Silk Road forums
Discussion => Security => Topic started by: thyme on May 05, 2012, 10:12 pm
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Recent appeal and opinion involving signing, false/modified names, and not opening packages.
Lots of information in here.
There are excerpts below but consider reading the whole opinion if you're in the set of "people who sometimes receive contraband" or the set of "people who sometimes mail contraband." It is 29 pages. If you want all 29 up here, I'll put them up.
Link to blog which links to the full PDF (excellent blog and links) -
hxxp://fourthamendment.com/blog/index.php?blog=1&title=dc_signing_for_package_in_controlled_del&more=1&c=1&tb=1&pb=1
the pdf itself:
hxxp://legaltimes.typepad.com/files/07-cf-1226_mtd.pdf
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
No. 07-CF-1226 COURTNEY H. JOHNSON, APPELLANT, v.
UNITED STATES, APPELLEE.
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(Argued November 12, 2009 Decided March 22, 2012) Courtney Johnson was convicted in a bench trial of misdemeanor possession with intent to distribute a quantity of marijuana, in violation of D.C. Code § 48-904.01 (a)(2)(B), after two juries failed to reach a verdict on a felony charge based on the same evidence. He claims on appeal 1) that law-enforcement officials lacked probable cause to arrest him when they made a “controlled delivery” to him of a package they knew contained drugs and, therefore, the search of his car and seizure of evidence that occurred incident to that arrest violated his Fourth Amendment rights; 2) that a post-arrest statement he made on the scene was procured in violation of his Miranda rights; and 3) that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because the government’s evidence was insufficient to prove that he possessed and intended to distribute drugs. We conclude that none of Johnson’s claims of error requires reversal of his convictions, which we therefore affirm.
I. Statement of Facts
On August 19, 2004, an analyst with the United States Postal Service was “profiling” parcels in a facility near the Los Angeles, California, airport, when he discovered a parcel that contained approximately 3,000 grams of marijuana. Less than a week later, on August 25, the same postal inspector noticed a parcel with a return address identical to the one that was listed on the parcel recovered on August 19. Inspector King, another postal inspector, found that the return address on the second parcel was valid, but that the sender’s listed name, “John Johnson,” was “fictitious.” Law-enforcement officers determined that the individual who mailed the two parcels was Ricardo Austin.
After a police dog, “Arco,” gave the second parcel a “positive hit,” the postal inspectors obtained a warrant to open it. They found two packages inside the parcel, one weighing approximately 5 pounds and the other weighing 11 pounds, of a substance that field-tested positive for marijuana. The packages were wrapped in Saran Wrap and dryer sheets, in an apparent attempt to mask the odor of the drugs. Law-enforcement officers removed the 5-pound package, but shipped the 11-pound package in the original parcel to a federal facility in Maryland. The net weight of the marijuana was approximately 4,797 grams.
Postal inspectors informed Detective Zerega of the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department that the parcel was addressed to “Corey Johnson” at 4604 Nannie Helen Burroughs Avenue, N.E., Washington, D.C., and that while the address was valid, no one named “Corey Johnson” was known to be associated with that address. Officers obtained a court order to install a device in the package that would notify officials if the parcel was opened. Law-enforcement officers then obtained an anticipatory search warrant for the Nannie Helen Burroughs address and decided to conduct a controlled delivery of the package.
At approximately noon on August 27, 2004, Inspector Green, disguised as a U.S. Postal Service courier, parked a delivery van in front of the Nannie Helen Burroughs address.
Other officers were arrayed around the house, out of sight. Inspector Green approached the house, with the parcel in hand, and knocked on the door. Johnson, wearing only his underwear, answered. Green and appellant differ as to what happened next.
According to Inspector Green, when he asked appellant if he was “Corey Johnson,” appellant “nodded his head . . . gesturing that he was.” Green then told Johnson to “take care of your business,” indicating that Johnson should get dressed. Appellant shut the door, dressed, and returned to the front door. Green testified that when appellant came back out, he repeated the question, whether he was “Corey Johnson,” and appellant again indicated that he was. Green then asked appellant to sign and print his name on a delivery-confirmation form. Appellant signed and printed his name as “Corey Johnson.”
According to appellant, when the postal courier (Inspector Green) first asked him if he was “Corey Johnson,” appellant responded: “I’m not; my name is Courtney Johnson.” Appellant testified that Green then said, “They could have made a mistake.” Once he returned to the door after having dressed, appellant repeated, “I need to show you my I.D. [because] that’s not me. My name is Courtney Johnson.” Appellant testified that he also told Green that he did not expect anything to be delivered to him that morning. Green, with a “grin on his face,” told him, “You can go ahead and sign.” Appellant explained that Green did not want to see his I.D. and that because Green was “kind of being persistent,” appellant signed his initials, “C.J.,” which “represent[ed] ‘Courtney Johnson.’” According to appellant, he told Green that “[t]his is kind of weird,” referring to how he was being “coerced” to sign the document.
After the inspector left, appellant felt “real leery about the whole situation,” and decided to call Sergeant Shields, an acquaintance of his who was in law enforcement. (1 No other proof was presented at trial regarding appellant’s call made to Sergeant Shields.) According to appellant, he decided to take the package to a nearby post office to return it. Ten to fifteen minutes after the package had been delivered, he came out of the front door of the house with the parcel in his hand and walked toward his car, which was parked in the driveway. He put the package in the car on the front passenger seat and, as he attempted to enter the driver’s side, officers tackled him to the ground and handcuffed him.
Inspector Green returned and identified appellant as the person who had received the package and said that he was “Corey Johnson.” Officers then searched the car, where they found the unopened parcel, as well as several documents in the front passenger side of the car and in the glove compartment. The documents included “personal papers with [appellant’s] name”; a PEPCO bill; a T-Mobile phone bill that matched the number for the cell phone recovered from appellant; and a notice from the Department of Motor Vehicles with the name “Constance Christian,” (2 Constance Christian was Johnson’s girlfriend at the time of the arrest. She lived at the address where the package was delivered.) addressed to the Nannie Helen Burroughs address and, in handwriting, “Corey Johnson.”
Approximately ten minutes after officers seized and handcuffed appellant, Detective Zerega placed him in the back seat of the detective’s SUV. According to Zerega, appellant was asked for “preliminary information . . . [like] his name and address so that [they could] complete [their] sheets.” Appellant was not asked about the package they had recovered from the car. Appellant inquired what he was being arrested for, and an officer told him that it was “for the package.” According to Officer McFadden, appellant then “spontaneously” said, “t’s nothing but crushed cookies and medication; go ahead and test it.” Appellant was told, “[Y]ou know we’re going to talk about the incident and everything when we get down to the precinct.” Appellant denied that he had said anything about what was in the package, only that he was on his way to return it to the post office. Appellant was taken to the police station where an officer read him his Miranda rights, which he waived. At the station, appellant stated that the parcel was not his and that he was “Courtney,” not “Corey,” Johnson.
Following appellant’s arrest, officers searched the house where they had made the controlled delivery, with the consent of the owner, but did not find anything incriminating.
The cell phone recovered from appellant indicated that calls were made from the phone to numbers in the state of California, but no connection was made between these numbers and any California phone numbers known to be used in drug transactions. Officers also determined that appellant’s principal address was on 6th Street, S.E., in Washington, D.C.
The same day the investigators conducted the controlled delivery in D.C., drug- enforcement officers in California searched an address (432 Regeant Street in Englewood, California) that officers had tracked to Ricardo Austin, the sender of the two intercepted parcels. Officers recovered marijuana, Saran Wrap, dryer sheets, “ledgers,” postal-delivery receipts, and money orders at Austin’s address. One of the postal-delivery receipts was to “Corey at 46014 North H. Burroughs Ave., N.E., Washington D.C.” Another receipt included the address “2027 Barlow Place, Hyattsville, Maryland.” A week later, August 31, officers obtained a search warrant for the Barlow Place address and found there a box with the same handwriting and return address as the one shipped to Corey Johnson at the Nannie Helen Burroughs address; money-order receipts totaling $50,000; one-half pound of marijuana; and $10,000 in cash. Officers also found a “tally sheet” that included “gross amounts . . . that they’re going to be sending . . . back to California, with an entry that stated ‘from Courtney Johnson, 2027 Barlow Place,’ written on it.” Using the serial numbers on the money-order receipts recovered from the Barlow Street address, law-enforcement officers obtained digital images of the corresponding money orders. Four money-order receipts were from “Courthney Johnson at 2027 Barlow Place” to “Ricardo Austin” at “423 West Regeant Street in Englewood,” totaling $3,500. Law-enforcement officers were also informed that another postal inspector, who profiled parcels in Baltimore, had in her files an express-mail receipt from a sender “Courthney Johnson, 2027 Barlow Place in Hyattsville, Maryland” to “Abraham Flores at 2535 Iowa Avenue, Southgate, California.”
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II. Probable Cause to Arrest
Appellant claims that because law-enforcement officials lacked probable cause to arrest him, the search of his car and seizure of evidence that occurred incident to that arrest violated his Fourth Amendment rights.
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At the suppression hearing, the government sought to establish probable cause by presenting evidence of the investigation that led to, and the execution of, Inspector Green’s “controlled delivery” to appellant of a parcel containing marijuana. The Supreme Court in Illinois v. Andrea, 463 U.S. 765 (1983), described the purpose and mechanics of a controlled delivery:
The lawful discovery by common carriers or customs officers of contraband in transit presents law enforcement authorities with an opportunity to identify and prosecute the person or persons responsible for the movement of the contraband. To accomplish this, the police, rather than simply seizing the contraband and destroying it, make a so-called controlled delivery of the container to its consignee, allowing the container to continue its journey to the destination contemplated by the parties. The person dealing in the contraband can then be identified upon taking possession of and asserting dominion over the container.
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continued in next post
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part 2, have edited out about half the document, I estimate
(4 As is clear from Andrea, there is nothing unlawful in a properly executed controlled delivery. The government is not planting drugs or engaging in entrapment; it is merely keeping tight surveillance over the course of an illegal transaction that had already been set in motion by the participants, by lawfully taking custody of the contraband pursuant to a warrant and then completing the delivery to the addressee on the parcel.)
Appellant claims that officers could not arrest him following the successful controlled delivery of the parcel containing marijuana addressed to him because they had no probable cause to believe he knew what was in the package. The question whether acceptance of a controlled delivery by the addressee is sufficient to establish probable cause to arrest the recipient is an issue of first impression for us and one that appears to have received scant attention by other courts. The government relies on Spencer v. Connecticut, 560 F. Supp. 2d 153 (D. Conn. 2008), which held that the officers had probable cause to arrest an individual once he accepted delivery of a package containing marijuana.5 Id. at 162. That a person accepts or is designated as the addressee of a package containing contraband intercepted by the government is some evidence – but it may not be enough – to establish probable cause that the recipient is engaged in unlawful activity. We recognize there can be a reasonable inference that the sender would not entrust contraband that is valuable, with the attendant risk of exposing the sender to criminal liability, to an unknown, unsuspecting person. That inference is not always reasonable, however. For example, in the case of delivery of offensive or noxious materials, such as anthrax, it would not be reasonable to infer that the recipient voluntarily accepts delivery with knowledge of the contents. Similarly, a person who lives with others at a common address may innocently sign for and accept a package intended for a family member, roommate or other tenant, without any knowledge of (or interest in) the contents of the package. Moreover, letters and parcels are often left on front porches, reception areas and slipped through mail slots, or are otherwise routinely delivered and accepted, without knowledge of their contents. Probable cause requires some fact suggesting the recipient’s awareness that the package contains contraband. We need not decide here whether acceptance of a package in the course of a controlled delivery suffices to establish probable cause in every case because, in this case, the officers had evidence of more than appellant’s mere acceptance.
In determining whether there is probable cause to arrest in the context of a controlled delivery, we assess the situation as a whole – the usual totality of the circumstances analysis – to establish the recipient’s link to the contraband in the controlled delivery.
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We also apply a “totality of the circumstances” analysis and conclude that the facts known to the officers before they arrested appellant, taken as a whole and viewed from the perspective of a reasonable officer with knowledge of the drug trade, established probable cause to arrest appellant. This was a controlled delivery, and the officers obviously knew that the package contained marijuana. The critical question for probable cause, however, is whether the officers reasonably could have believed that appellant accepted the parcel knowing what was in it. Here, such a belief was reasonable. Appellant accepted a parcel addressed to “Corey Johnson.” He did so by signing and printing “Corey Johnson” on the form provided by Inspector Green, disguised as a U.S. Postal Service courier, after twice acknowledging he was “Corey Johnson.” Although appellant testified that he made clear he was not “Corey Johnson,” we defer to the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of Inspector Green in this respect, and are bound by its finding that “[Johnson] was not coerced by Inspector Green to sign the receipt.” See Lewis v. United States, 767 A.2d 219, 222 (D.C. 2001) (“Deference must be given to the factfinder’s duty to determine credibility . . . .”).
The parcel was delivered to a house postal records did not identify as appellant’s address, suggesting that the sender knew to find appellant at his girlfriend’s house and that appellant had chosen that address to avoid detection. Fifteen minutes after the controlled delivery, appellant left the house with the unopened package, (10 The tracking device did not indicate that the parcel had been opened. Different inferences can be drawn from the fact that appellant did not open the package. One is that he did not need to do so because he already knew what it contained. The opposite inference – the one appellant’s testimony supported – is that he was returning the parcel to the post office because it was not his and he had accepted its delivery only because Investigator Green forced him to sign the receipt.) headed towards a car parked in the driveway, and placed the parcel in the car. Investigators knew, based on their experience, that it is common practice for contraband coming from the Midwest or California, to be “transported from the location it’s sent to another location where it is disbursed just in case law enforcement is watching.” The officers also knew that the package delivered to appellant was one of at least two parcels containing marijuana sent by Ricardo Austin, who was based in California and involved in suspicious drug-related activity.(11 Although the exact timing is not altogether clear, it appears that fairly simultaneously with the controlled delivery to appellant, officers in California executed the search warrant at the Englewood address linked to Ricardo Austin. There, they found a postal receipt with the name “Corey” and an address that approximated the one where appellant accepted the controlled delivery. The government did not present this evidence at the hearing on the motion to suppress.) In light of the officers’ knowledge of the sender and characteristics of the drug trade, appellant’s acknowledgment that he was the intended recipient, at an address that was not his home, and his exercise of control of the package, we conclude, based on the totality of the circumstances, the officers had probable cause to arrest appellant.
The search of appellant’s car that followed Johnson’s arrest and led to the seizure of inculpating evidence was also reasonable as a search incident to appellant’s arrest for possession of marijuana. As we noted in Dawkins v. United States, 987 A.2d 470 (D.C. 2010), the warrantless search of an automobile incident to arrest is constitutionally permissible only if the police reasonably believe either that the suspect could have such access to his car as would pose a risk to the safety of the officers or potential destruction of evidence, as permitted by Chimel [v. United States, 395 U.S. 752 (1969),] or that evidence of the offense for which he was arrested could be found in the car, pursuant to Thornton [v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004)].
Id. at 476 (citing Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009)). In this case, the search would be reasonable under either Chimel or Thornton. Appellant had placed the package with the drugs in the car, and opened the door to the driver’s seat with an intent to enter the car, thereby possibly posing a risk to the integrity of the drug evidence, the situation addressed in Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762-63. Moreover, Thornton allowed the vehicle search because the officers had reason to believe that “evidence relevant to the crime for which he had been arrested might be found in the vehicle,” as appellant had just placed the parcel officers knew contained marijuana on the front seat of the car. See Thornton, 541 U.S. at 632. Additional evidence seized during the search was recovered from the vehicle’s glove compartment, but that too was reasonable, as a search of a vehicle incident to an arrest may include search of containers “[such as] closed or open glove compartments.” New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 484, 460 n.4 (1981). Thus, as there was reasonable cause to arrest appellant, and the search of his vehicle incident to that arrest was lawful, under Gant, Chimel, and Thornton, the Fourth Amendment did not require that the fruits of the search be suppressed.
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Appellant was charged under D.C. Code 48, § 904.01 (a)(1) (2001), which states, in relevant part, that “it is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to . . . possess . . . with intent to . . . distribute, a controlled substance.” Id. Proof of possession requires that the government establish that the accused had actual or constructive possession of the prohibited item. See Smith v. United States, 809 A.2d 1216, 1221-22 (D.C. 2002). Actual possession is “the ability of a person to knowingly exercise direct physical custody or control over the property in question.” Id. at 1222 (quoting United States v. Hubbard, 429 A.2d 1334, 1338 (D.C. 1981)). Proof of possession can be established by either direct or circumstantial evidence. Smith, 908 A.2d at 1222.
The government presented sufficient evidence that appellant knowingly possessed the marijuana. Appellant accepted the parcel with the drugs addressed to “Corey Johnson” at the address where he was found, acknowledged he was the correct recipient, and signed the postal receipt, which was introduced at trial. A document found in appellant’s car had the name “Corey Johnson” and the address where the package was mailed. Almost immediately after the delivery, appellant left the house carrying the unopened parcel, placed it in the front seat of his car, with the intent to transport it to another location. These actions evidenced actual physical custody and control of the package. And even though appellant never opened the parcel, the fact finder could have inferred from appellant’s behavior that he knew what was in it, and thus knowingly possessed the marijuana in the parcel. After being arrested, appellant told the officers that the contents of the parcel were “crushed cookies and medicine,” and that the officers could “test it.” As the trial court noted in denying the motion for judgment of acquittal, it was reasonable for a factfinder to infer that appellant knew the contents of the parcel because, “if you didn’t know what was in the box, you wouldn’t make up something.” See United States v. Bronham, 515 F.3d 1268, 1273-74 (D.C. Cir 2008) (rejecting contention that evidence was insufficient because “there was no indication defendant had any idea what was in the package[]” where the jury could infer defendant had 1) arranged for the package to be delivered to him at another address, 2) was anticipating its arrival, 3) appeared to try to conceal his connection to the package, and 4) was dealing drugs from the building where the package was delivered); United States v. Calhoun, 49 F.3d 231, 236 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding evidence sufficient to establish that defendant had knowledge of contraband in parcel even though the parcel was never opened, because she, inter alia, signed a false name for a package that contained a kilogram of cocaine and gave officers false information about the person she claimed was the intended recipient). Furthermore, as discussed infra, there was evidence linking appellant to a large-scale contraband operation, which bolsters the conclusion that appellant possessed the parcel with knowledge that it contained marijuana. See Bronham, 515 F.3d at 1274; cf. Moore v. United States, 927 A.2d 1040, 1050 (D.C. 2007) (“[W]e have recognized that a prima facie case of constructive possession may be established by evidence linking the accused to ‘an ongoing criminal operation of which that possession is a part.’” (quoting Earle v. United States, 612 A.2d 1258, 1265-66 (D.C. 1992)).
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We have upheld PWID convictions for possession of contraband worth far less than the marijuana appellant possessed. See, e.g., Spriggs v. United States, 618 A.2d 701, 704 (D.C. 1992) (eight packets of heroin and five packets of cocaine worth approximately $470); Taylor, 662 A.2d at 1370 (crack cocaine worth $180); Mack v. United States, 570 A.2d 777, 779 (D.C. 1990) (a gallon jar of PCP and one pound of marijuana worth an estimated $4,500).
In addition to the quantity of drugs, there were other indications that the marijuana was intended for distribution. According to the government’s narcotics expert, the parcel and the way the drugs were packaged were typical of “how marijuana is sent through the Washington metropolitan area in bulk form” for further distribution. Once the package is received, it is transported to another location where it is further distributed, to reduce the likelihood of raising law enforcement awareness. The expert testified that the buyers tend to use fictitious names and addresses that do not correspond with their residence or work addresses. The narcotics expert also testified that dealers often obtain supplies from the Midwest or California and pay for shipments by wiring money through Western Union or by mailing multiple money orders in $1,000 increments. He explained that money orders are the most common methods of payment because they leave almost no paper trail. The known scheme described by the expert closely resembles the operation of the transaction involving appellant. The two packages of marijuana located in the parcel Johnson accepted were wrapped in Saran Wrap and dryer sheets, in an apparent attempt to mask the odor of the drugs during delivery from the West to the East coast. The package was addressed to a fictitious name and delivered to appellant’s girlfriend’s house. Minutes after its delivery, appellant left the house with the parcel and placed it in his car, with the intention to take it to some other location. Finally, the government presented evidence that tied appellant to Ricardo Austin, who was connected to drug-trade activity: the parcel containing 16 pounds of marijuana addressed to appellant was sent by Austin from California; at least four money orders totaling $3,500 were purchased by “Courthney Johnson” and sent to Ricardo Austin in California; an express-mail receipt located in a postal office in Baltimore identified “Courthney Johnson” as its sender and an individual in California as the recipient; three different addresses, all within the greater D.C. area, were connected to a drug scheme and to a “Corey,” “Courthney” or “Courtney” Johnson; several other parcels containing marijuana found at the Barlow Place address, all of which used fictitious names, and similar packaging and the same handwriting as the package accepted by appellant, were connected to Ricardo Austin. These facts, taken as a whole, constitute ample evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant knowingly possessed the marijuana that was the subject of the controlled delivery with the intent to distribute it.
Affirmed.
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Why this dude wrap up 5 lbs of weed in dryer sheets? Seriously?
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This is great information, thyme, thanks for posting it!
For those who think "TL;DR," you really should reconsider. This has loads of information regarding all of our safety. I've discussed some parts below that I think are important, but you should read the whole thing.
Law-enforcement officers determined that the individual who mailed the two parcels was Ricardo Austin.
How? They don't elaborate here, but I wouldn't be surprised if Mr. Austin left behind fingerprints, or even mailed it from his home address. Wear good gloves and don't leave behind DNA (hair, skin) when packaging, mail from a drop box far from your home.
According to appellant, he told Green that “[t]his is kind of weird,” referring to how he was being “coerced” to sign the document.
The cop definitely WILL pressure you to sign more than a real mailman would. The mailman won't give a shit if you don't want a package, the cop will act like you "better sign it!" Don't.
The question whether acceptance of a controlled delivery by the addressee is sufficient to establish probable cause to arrest the recipient is an issue of first impression for us and one that appears to have received scant attention by other courts…officers had probable cause to arrest an individual once he accepted delivery of a package containing marijuana. That a person accepts or is designated as the addressee of a package containing contraband intercepted by the government is some evidence – but it may not be enough – to establish probable cause that the recipient is engaged in unlawful activity. We recognize there can be a reasonable inference that the sender would not entrust contraband that is valuable, with the attendant risk of exposing the sender to criminal liability, to an unknown, unsuspecting person. That inference is not always reasonable, however. For example, in the case of delivery of offensive or noxious materials, such as anthrax, it would not be reasonable to infer that the recipient voluntarily accepts delivery with knowledge of the contents. Similarly, a person who lives with others at a common address may innocently sign for and accept a package intended for a family member, roommate or other tenant, without any knowledge of (or interest in) the contents of the package. Moreover, letters and parcels are often left on front porches, reception areas and slipped through mail slots, or are otherwise routinely delivered and accepted, without knowledge of their contents. Probable cause requires some fact suggesting the recipient’s awareness that the package contains contraband.
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This was a controlled delivery, and the officers obviously knew that the package contained marijuana. The critical question for probable cause, however, is whether the officers reasonably could have believed that appellant accepted the parcel knowing what was in it. Here, such a belief was reasonable. Appellant accepted a parcel addressed to “Corey Johnson.” He did so by signing and printing “Corey Johnson” on the form provided by Inspector Green, disguised as a U.S. Postal Service courier, after twice acknowledging he was “Corey Johnson.” Although appellant testified that he made clear he was not “Corey Johnson,” we defer to the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of Inspector Green in this respect, and are bound by its finding that “[Johnson] was not coerced by Inspector Green to sign the receipt.”
Order to the name of a person who actually lives at the delivery address! Don't use a fake name, don't use a your real name at a different address.
Also, that line about anthrax got me thinking: when you decline signing for the package (because you know it's a controlled deliver, because you've read this thread), the cop will ask you why, or imply that you should sign it. If you're not comfortable just smiling and going inside, you can say something simple, like, "No thanks, I never accept packages I didn't order." If you were ever questioned further about that statement, you can point out that, after all the anthrax stuff in the news a few years ago, you've always been wary of the mail, and only open mail you think is really for you.
It's also worth noting that the court will trust what the cop says way more than you. This is evidenced by the last sentence in the above section.
The parcel was delivered to a house postal records did not identify as appellant’s address, suggesting that the sender knew to find appellant at his girlfriend’s house and that appellant had chosen that address to avoid detection.
Again, he raised a red flag when he was trying to do the opposite. Only order to a properly matching name and address!
Investigators knew, based on their experience, that it is common practice for contraband coming from the Midwest or California, to be “transported from the location it’s sent to another location where it is disbursed just in case law enforcement is watching.”
This is just worth noting. If you do it right and don't sign for it, you shouldn't have the package in your possession at all, so you shouldn't be able to further incriminate yourself by trying to "run off" with it.
In light of the officers’ knowledge of the sender and characteristics of the drug trade, appellant’s acknowledgment that he was the intended recipient, at an address that was not his home, and his exercise of control of the package, we conclude, based on the totality of the circumstances, the officers had probable cause to arrest appellant.
This is very worth keeping in mind: each "little" thing you let slip through the cracks, each "small" security mistake you make, can add up to create enough evidence to bust you.
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thank you :)
How? They don't elaborate here, but I wouldn't be surprised if Mr. Austin left behind fingerprints, or even mailed it from his home address. Wear good gloves and don't leave behind DNA (hair, skin) when packaging, mail from a drop box far from your home.
I think (from first reading of the PDF, there's a lot more in there) that he was caught on the Express Mail receipts, then also the money orders.
I have read far too many of these complaints/indictments in the past year - I became interested in them. There is a theme of Express Mail (when it's not FedEx/UPS.) Those receipts are so handy as evidence.
The issue of an 'off' name comes up again and again in those indictments/complaints as well.
Lots implied and unknown. How long do the postal profilers hang on to marginal addresses, for example? Here there was a 'file' that was promptly pulled out for cross-checking.
As far as signing with any name - Even if you DON'T sign for it, you've accepted it and it's in your possession. If I am pulled over and found with 16# of cannabis in my car, I am almost certain they won't let me go on the basis of not having a signed receipt for it.
This is very worth keeping in mind: each "little" thing you let slip through the cracks, each "small" security mistake you make, can add up to create enough evidence to bust you.
^this and the idea of totality are important
There is a thread of "damned if you do, damned if you don't" that goes through the opinion. (If he'd hung on to it, he would have been waiting for a reasonable interval; if he instantly tried to send it to another location, he was trying to distance himself. What?)
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There is a theme of Express Mail (when it's not FedEx/UPS.) Those receipts are so handy as evidence.
I would like to know more about this. This doesn't refer to standard First Class or Priority mail since they can just be dropped in a box with correct postage, right? Does a DCN (delivery confirmation number) ever come back to haunt someone as evidence?
As far as signing with any name - Even if you DON'T sign for it, you've accepted it and it's in your possession. If I am pulled over and found with 16# of cannabis in my car, I am almost certain they won't let me go on the basis of not having a signed receipt for it.
Well of course, but you won't get the package if you don't sign for it. We're assuming the situation is that you are in Mr. Johnson's position: you get a controlled delivery, except you've read this thread, so you know it's a controlled delivery (since no one on SR should have you sign for a package!). So you just politely refuse the package and go inside without saying anything. You have not accepted the contraband, if they didn't know any better (and they really don't KNOW), they'd figure you were just an ordinary guy who doesn't realize this package contains drugs, but doesn't want a mystery package. There's nothing they can do, as far as I understand.
If you actually receive your drugs without a controlled delivery, chances are they don't realize you were shipped drugs. You should, of course, always take every precaution possible when you have drugs in your possession (driving around with lbs of bud is clearly the opposite of this).
(Random note: I saw your BBCode attempts. This forum unfortunately doesn't support formatting like that. It should, since it leads to everyone emphasizing things with "quotes" or IN CAPS, which is often misleading.)
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I would like to know more about this. This doesn't refer to standard First Class or Priority mail since they can just be dropped in a box with correct postage, right?
To my knowledge, which is very limited and entirely open-source, yes.
Express Mail is relatively rare. Priority is relatively common. My understanding is that Express is handled quite differently in terms of inspection (...or has been). In addition, Express Mail, like most FedEx, is usually business-to-business. Some FedEx is business-to-consumer; I'll guess that very little Express Mail is business-to-consumer.
Express that goes home-to-home is going to stand out like the red flag announcing the special on red flag sales, or so it seems to me. My office receives and sends a /lot/ of mail, a lot of books, to office and box, etc. We have two orgs that always use Express Mail. They stand out. No one else uses it - FedEx and Priority only.
"Hahahaha," said the sweet lady at the mailbox place, a few years ago, when I was cursed to be an executor in another state for kinfolk. "Another Express box, only lawyers and drug dealers use these. And the government, I guess."
"Hahahaha," I said."Good thing it's from a law firm and weighs a ton!"
We laughed and laughed and I took my box of paper to my hotel to work on it.
Prescient little conversation, though.
Does a DCN (delivery confirmation number) ever come back to haunt someone as evidence?
I do not know the answer to this question. I'll have to look back at the complaints, or better yet, someone who knows will speak up.
Pragmatically, what are the mechanisms by which one could be screwed? Since there is a confirmed delivery point, then, yes, at that delivery end, it seems like it could be used. But the data to be gained seems worthwhile from kewm's earlier comments.
curses, no bbcode. thanks for the headsup. I'll try to avoid the allcaps.
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Lots of great info tidbits in this thread, thanks. I would think FedEx for mailing contraband would be potentially more dangerous, since they don't require a warrant to open. However, I don't know how active of an inspection program they have, so with good packing, it may be more safe. Either way, USPS only on SR.
"only lawyers and drug dealers use these. And the government, I guess."
"Hahahaha," I said."Good thing it's from a law firm and weighs a ton!"
We laughed and laughed and I took my box of paper to my hotel to work on it.
Prescient little conversation, though.
Indeed. Though I wasn't thinking of law firms, I've considered what the best return address options might be. I figure businesses (that really exist) are a better option than homes. The mailing point should be from a mailbox in the same zip code. From your reading, do you agree with this assessment?
Pragmatically, what are the mechanisms by which one could be screwed? Since there is a confirmed delivery point, then, yes, at that delivery end, it seems like it could be used. But the data to be gained seems worthwhile from kewm's earlier comments.
Technically speaking, they could trace each DCN to the post office and time it was purchased. Then they could, presumably, watch the security footage (assuming it's still archived) and see who buys those DCNs at that time. Then they could potentially track you down from your images on camera? I don't honestly know what's possible or what's worth the time to LE, but thinking in paranoid Orwellian terms (which is handy sometimes in this game), it seems doable.
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Lots of great info tidbits in this thread, thanks. I would think FedEx for mailing contraband would be potentially more dangerous, since they don't require a warrant to open. However, I don't know how active of an inspection program they have, so with good packing, it may be more safe. Either way, USPS only on SR.
"only lawyers and drug dealers use these. And the government, I guess."
"Hahahaha," I said."Good thing it's from a law firm and weighs a ton!"
We laughed and laughed and I took my box of paper to my hotel to work on it.
Prescient little conversation, though.
Indeed. Though I wasn't thinking of law firms, I've considered what the best return address options might be. I figure businesses (that really exist) are a better option than homes. The mailing point should be from a mailbox in the same zip code. From your reading, do you agree with this assessment?
Pragmatically, what are the mechanisms by which one could be screwed? Since there is a confirmed delivery point, then, yes, at that delivery end, it seems like it could be used. But the data to be gained seems worthwhile from kewm's earlier comments.
Technically speaking, they could trace each DCN to the post office and time it was purchased. Then they could, presumably, watch the security footage (assuming it's still archived) and see who buys those DCNs at that time. Then they could potentially track you down from your images on camera? I don't honestly know what's possible or what's worth the time to LE, but thinking in paranoid Orwellian terms (which is handy sometimes in this game), it seems doable.
Good stuff all! I choose to live in the Paranoid Orwellian thinking myself these days!
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Something I've always thought seemed to be confirmed in those huge blocks of text (which I did take the time to read)...
The primary purpose of a controlled delivery is to maintain a secure chain of evidence; what happens after the delivery is presented depends on a number of factors, including, but not limited to: If the recipient accepts/signs for the package, and if he does, what other evidence is discovered during the search, and what other evidence was available PRIOR to presenting the controlled delivery. What they are attempting to do is connect the dots. The more dots they can connect, the stronger the case. A single dot by itself is circumstantial, and needs to be corroborated, even if only with other circumstantial evidence.
If I receive a hundred packages in the clear, without reprisal, then none of them can later be used as evidence... What packages? I have no recollection of receiving them, and they have no proof that I did without a secure chain of evidence. Right or wrong?
What I am still uncertain about is this: What happens if you calmly and rationally refuse a controlled delivery? Is this the end of the line for them, or can they still legally swoop down and execute a warrant to search your premises?
In other words... Is the warrant to search one's premises, in the absence of ANY OTHER EVIDENCE, predicated on the recipient actually accepting the package?
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buy your priority envelopes and dcns with an anonymous reloadable debit card and have them delivered to a drop ;)
Good call. That requires organizing a drop, but that can be done anonymously if necessary.
If I receive a hundred packages in the clear, without reprisal, then none of them can later be used as evidence... What packages? I have no recollection of receiving them, and they have no proof that I did without a secure chain of evidence. Right or wrong?
This is, in my understanding, correct. They don't even know you ever got other packages, otherwise why were they delivered?
What I am still uncertain about is this: What happens if you calmly and rationally refuse a controlled delivery? Is this the end of the line for them, or can they still legally swoop down and execute a warrant to search your premises?
In other words... Is the warrant to search one's premises, in the absence of ANY OTHER EVIDENCE, predicated on the recipient actually accepting the package?
I've thought on this a lot, and read around, and I believe that it would probably be the end of the line for them. First, that's what janetreno (person who claimed to have worked as a postal inspection intern, did a big Q&A months back) said, but they could easily have been lying or misinformed. But it stands to reason that if they had more evidence on you already, they might have already busted you (unless this shipment came at an opportune time for them to gather even more evidence). The controlled delivery process is what allows them to execute the warrant, as far as I'm aware.
However, for all we know, they may have a lot of circumstantial "dots," enough to execute a warrant already. It would just be nice for them to get your signature as further evidence, before they bust in and search the place. That is how LE operates: get you to mount as much evidence against yourself as possible, to make their jobs easier.
So really, I don't know at all. I think the answer lies between what amount of evidence is usually required to execute a warrant, and how much evidence they have on a case-by-case basis.
Aren't warrants generally only issued by a judge when there's sufficient evidence for the warrant to be executed? For instance, PO inspectors must get a warrant to open your mail. They generally have evidence that the mail contains contraband, and they present this evidence to a judge, who issues a warrant, which allows them to search the package (your property) without your permission. If this is the standard for warrants, then is the warrant used in a controlled delivery any different? Is it actually contingent on your acceptance of the package, as janetreno claimed, or is the controlled delivery an evidence-grabbing formality before an inevitable search?
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What I am still uncertain about is this: What happens if you calmly and rationally refuse a controlled delivery? Is this the end of the line for them, or can they still legally swoop down and execute a warrant to search your premises?
In other words... Is the warrant to search one's premises, in the absence of ANY OTHER EVIDENCE, predicated on the recipient actually accepting the package?
I think the term here, from what I've seen, is "anticipatory" warrant.
Not an attorney. But the standard wording on the anticipatory warrant specifies acceptance of the package. (Does not specify signing, signing one's correct name, or accepting x more than 5 minutes.)
Here -
This is -excellent- and worth the full read, not just the excerpt below. 14 pages. Can put them all up separate if wanted. It covers no-knocks, night calls, and sealing as well, written from LE perspective.
It is for CA but the concepts, from cross checking, appear generally valid.
It's a wall of text, but I think TL;DR doesn't apply if it keeps someone out of jail/prison.
hxxp://le.alcoda.org/publications/point_of_view/.../special_procedures.pdf
For example, it may suddenly become necessary to obtain or execute a warrant immediately, or to expedite entry into the premises, or to serve the warrant in another county or even another state. Officers may determine that the affidavit they were about to submit to a magistrate contains information that, if disclosed to the suspect or others, could cause major problems for officers or an informant.
Other twists include the need to search the office of an attorney or physician, search the customer records of phone companies and banks, obtain a warrant to search a place before the evidence has arrived, and obtain a warrant authorizing a covert search.
As we will now discuss, there are ways that search warrants can be modified to deal with all of these situations and more.
...
Anticipatory search warrants
“Anticipatory” search warrants are issued before the evidence has arrived at the place
to be searched.35 Why is this necessary? Usually because officers want to be able to conduct an immediate search when the evidence is taken inside.36 This is often considered a better option than waiting for a warrant (and taking a chance the evidence may be moved or destroyed37), or securing the premises pending issuance of the warrant.38
Anticipatory warrants are most commonly used in connection with controlled deliveries of drugs and other contraband.39 For example, officers may discover that a package being mailed or shipped to a certain address contains illegal drugs or weapons. If the package is sent on its way, officers would have probable cause to search the premises when it arrives and is taken inside.40 Consequently, an anticipatory warrant would be an option.
At first glance, there might appear to be a serious legal problem. As the courts routinely point out, search warrants may be issued only when there is probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime is now located in the place to be searched. They have, however, made an exception to this rule when it is apparent that probable cause will exist when the warrant is executed.41
The procedure for obtaining anticipatory search warrants is essentially the same as that for conventional warrants except that the affidavit must demonstrate probable cause to believe the evidence will be on the premises when the warrant is executed. To accomplish this, the affidavit must contain the following:
(1) TRIGGERING EVENT DESCRIBED: The circumstance that will result in probable cause—known as the “triggering event”—must be described with “reasonable specificity” in the affidavit and in the warrant (usually in an attachment).42
(2) TRIGGERING EVENT WILL OCCUR: The affidavit must establish probable cause to believe the triggering event will occur.43 As a practical matter, this means that officers must have the ability to make it happen, or that it will happen as a matter of course when they take certain action.
For example, in controlled-delivery cases where the triggering event is the delivery of a package containing contraband to the suspect’s house, probable cause to believe this will occur usually exists when the contraband will be delivered by an undercover officer or by an informant who is being supervised by officers. 44 Probable cause will also exist when the package will be delivered as a matter of course after officers return it to the Post Office or shipping company for delivery.45
If, however, the suspect will be picking up the package at, for example, a post office or shipping company, an anticipatory warrant to search his home or other place is permitted only if there is probable cause to believe he will be taking it there.46
For example, in U.S. v. Hendricks47 a package shipped by air from Brazil to Tucson was searched by DEA agents who found it contained seven pounds of cocaine. The package was addressed to Hendricks for pick up at the Tucson airport. The agents then learned that Hendricks lived in Tucson where he ran an import business. They were also aware that cocaine had been shipped to Hendricks’ business office about six weeks earlier.
The agents then sought an anticipatory warrant to search Hendricks’ home—the triggering event being Hendricks’ act of picking up the package at the airport and taking it home.
Although probable cause to search the house would have existed when the package was taken inside, the Ninth Circuit ruled there was no reason to believe he would be taking it there. In fact, all indications were he would be taking it to his business—and nowhere else. Said the court:
[T]he business premises were the only place that was linked to past illegal activity, the residence not at all. . . . [T]he agents had no information giving rise to a belief that the package would ever go to Hendricks’s home.48
(3) PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH WILL EXIST: Finally, there must be a fair probability that when the triggering event occurs, probable cause will exist to search the place listed in the warrant.49 In other words, anticipatory warrants cannot be issued merely because the triggering event will result in probable cause to arrest the suspect or to search some location.50 Instead, the event must result in probable cause to search the place described in the warrant. [edit in footnote: 50 See U.S. v. Hendricks (9th Cir. 1984) 743 F.2d 653, 655; U.S. v. Ricciardelli (1st Cir. 1993) 998 F.2d 8, 13 [anticipatory warrant to search suspect’s home invalid because the triggering event was the delivery of contraband to the suspect’s person, not his home].]
For example, in controlled-delivery cases where the triggering event is the suspect’s act of taking the package into his home, the event will necessarily result in probable cause to search the home because, at that point, contraband will be on the premises.51
Although anticipatory warrants are used mostly in controlled delivery cases, they may be used in other types of cases in which the occurrence of some event will automatically result in probable cause to search a certain place. For example, in People v. Sousa52 narcotics officers were tipped by an untested informant that Sousa was selling large quantities of marijuana out of his home. And, according to the informant, business was so good that Sousa was actively looking for additional suppliers.
Because uncorroborated information from an untested informant will not ordinarily support a warrant, the officers figured a way to obtain corroboration. Posing as a marijuana grower, an officer arranged to meet with Sousa for the ostensible purpose of selling him ten pounds of marijuana. When the meeting was set, officers obtained an anticipatory warrant to search Sousa’s house, the contingency being Sousa’s purchase of the marijuana. As explained in the affidavit, the officers theorized that Sousa’s purchase of such a large amount of marijuana would corroborate the informant’s tip that Sousa was selling marijuana out of his home, thereby establishing probable cause to search the house. This, according to the court, made sense. As the court noted:
It is true that most anticipatory warrant cases involve controlled deliveries of packages containing contraband. None of them, however, holds that anticipatory warrants are improper in other contexts. Instead, they establish that a warrant may issue on a clear showing that the police’s right to search . . . will exist within a reasonable time in the future.
Similarly, in U.S. v. Dennis,53 Postal Inspectors intercepted a package containing cocaine addressed to Dennis’s home. The inspectors learned that Dennis’s home was actually a two-story duplex, but the address on the package did not specify whether delivery was to be made to the lower or upper unit. Consequently, the inspectors inserted language in an anticipatory warrant authorizing a search of the first floor apartment “if and only if an occupant of that apartment accepts delivery or opens the package” or the second floor apartment “if an only if an occupant of the second floor accepts delivery or opens the package.” The court ruled the warrant was lawful.
Finally, a note about the scope of an anticipatory warrant. If the sole purpose of the search is to find the evidence that is brought to the premises (e.g., cocaine in a container), the warrant must be written rather narrowly, authorizing a search for just that evidence. If, however, the warrant also demonstrates probable cause to search the premises for additional evidence, such as indicia and sales paraphernalia (assuming there is probable cause to believe the recipient is selling54), the warrant may authorize a much broader search.
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Technically speaking, they could trace each DCN to the post office and time it was purchased. Then they could, presumably, watch the security footage (assuming it's still archived) and see who buys those DCNs at that time. Then they could potentially track you down from your images on camera? I don't honestly know what's possible or what's worth the time to LE, but thinking in paranoid Orwellian terms (which is handy sometimes in this game), it seems doable.
buy your priority envelopes and dcns with an anonymous reloadable debit card and have them delivered to a drop ;)
Either that or just pay cash and buy about a month ahead, keep them in order by purchase. I have never heard of a post office or any other location archiving 30 days. A week, yes, and most of the time it's 24-48 hours because video footage is usually for theft/robberies and it would be called in long before that time-frame.
Remember, the more elaborate you make your methods, the more places you have to make a mistake and draw attention. I recommend a simple, straightforward approach that keeps you anonymous but that you can change up regularly.
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What I am still uncertain about is this: What happens if you calmly and rationally refuse a controlled delivery? Is this the end of the line for them, or can they still legally swoop down and execute a warrant to search your premises?
In other words... Is the warrant to search one's premises, in the absence of ANY OTHER EVIDENCE, predicated on the recipient actually accepting the package?
I think the term here, from what I've seen, is "anticipatory" warrant.
Not an attorney. But the standard wording on the anticipatory warrant specifies acceptance of the package. (Does not specify signing, signing one's correct name, or accepting x more than 5 minutes.)
Here -
This is -excellent- and worth the full read, not just the excerpt below. 14 pages. Can put them all up separate if wanted. It covers no-knocks, night calls, and sealing as well, written from LE perspective.
It is for CA but the concepts, from cross checking, appear generally valid.
It's a wall of text, but I think TL;DR doesn't apply if it keeps someone out of jail/prison.
hxxp://le.alcoda.org/publications/point_of_view/.../special_procedures.pdf
For example, it may suddenly become necessary to obtain or execute a warrant immediately, or to expedite entry into the premises, or to serve the warrant in another county or even another state. Officers may determine that the affidavit they were about to submit to a magistrate contains information that, if disclosed to the suspect or others, could cause major problems for officers or an informant.
Other twists include the need to search the office of an attorney or physician, search the customer records of phone companies and banks, obtain a warrant to search a place before the evidence has arrived, and obtain a warrant authorizing a covert search.
As we will now discuss, there are ways that search warrants can be modified to deal with all of these situations and more.
...
Anticipatory search warrants
“Anticipatory” search warrants are issued before the evidence has arrived at the place
to be searched.35 Why is this necessary? Usually because officers want to be able to conduct an immediate search when the evidence is taken inside.36 This is often considered a better option than waiting for a warrant (and taking a chance the evidence may be moved or destroyed37), or securing the premises pending issuance of the warrant.38
Anticipatory warrants are most commonly used in connection with controlled deliveries of drugs and other contraband.39 For example, officers may discover that a package being mailed or shipped to a certain address contains illegal drugs or weapons. If the package is sent on its way, officers would have probable cause to search the premises when it arrives and is taken inside.40 Consequently, an anticipatory warrant would be an option.
At first glance, there might appear to be a serious legal problem. As the courts routinely point out, search warrants may be issued only when there is probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime is now located in the place to be searched. They have, however, made an exception to this rule when it is apparent that probable cause will exist when the warrant is executed.41
The procedure for obtaining anticipatory search warrants is essentially the same as that for conventional warrants except that the affidavit must demonstrate probable cause to believe the evidence will be on the premises when the warrant is executed. To accomplish this, the affidavit must contain the following:
(1) TRIGGERING EVENT DESCRIBED: The circumstance that will result in probable cause—known as the “triggering event”—must be described with “reasonable specificity” in the affidavit and in the warrant (usually in an attachment).42
(2) TRIGGERING EVENT WILL OCCUR: The affidavit must establish probable cause to believe the triggering event will occur.43 As a practical matter, this means that officers must have the ability to make it happen, or that it will happen as a matter of course when they take certain action.
For example, in controlled-delivery cases where the triggering event is the delivery of a package containing contraband to the suspect’s house, probable cause to believe this will occur usually exists when the contraband will be delivered by an undercover officer or by an informant who is being supervised by officers. 44 Probable cause will also exist when the package will be delivered as a matter of course after officers return it to the Post Office or shipping company for delivery.45
If, however, the suspect will be picking up the package at, for example, a post office or shipping company, an anticipatory warrant to search his home or other place is permitted only if there is probable cause to believe he will be taking it there.46
For example, in U.S. v. Hendricks47 a package shipped by air from Brazil to Tucson was searched by DEA agents who found it contained seven pounds of cocaine. The package was addressed to Hendricks for pick up at the Tucson airport. The agents then learned that Hendricks lived in Tucson where he ran an import business. They were also aware that cocaine had been shipped to Hendricks’ business office about six weeks earlier.
The agents then sought an anticipatory warrant to search Hendricks’ home—the triggering event being Hendricks’ act of picking up the package at the airport and taking it home.
Although probable cause to search the house would have existed when the package was taken inside, the Ninth Circuit ruled there was no reason to believe he would be taking it there. In fact, all indications were he would be taking it to his business—and nowhere else. Said the court:
[T]he business premises were the only place that was linked to past illegal activity, the residence not at all. . . . [T]he agents had no information giving rise to a belief that the package would ever go to Hendricks’s home.48
(3) PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH WILL EXIST: Finally, there must be a fair probability that when the triggering event occurs, probable cause will exist to search the place listed in the warrant.49 In other words, anticipatory warrants cannot be issued merely because the triggering event will result in probable cause to arrest the suspect or to search some location.50 Instead, the event must result in probable cause to search the place described in the warrant. [edit in footnote: 50 See U.S. v. Hendricks (9th Cir. 1984) 743 F.2d 653, 655; U.S. v. Ricciardelli (1st Cir. 1993) 998 F.2d 8, 13 [anticipatory warrant to search suspect’s home invalid because the triggering event was the delivery of contraband to the suspect’s person, not his home].]
For example, in controlled-delivery cases where the triggering event is the suspect’s act of taking the package into his home, the event will necessarily result in probable cause to search the home because, at that point, contraband will be on the premises.51
Although anticipatory warrants are used mostly in controlled delivery cases, they may be used in other types of cases in which the occurrence of some event will automatically result in probable cause to search a certain place. For example, in People v. Sousa52 narcotics officers were tipped by an untested informant that Sousa was selling large quantities of marijuana out of his home. And, according to the informant, business was so good that Sousa was actively looking for additional suppliers.
Because uncorroborated information from an untested informant will not ordinarily support a warrant, the officers figured a way to obtain corroboration. Posing as a marijuana grower, an officer arranged to meet with Sousa for the ostensible purpose of selling him ten pounds of marijuana. When the meeting was set, officers obtained an anticipatory warrant to search Sousa’s house, the contingency being Sousa’s purchase of the marijuana. As explained in the affidavit, the officers theorized that Sousa’s purchase of such a large amount of marijuana would corroborate the informant’s tip that Sousa was selling marijuana out of his home, thereby establishing probable cause to search the house. This, according to the court, made sense. As the court noted:
It is true that most anticipatory warrant cases involve controlled deliveries of packages containing contraband. None of them, however, holds that anticipatory warrants are improper in other contexts. Instead, they establish that a warrant may issue on a clear showing that the police’s right to search . . . will exist within a reasonable time in the future.
Similarly, in U.S. v. Dennis,53 Postal Inspectors intercepted a package containing cocaine addressed to Dennis’s home. The inspectors learned that Dennis’s home was actually a two-story duplex, but the address on the package did not specify whether delivery was to be made to the lower or upper unit. Consequently, the inspectors inserted language in an anticipatory warrant authorizing a search of the first floor apartment “if and only if an occupant of that apartment accepts delivery or opens the package” or the second floor apartment “if an only if an occupant of the second floor accepts delivery or opens the package.” The court ruled the warrant was lawful.
Finally, a note about the scope of an anticipatory warrant. If the sole purpose of the search is to find the evidence that is brought to the premises (e.g., cocaine in a container), the warrant must be written rather narrowly, authorizing a search for just that evidence. If, however, the warrant also demonstrates probable cause to search the premises for additional evidence, such as indicia and sales paraphernalia (assuming there is probable cause to believe the recipient is selling54), the warrant may authorize a much broader search.
+1 for this little gem! Best wall of text I've read in a long time. I'll grab the remainder when I'm on clear net again, but the text you quoted above is extremely insightful.
There was a post I remember reading a while back, about a guy who ordered a quantity of anabolic steroids, and when presented with the package, became suspicious and refused it. As I recall from the post, the "mail carrier" was very insistent that he take the package. He still refused, and suddenly, two undercover LE popped up out of nowhere, trying in vain to convince him that it was actually ok to receive that amount of steroid through the mail. He still refused, and that was the end of it.
I tend to take such posts under advisement, and as good information, but hardly consider them to be a definitive, final word on the subject. Given that I seldom do anything outside of the Road that would draw attention to myself, I've always kind of hoped that a controlled delivery would be my ace in the hole... That if ever I was asked to accept a package addressed to first initial last name, I would know to refuse it and hopefully avoid further unpleasantness. It still seems like the best course of action, even if it may not be foolproof.
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I just read that part about anticipatory warrants and figured this thread could use a bump. That is extremely good information that everyone should read. It seems to support the idea that if you calmly refuse a package during controlled delivery, your property can't be searched.
NEVER sign for/accept from the mailman a package that you suspect contains contraband! No SR order should require a signature and the package should either be left in the mailbox or on the doorstop, depending on size. Don't deal with vendors who require you to accept delivery directly from the mailman.
Thyme, have you run across any examples of controlled deliveries being conducted without the person having to take the package directly from the "mailman"? I wouldn't think they would leave it on the doorstep and wait for you to pick it up and bring it inside, but I'd like to know if there's precedence for this.
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NEVER sign for/accept from the mailman a package that you suspect contains contraband!
Here's a side question. I was picking up a friend's mail while housesitting, different state, and she gets all mail at the UPS Store. They required a sign slip for all packages, even though she had the big box for her business. Is this standard at all UPS Stores or is it state-specific? It doesn't seem universal to all CRMAs but I've seen it at a couple of UPS Stores now.
Thyme, have you run across any examples of controlled deliveries being conducted without the person having to take the package directly from the "mailman"? I wouldn't think they would leave it on the doorstep and wait for you to pick it up and bring it inside, but I'd like to know if there's precedence for this.
Via a PMB/POB, yes, that's come up in the indictments/appeals, for substance and for CP alike (the other big controlled delivery area, although that's more online now); can start pulling in cites this weekend but I am on the wrong machine.
I recall "on the porch"type cases but not for certain, will have to look and add them on to the thread.
Someone else can speak to you about IRL experience.
I probably need a life that does not involve reading indictments and appeals, but it does have a horrible fascinating quality.
"Dominion and control" does not require handoff from the postal carrier, as I understand it. Important idea.
Consider this: if I leave you $10K on your porch and wander off reading my book, are you going to argue? No?
Right. You have dominion/control over it. It's Your Money now. Finders keepers = dominion and control.
By the way, that le.alcoda.org/publications/point_of_view
site is full of good stuff - look through it. Hope they don't get squicked out by the sudden influx of traffic.
More to follow, cheers.
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NEVER sign for/accept from the mailman a package that you suspect contains contraband!
Here's a side question. I was picking up a friend's mail while housesitting, different state, and she gets all mail at the UPS Store. They required a sign slip for all packages, even though she had the big box for her business. Is this standard at all UPS Stores or is it state-specific? It doesn't seem universal to all CRMAs but I've seen it at a couple of UPS Stores now.
Thyme, have you run across any examples of controlled deliveries being conducted without the person having to take the package directly from the "mailman"? I wouldn't think they would leave it on the doorstep and wait for you to pick it up and bring it inside, but I'd like to know if there's precedence for this.
Via a PMB/POB, yes, that's come up in the indictments/appeals, for substance and for CP alike (the other big controlled delivery area, although that's more online now); can start pulling in cites this weekend but I am on the wrong machine.
I recall "on the porch"type cases but not for certain, will have to look and add them on to the thread.
Someone else can speak to you about IRL experience.
I probably need a life that does not involve reading indictments and appeals, but it does have a horrible fascinating quality.
"Dominion and control" does not require handoff from the postal carrier, as I understand it. Important idea.
Consider this: if I leave you $10K on your porch and wander off reading my book, are you going to argue? No?
Right. You have dominion/control over it. It's Your Money now. Finders keepers = dominion and control.
By the way, that le.alcoda.org/publications/point_of_view
site is full of good stuff - look through it. Hope they don't get squicked out by the sudden influx of traffic.
More to follow, cheers.
dominion/control doesn't quite work like that. There has to be intent to relinquish ownership. Sending something in the mail is, as a sender, implicating an intent to relinquish ownership of that thing and pass it on to whomever it is designated. If I pick up something out of the garbage, that's considered dominion because the act of disposing of something indicates that the owner has relinquished ownership to anyone who wishes to utilize the thing.
There has to be intent, because if I forget my wallet at my buddy's house he can't just take my credit card and go buy himself a new motorcycle and think that's cool. That's how the practicalities of anarcho-syndicalism would work out (it's an utterly failed ideology that understands nothing of human nature or economics), but it is in complete violation of natural law without a demonstration of intent.
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Thank you. I sit corrected!
I have been meaning to get back to this for several hours, I woke up early thinking about correcting that (nerd that I am).
I should have been more precise, mea culpa.
Aren't there a bunch of attorneys wandering around here who can answer just these questions?
hxxp://www.legaloutsourcing.net/?p=963
Dominion and control are not established by mere proximity to the drug, or mere presence on the property where it is located or mere association with the person who does control the drug or the property.…Mere proximity to an illegal item or mere presence on the property where the item is located are not determining factors on whether a defendant has exercised dominion and control. Id. Although an ownership interest in property is a “significant factor” in the constructive possession analysis, an ownership interest alone is insufficient to establish dominion and control. Id. Rather, some additional evidence of dominion and control is required before a finding of constructive possession can be made beyond a reasonable doubt. … In order to establish constructive possession there should be a fact-specific inquiry that requires examining the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the jury could have reasonably inferred that the Client had dominion and control over the cocaine. United States v. Rodriguez, 392 F.3d 539, 548. It was held in Rodriguez that, in order to establish constructive possession, the government must demonstrate that defendant had the power and intention to exercise dominion and control over the controlled substance."
The CT jury instructions on the issue:
hxxp://www.jud.state.ct.us/ji/criminal/part2/2.11-1.htm
It looks like a squashy concept ("it depends" would be the flag for that.)
hxxp://www.legalmatch.com/law-library/article/constructive-possession-of-a-controlled-substance-those-arent-mine.html
Are Drugs in My House or Car Enough to Prove Constructive Possession?
It depends. Remember, close proximity to a controlled substance is never enough to prove constructive possession.
Exclusive Occupancy
If you are the sole occupant of the home or car where a controlled substance is found, your exclusive occupancy is often enough to evidence your ability to exercise control over the substance and your knowledge of its presence.
Non-Exclusive Occupancy
If you are not the sole occupant of the home or car, possession is slightly more difficult to prove. Where there is more than one occupant, there must be additional evidence, such as incriminating facts or circumstances, that shows both knowledge and control.
What are Incriminating Facts or Circumstances?
Every jurisdiction puts a different amount of weight on specific facts or circumstances, but these are a few examples of common links between a person and a controlled substance.
• The drugs are in plain view
• The drugs are with the person's personal items
• If in a car, they are found on the same side of the car or are in the person's immediate proximity
• If in a home, they are found in the person's bedroom
• Suspicious behavior during arrest
• Ownership of smoking devices or drug paraphernalia
• Ownership or control over the place where the substance is found
edited for bbcode/quote tags
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Great info in this thread. Thanks everyone.
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money orders. interesting. dryer sheets. clever. keeping records, even better.
They really should have just handled all of their business over texting, you can't wire tap that shit.
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"Officers obtained a court order to install a device in the package that would notify officials if the parcel was opened."
One more tactic to provide intent on the part of the recipient of this package. In this case, the arresting officers already had enough evidence. But I wonder what kind of plausible defense could be offered once that device in the package was activated.
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Has anyone seen examples of cases involving doormen? In most doorman buildings, when a package arrives (regardless of carrier) the doorman signs for it. The resident then will pick it up the next time they pass through the lobby. Sometimes buildings have an internal log book that the resident signs, but often they don't even log anything at all. I also wonder how legally useful an internal log book is, especially since I've seen some doormen who will just sign it for you.
It seems like an average anticipatory warrant would not apply in this scenario--could it be made contingent upon the resident picking up the package from the lobby? What if it sits for a day or two in the lobby first?
Also, in reference to the question of whether refusing to sign for/accept a package is sufficient protection: I would think no, at least not in the long term. It might be enough in the short term to prevent a search, but you can be assured they are not going to forget about you. At the very least it would require you be squeaky clean for a long time afterwards.
I would also guess that having something like that on your record, even without a conviction, makes it easier to get a warrant in the future. I think if I ended up in that situation I would clean out my house and remove anything incriminating, down to pirated mp3s on my computer. Who knows when they'll manage to dig something else up (phone/email record, a facebook message, anything at all) and come knocking again.
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Great Information guys..++ Thanks