remember that they can force you to give up encryption keys (and even sentence you harshly based on suspicion if you refuse to give it out), so it's definitely not safe to keep encrypted TrueCrypt containers. Your freedom should be worth more than that. Take no chances. Perform a full 3-pass random DBAN (http://www.dban.org/) format of ALL hard disks that were used for child porn AND ALL operating system disks related to that! We are on the verge of a global law-enforcement crackdown unlike anything else ever before once the FBI uses the data they have collected, and you may only have a few days until the knock comes. Don't waste time with 35-pass erases, it takes days and they may knock on the door sooner than it can finish and research shows that even a single-pass erase is safe enough, but if you are truly paranoid (even though you would not gain anything from it and would only waste more time) you could do 3 random passes just to be extra safe. Good luck everyone and may God be with you. Time to brace for impact. And remember that silence does not mean that nothing is going on. People that are getting busted won't have any time to connect to Tor and let others know they've been busted. Silence does not mean that busts are not taking place. The FBI is taking this FreedomHosting compromise as the biggest victory in human history. You should treat it with equal respect and do everything in your power to stay safe. This is the calm before the storm. You will see the victims being paraded around in a giant FBI press release within a month or two.
   
17. For those that had blocked Javascript and are safe: It's now a good idea to remember that Tor should never be trusted, and that any content from Tor sites can be compromised at any time. Always be sure to update your media players such as VLC to the latest versions to protect against exploits in media files. There are no signs that such tampering has taken place, but this is a good time to remind people to be smart. How to be as safe as you can be: 1: Keep Tor Browser Bundle up to date every time you get an update notification. 2: Always disable Javascript. 3: Always keep all your software fully updated. 4: Run everything in a Virtual machine (VirtualBox is free) to avoid data leaking out into your main OS. 5. Use Linux in that VM even if you are primarily a Windows user, because Linux is a fuckton more resilient against attacks. 6: Use encrypted containers inside the VM if your freedom depends on your data being safe from prying eyes. 7: Trust noone. Never reveal personal info on Tormail (now compromised) or even Torchat. You never want to leak anything that leads back to you. Always assume that everyone is out to get you and you will never have the issue of trusting the wrong person.
   
18. More warnings (TORMAIL): The hidden service for Tormail has been compromised since it ran on FreedomHosting. It's therefore very likely that all the contents of your Tormail inboxes are in their hands. Do not log into your accounts. Depending on how Tormail works, your emails might possibly have been stored in encrypted form in the database and will only be decrypted whenever you log in. In that case, they can only read them by installing a backdoor that makes unencrypted copies as soon as someone logs into their account. Logging in would thereby give them the unencrypted versions. Alternatively, if Tormail already stored everything unencrypted then they already have a complete copy of it and no logging-in-and-deleting will do any good whatsoever. Unfortunately everything points towards Tormail just using a regular IMAP mail server hosted on Freedom Hosting (because of how they allowed regular Roundcube / SquirrelMail access to your mailbox, both of which are just regular unencrypted IMAP web clients), and that would mean that all plaintext emails are already in the FBI's hands and there's nothing you can do about it. Do not log in. Logging in can only make things worse! Tormail is guaranteed to be a major part of this sting because it (along with certain private messaging systems on boards) is the most likely place where people will reveal their true identities to people they've trusted. Tormail has been compromised and all you can do now is NOT log in, and pray that everything was stored as decrypt-on-demand via custom IMAP server software (unfortunately extremely unlikely because no off-the-shelf IMAP servers offer encrypted email storage). That, and destroy all the evidence so that anyone knocking down your door will find nothing on your computers.

479
Security / Re: Verification
« on: August 05, 2013, 05:42 pm »
I'm really worried about vendors, some of whom used Tormail daily.

A couple things to note about this:

1. If you used PGP, the content of your emails is safe, but the metadata -- who you emailed and when -- is in the hands of the FBI.

2. If you used a desktop email client like Thunderbird, you would not have been exposed to the JavaScript exploit (assuming you also didn't visit other FH sites), and old emails would not be on the server.

If you visited FH or the Tormail web interface recently, and you were on Windows and had JavaScript enabled, and you are a large vendor, you should assume that you have been compromised and take proper security precautions. Most importantly, don't keep any drugs in your house.

480
So if I'm reading the reports correctly, the JavaScript exploit was only live for a few days, after they seized the FH server. That means they must have identified it some way (I thought they hacked the server to add the exploit). That is worrying, but I think it's still more likely they used application level exploits to identify Tormail and/or FH, rather than an attack on the Tor network.

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