The disposable VMs - they run entirely in RAM right? I know they check the savefile and then start but I read somewhere that when you open a specific file using a dispVM (like a PDF) any changes made are also made to the original so obviously I want to avoid this.
I don't think disposable VMs run entirely in RAM. I have seen no mention of that, and if it was a feature, I expect to have read it somewhere. It isn't mentioned in any of the documentation that I've dug up (which is unfortunately sparse):
http://qubes-os.org/trac/wiki/DisposableVms
http://qubes-os.org/trac/wiki/UserDoc/DispVMCustomization
http://theinvisiblethings.blogspot.com/2010/06/disposable-vms.html
I'm not running Qubes right now because the hard drive crashed on the old laptop that I was testing it on, but you should be able to look at the properties of the dispvm in the VM Manager and see whether / how much disk storage space it has been assigned.
A VM that runs only in RAM would be preferred, but I suppose it's not a big problem if you use full disk encryption. If someone has access to your decrypted hard drive, you are probably already screwed.
Linked to this is the wiping of RAM, looking at TAILS I see they use smem to wipe the ram upon shutdown, at some point I would like to get to that but for now I am just looking to run it at all. I am assuming it should be run in dom0 to give it full access to the RAM, is this correct?
Seems so, although you may be able to wipe the RAM of specific VMs too. IDK. I heard DDR3 memory decays very quickly anyway, so cold boot attacks are not very effective on it. All I can find about this issue re Qubes was this message from the qubes-devel mailing list:
> Also, they wipe the memory on
> shutdown to prevent data being held in RAM upon reboot. Would these
> features be of use in Qubes to further enhance security?
>
Right now (Qubes 1.0) we're not addressing any of the physical attacks
(such as Cold Boot, or Evil Maid). We really need a good trusted boot
for this, such as perhaps Intel TXT, which howover is still unsupported
on majority of laptops, and this is planned for Qubes 2.0 branch.
So, no.
And then this roadmap:
http://qubes-os.org/trac/roadmap
which says that the trusted boot / anti-evil mail stuff won't be added until Qubes version 3, meaning it could be a few years before they include a memory wipe feature.
Connected to this is the command for copying files to dom0, I cannot get this to work, it simply does nothing rather like most terminals when they are running a process, has anyone used this command successfully?
I haven't tried this, but cat with redirection is supposed to do nothing in the terminal. Did you check if the file is in the destination location?
And finally (finally!) has anyone used the tbb_torless_launcher? It seems to work (as in I can access hidden services) but whenever I try to use the tor check site I get the message that the proxy is refusing connections.
Haven't tried this either. Can you get to check.torproject.org in a regular browser (through the TorVM)? If so, then maybe the script is blocking everything but onion addresses, which seems strange. Can you paste it here?