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Messages - astor

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211
There was absolutely NO problem with the old feedback system, except for the possible extortion and feedback leverage

I agree with this. The 4 month window to change reviews was absurd. It should have closed 2 or 3 weeks after finalizing. We've gone from one extreme to the other, and it isn't better.

212
Oh yeah, I third option for wanting an alias is to change your name on each review so someone can't reconstruct your purchasing history by scraping the site and searching for your name. First of all, I bet 90% of buyers won't change their alias from review to review, but even if the do, their stats will allow an adversary to rebuild their purchasing history with relative ease, as I've already outlined:

They find a reviewer with 12 purchases and $675 spent on a $125 item. So they search for reviews at earlier time points from someone with 12 - 1 = 11 purchases and $675 - $125 = $550 spent. When they find a candidate, they can confirm it by the account age, because the second review came N days before the first one, and the account is N days younger (if they stamp the review with the account age at the time it was made, and not the current account age, in which case it would be even easier since they would be direct matches). The second review is on a $50 item, so they look for a review with 11 - 1 = 10 purchases and $550 - $50 = $500 spent. Rinse and repeat. There might be some false positives and a little difficulty because of the slightly floating cost of items due to the exchange rate and not hedging, but it won't be too hard. The buyer age will usually be sufficient to get the right person.

So again, the alias simply fails at everything it is intended to do.

213
The new system is good, just too specific.  Make aliases customizable sure, but set them by default to random hex strings.

Step back and ask yourself what the purpose of the alias is.

Do you want to unlink your market username from your forum username? If so, you shouldn't be using the same username in the first place, because you leak it to every vendor that you make a purchase from. Thus you link your market and forum accounts to every vendor. That's a threat to your privacy, because a vendor could intentionally or unintentionally reveal the association.

Do you want to leave a review without the vendor knowing which buyer you are? Right now the stats are too specific and it should be trivial to do. I am a vendor. Someone with 3 m 5 d made a purchase off me 5 days ago, and today someone with 3 m 10 d left a review. Derp, they're the same person. Not too many vendors will get purchases on the same day from two accounts that are the same age down to the day, but if there's any doubt, the other stats will distinguish them. (And obviously vendors can save stats to identify their reviewers.)

Under this implementation, an alias is a superficial and flawed privacy defense, and it doesn't matter if it's a hex string.

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And then make buyer stats generalized!  That's all you have to do.  e.g.  $0-50; $50-200; $200-1000; etc, and 0-5 purchases; 5-10 purchases, or something like that.  Or just make it completely generalized (use a hidden or exposed rating system for buyers).

The main reason I've heard why we should see buyer stats is to ferret out shills, but shills operate at the low end of the buyer spectrum. Dividing the stats into two categories could be sufficient: less than 10 purchases vs more than 10 purchases, less than $1000 spent vs more than $1000 spent. You can ignore reviews from the low category. Maybe there could be a feature to hide them.

If you want, you can subdivide into more categories, but I honestly don't see the point. I don't see why someone with $12,000 spent is inherently more trustworthy than someone with $2000 spent. And the account age is utterly useless. People can register accounts months before they use them for anything. I have accounts that are over 6 months old and one that is over a year old with no or little spent on them. If you think account age means anything, I can create a vendor account and easily fool you.

Bottom line is, these stats are needlessly specific and threaten the privacy of buyers.

214
Security / Re: Qubes Qubes Qubes
« on: August 27, 2013, 03:47 pm »
astor is right.. Qubes isn't built to use and not leave a trace on the hard drive.   They're fairly clear that that isn't one of their design goals.   Their goal is to minimize the attack surface available to malicious code to the smallest degree possible.   

I believe a Disposable VM is simply a running snapshot that's just instantiated and then destroyed when you're done.  Shouldn't be pinned to memory any more than anything else in Qubes would be.   If you're worried about forensic recovery whenever somebody gets their hands on your computer, all you really have is your full disk encryption between them and you. 

Yeah, I think their threat model right now is that Qubes locks down your computing environment so well that it is extremely difficult for an attacker to identify you, so the threat of a physical attack is secondary. Of course, an attacker might identify you in many ways not related to exploiting your OS, so they plan on physical defenses in the future.

OTOH, Tails assumes there is a high probability you will be physically attacked and your best defense is to leave no trace of your activities. (That is a reasonable assumption for its original user base, political dissidents at internet cafes in repressive regimes.)

We all want both defenses: the strongest isolation to protect against exploits and identification, and the best security against physical attacks, but no preconfigured solution offers that right now. Qubes looks the most promising going forward, since they mention defenses against physical attacks in their future milestones, while it doesn't look like Tails has any plans to add VM isolation.


215
Security / Re: Theory: Blind markets
« on: August 27, 2013, 12:36 pm »
Unless I'm misunderstanding, #1 has to be true.  If servers can see the files they store, but don't have access to the key to those files, I don't see how they can exercise any content-level control over what they store or serve.   An encrypted BLOB is an encrypted BLOB.

If the content is uploaded encrypted and the operator doesn't know the key, then they don't know what they are storing, so they can't be blamed for what they're hosting anymore than Dropbox can be blamed if someone dumps a Truecrypt file on their servers and LE finds out that file contains illegal content.

Of course, if that's true, they can't censor it either. I mean, Dropbox could reject all Truecrypt files but an EKS server would be designed to store encrypted content.

The thing about dumping old content, I consider that a feature. Look at this forum. Why store every thread since the beginning, when everyone asks the same questions over and over every week? The popular threads stay on the front page for weeks or months at a time, so they are safe. It would work just as well if it was designed like 4chan to roll old threads off the server, say after 3 months of inactivity. Hell, it even warns you not to dig old threads back up and to start a new thread! It is needlessly storing gigabytes of data.


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It probably falls into the usual anonymous storage/communication conundrum.    If you design a perfect system that someone else can't censor or track, you can't censor or track it either.  So when you support "good" causes for anonymity, you also support  Appelbaum's Four Horsemen (CP, drugs, terrorism, and money laundering).

Yep, that's what the Tor people keep saying.


216
Security / Re: Theory: Blind markets
« on: August 27, 2013, 12:21 pm »
Goldberg (damn is this guy the new Chaum or what? He has invented so many amazing algorithms and published so many kick ass papers at this point, he is pretty much a cypherpunk rockstar)

The guy who invented OTR and/or wrote the Pidgin plugin and is currently working on multi-party OTR? If he gives us an mpOTR plugin, I would have 10,000 of his babies.

217
Security / Re: Theory: Blind markets
« on: August 27, 2013, 05:47 am »
If EKS servers can see the content that they store, then presumably

1. The servers and operators will become targets for storing massive amounts of CP or whatever illegal content

2. The servers could filter or remove certain kinds of content (obv 2 solves 1)

218
Off topic / Re: Official Ladies of S/R Thread
« on: August 27, 2013, 04:24 am »
Calendar? hahahaha. I'm sure all of the girls would be more than happy to show it all for the gents and lezbos of SR.

There was a "best dick on SR" competition a few months ago, run by TrashBox not surprisingly. That was followed by a "best boobs on SR" competition. Forgot who ran that. I don't think anyone entered the boobs competition, but you don't even have to ask to get dick picks on the internet.

219
Security / Re: more hidden services seized?
« on: August 27, 2013, 01:01 am »
The Hidden Wiki has gone down for days at a time before. Nothing new about that. Although I expect it to be one of the biggest targets in onionland (probably second biggest after SR), so you should only load it under the assumption that it is serving exploits, and protect yourself accordingly.

220
Security / Re: Theory: Blind markets
« on: August 27, 2013, 12:57 am »
But the good thing about using EKS is that the underlying system could be used for a lot more than this. We could have "blogs" that are tagged with a single string for keyword search, and let only the owner of the blog edit it (over the mix network) but anybody else gain access to it via EKS. We can also have arbitrary files uploaded via the mix network and downloaded via EKS with actual keyword searches

Where are these blogs and files stored? On the EKS servers? And they don't know which specific files they are storing? In that case, it's like having Freenet on Tor?


221
Security / Re: Qubes Qubes Qubes
« on: August 27, 2013, 12:43 am »
The disposable VMs - they run entirely in RAM right? I know they check the savefile and then start but I read somewhere that when you open a specific file using a dispVM (like a PDF) any changes made are also made to the original so obviously I want to avoid this.

I don't think disposable VMs run entirely in RAM. I have seen no mention of that, and if it was a feature, I expect to have read it somewhere. It isn't mentioned in any of the documentation that I've dug up (which is unfortunately sparse):

http://qubes-os.org/trac/wiki/DisposableVms
http://qubes-os.org/trac/wiki/UserDoc/DispVMCustomization
http://theinvisiblethings.blogspot.com/2010/06/disposable-vms.html


I'm not running Qubes right now because the hard drive crashed on the old laptop that I was testing it on, but you should be able to look at the properties of the dispvm in the VM Manager and see whether / how much disk storage space it has been assigned.

A VM that runs only in RAM would be preferred, but I suppose it's not a big problem if you use full disk encryption. If someone has access to your decrypted hard drive, you are probably already screwed.

Quote
Linked to this is the wiping of RAM, looking at TAILS I see they use smem to wipe the ram upon shutdown, at some point I would like to get to that but for now I am just looking to run it at all. I am assuming it should be run in dom0 to give it full access to the RAM, is this correct?

Seems so, although you may be able to wipe the RAM of specific VMs too. IDK. I heard DDR3 memory decays very quickly anyway, so cold boot attacks are not very effective on it. All I can find about this issue re Qubes was this message from the qubes-devel mailing list:

Quote
> Also, they wipe the memory on
> shutdown to prevent data being held in RAM upon reboot. Would these
> features be of use in Qubes to further enhance security?
>

Right now (Qubes 1.0) we're not addressing any of the physical attacks
(such as Cold Boot, or Evil Maid). We really need a good trusted boot
for this, such as perhaps Intel TXT, which howover is still unsupported
on majority of laptops, and this is planned for Qubes 2.0 branch.

So, no.

And then this roadmap:

http://qubes-os.org/trac/roadmap

which says that the trusted boot / anti-evil mail stuff won't be added until Qubes version 3, meaning it could be a few years before they include a memory wipe feature.

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Connected to this is the command for copying files to dom0, I cannot get this to work, it simply does nothing rather like most terminals when they are running a process, has anyone used this command successfully?

I haven't tried this, but cat with redirection is supposed to do nothing in the terminal. Did you check if the file is in the destination location? :)

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And finally (finally!) has anyone used the tbb_torless_launcher? It seems to work (as in I can access hidden services) but whenever I try to use the tor check site I get the message that the proxy is refusing connections.

Haven't tried this either. Can you get to check.torproject.org in a regular browser (through the TorVM)? If so, then maybe the script is blocking everything but onion addresses, which seems strange. Can you paste it here?

222
So what do you think DPR hasn't already considered this? Or you think he is trying to get his customers pinched?

You mean like when he created that Twitter account and I had to point out that he should add a reminder for people not to follow him with accounts they created over clearnet?

Yeah, he's capable of overlooking security issues, and this feedback system creates an opportunity for several new attacks. Hiding the name is a superficial defense when purchasing stats and account age make pseudonymous reviewers uniquely identifiable. What's worse is that now there's verifiable proof of how much money a buyer has spent, and it will be possible to reconstruct their buying history, whereas before, even if people on the forum claimed they spent $100K, they could have been full of shit. Stats in forum signatures can be completely made up, but stats in market reviews are admissible as evidence in court, just like traditional paper and pen transaction ledgers have been used against drug dealers for decades.

And we pretty much know now with 99% certainty that he doesn't delete any transaction info, otherwise he could not have known have many unique vendors people purchased from a year ago. A smart dealer would throw his ledger in the fireplace each week, but you have no control over this one, except to hide it.

223
What your describing is some unrealistic movie type CIA shit.

I have seen buyers with purchasing stats as high as $50K, $100K and $200K. If you are one of these people and you think LE doesn't care about you and won't spend any resources to find you, then I'll see you at visitation.

Please refer to my signature.

224
Security / Re: Theory: Blind markets
« on: August 26, 2013, 01:19 pm »
Decentralization is the the future. Freedom Hosting and Tormail taught us that in a painful way. 80% of onionland is gone, and dozens of threads have been created, asking about Tormail alternatives. Centralized services are easy targets. SR is now the biggest target in onionland by lightyears. We must decentralize the darknet drug markets before they are gone too.

A good but imperfect example is Torchat. It's the only fully decentralized messaging system that runs over Tor by design. As long as you and your friends have Torchat clients, nobody can stop you from communicating anonymously. There is no server to seize. A small drawback is that Torchat runs a hidden service on your computer, which makes you vulnerable to certain attacks, but in my view it's not a problem for the vast majority of people, as long as they don't make their Torchat IDs public.

When I started this thread, I wanted to solve a different problem: how to keep my activities private from the operators of the service that I'm using. The conclusion that I came to, the only way to do it it effectively, is to use a decentralized market that has no admins. Now I see that that solution solves an even bigger problem: authoritarian censorship.

225
Off topic / Re: my PM to OZ about my history in the drug scene
« on: August 26, 2013, 10:44 am »
Looks like Weirder Web wrote an article about the early usenet scene and Eleusis: http://weirderweb.com/2013/02/25/the-freest-the-beginnings-of-online-drug-culture/


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